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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines aspects of the market for childcare that affect female 
labour force participation and the use of childcare. The literature review 
indicates that previous research on the topic has not come to any clear conclusion 
on the impact of the price of childcare on the labour force participation and the 
use of childcare of mothers of pre-school age children. 
I examine the market for childcare in the UK in particular. In the UK, the 
common complaints made about childcare include the lack of availability and its 
high price. I study these two topics separately in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
respectively. The lack of childcare availability is confirmed in Chapter 2 with its 
finding that there is a large excess demand for childcare in the UK. 
A topic intertwined with the availability of childcare is the impact of the 
price of childcare. I estimate the price elasticities with respect to labour force 
participation and the use of formal childcare in Chapter 3. I find that a lower 
price for formal childcare would have a significant effect on the labour force 
participation and the use of childcare of mothers of pre-school age children. 
The results in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 may indicate that the market for 
childcare has failed in the UK. The unsatisfied demand for childcare and the 
high price for formal childcare that is available are likely to result from a lack of 
providers in the formal childcare market. Hence it may be necessary to examine 
whether a subsidy for the producers of childcare can increase the provision of 
formal childcare and decrease its price to bring the childcare market to an 
equilibrium. 
In Chapter 4, I examine whether the methods of childcare financing used in 
Finland could provide solutions to dealing with the UK childcare problem. In 
particular I examine the impact of a voucher for privately produced childcare that 
was adopted in Finland in an experimental setting. I find that, in a market with 
widely available, low cost public care, the voucher for privately produced 
childcare has a significant effect on the labour force participation and the use of 
childcare working through increased availability of private childcare and its 
lower price. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMICS OF CHILDCARE 
"Childcare has been neglected for 
too long. [... ] the quality Of care 
can be variable, there are not 
enough childcare places, and 
ordinary working parents often 
cannot afford to take them up. " 
Green Paper DJEE (1998) 
Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair's foreword to the Green Paper for the 
launch of the National Childcare Strategy identifies three areas of concern in the 
market for childcare in the UK - accessibility, affordability, and quality. The 
National Childcare Strategy, launched in May 1998 by the Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment, promises to raise the quality of formal childcare1, to 
make it more affordable, as well as to increase its provision (DfEE, 2001). 
The government promises should be welcome to the general public. The 
Independent (2.9.2001) reports that the "British childcare is worst in Europe". 
This claim is based on a study by the Daycare Trust that finds that the childcare 
provision in Britain comes close to the bottom among the 15 European Union 
member states using measures such as publicly funded nurseries and parental 
leave (Moss, 2001). The director of the Daycare Trust, Stephen Burke concludes 
that "compared to many of our European neighbours, where childcare is a key 
' From hereafter references to childcare in this thesis refer to formal childcare unless stated 
otherwise. Formal childcare includes the following types of care: nursery schools/classes, 
childminders, creches and playgroups (see Appendix 1 for detailed description of these different 
types of childcare). Furthermore, this thesis examines only pre-school childcare (the official 
school starting age in the UK is five). 
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part of economic and social structure that families take for granted, the UK still 
has a long way to go". 
Instead of heavy public investment in childcare witnessed in many of our 
European neighbours, Britain has relied on the markets to provide the childcare to 
the majority of its inhabitants. Public support is offered mainly for low-income 
and single-parent families. The support is monetary in nature with little 
investment in the childcare infrastructure. In theory markets should be able to 
deal with the demand for childcare by parents of young children. However, there 
may be reasons to argue that the childcare market in Britain fails and is not able to 
supply enough childcare places for a price that parents are willing or able to pay. 
The main objectives of childcare are to help parents gain employment while 
their children are young and enhance the educational and psychological 
development of children. In a large survey by La Valle et al. (2000), two-thirds 
of non-working mothers in the UK would prefer to work or study if they had 
access to good quality, convenient, reliable and affordable childcare. Thirty-one 
per cent of parents who used some form of childcare in the previous year admitted 
that there were times when they would have needed more childcare hours but 
were unable to obtain them. This proportion is larger for lone parents and those 
in the lowest income groups (La Valle et al., 2000). Nearly 3/4 of working parents 
said their childcare arrangements are not ideal, with most common reason being 
2 Throughout the thesis the terms employment and labour force participation are treated 
synonymously and refer to non-employment versus employment at any level of hours. 
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lack of local provision and inability to afford more adequate care (La Valle et al., 
2000)3. The Daycare Trust reports that 43% of parents want, as top priority, more 
affordable provision of childcare, 38% want increased availability of care; 
furthermore, 3/4 of parents say that working mothers cannot find enough 
affordable childcare4. 
Parents as consumers of childcare are facing conflicting sets of needs: those of 
their offspring regarding the quality of care and their own needs for convenience, 
affordability and reliability. Providers of childcare are better informed about the 
quality of the care they provide than the consumers of formal childcare. The 
information is therefore asymmetric, and the resulting unfair exchange is often an 
inefficient allocation of resources, or market failure (Akerlof, 1970). Mocan 
(2001) in a unique paper in the childcare literature demonstrates the existence of 
information asymmetry and adverse selection in the childcare market as well as 
provides some limited evidence for moral hazard. Therefore, since market 
competition does not seem to create childcare services of acceptable quality 
suitable to every family budget, government intervention may be desirable in 
order to increase total social welfare. 
Different aspects of the childcare market that may be associated with market 
failure include the quality of childcare, accessibility to childcare and its price. A 
2001 MORI survey commissioned by the Daycare Trust found that 70% of all 
3 The findings are based on a Baseline Survey of Parents' Demand for Childcare for children aged 
14 and under in England and Wales. 4 MORI surveys published by the Daycare Trust on 22.5.2000 and 30.04.2001. 
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surveyed parents said that the availability of well-trained experienced staff is the 
most important factor in high quality childcare provision (Childcare Trust, 
2001a). Less than a quarter of UK parents use formal childcare on a regular 
basis5, of whom 90% was happy with the quality of childcare (La Valle et al., 
2000). Hence for the remaining non-users of childcare the perceived quality of 
the childcare available may be a deterrent to use formal modes of childcare. The 
literature review on Chapter 1 reviews the previous literature on the quality of 
childcare. 
Discussions on the accessibility to childcare focus on the parents' ability to 
find appropriate childcare for their offspring. The problem is one of providing 
access to decent and affordable childcare to the pre-school age children in the 
UK. Holloway and Tamplin (2001) report that the total number of UK childcare 
places has increased by approximately 13% between 1995 and 1999 despite of a 
fall in the under 5 population. However, the number of childminder places, which 
may be the preferred choice of care for many parents because of the flexibility in 
hours and often a more convenient location, has actually declined in the more 
recent years. Ideally the childcare available to parents is conveniently located: 
49% of surveyed parents expressed the location being their top priority when 
choosing a childcare provider. Many have argued that there is a shortage of 
childcare options available to parents. A MORI survey commissioned by the 
Daycare Trust finds that 75% of parents of young children say that there is not 
5 Author's calculation from the Family Resources Survey 1994-1998. 
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enough childcare provision (Daycare Trust, 2001b). Advocates of this position 
also point to long waiting lists for formal childcare. The government estimates 
that there are only 830,000 registered childcare places for the 5.1 million under 8- 
year-old children in England, which gives a ratio of approximately one place to 
every six children. This potential shortage of childcare providers is likely to 
worsen with time as the participation of women to the labour market is due to 
increase by 1.5 million individuals between 1999 and 2010 (Wilson and Green, 
2001). Chapter 2 examines this issue of accessibility in the UK childcare market. 
A substantial part of the household disposable income is devoted to childcare 
expenses. According to the Daycare Trust "the typical cost of a nursery place [is] 
more than the average household spends a year on either housing or food". For a 
family with a pre-school age child living in London and where mother works and 
purchases childcare, up to a fifth of family income is devoted to childcare. As a 
result, concerns about the affordability of childcare are often focused on families 
in the lower end of the income distribution. Hence the UK government has 
introduced policies, such as the childcare element of the Working Tax Credit, to 
reduce the costs of childcare to parents of young children and hence enable 
employment. Chapter 3 examines the issue of affordability in the UK childcare 
market. 
The accessibility, quality, and affordability are related to the price of 
childcare. The problem of affordability comes from the large proportion of 
6 Unfortunately this information is not provided separately for pre-school age children. 
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family income being spent on childcare. Accessibility is a problem possibly 
because of the supply, or rather the lack of supply, or because families are 
unwilling to or unable to pay the market price for the level of quality of childcare 
they prefer. 
The price of childcare provides an important policy instrument with impacts 
on family disposable income, the quality of childcare and the accessibility to 
childcare. Furthermore, there exists possible macroeconomic impacts in the form 
of increased labour force participation and hence increased government tax 
revenue. 
My thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 provides a literature review on 
the different aspects of examining the childcare problem. Chapter 2 estimates the 
queue for formal childcare, while Chapter 3 examines the impact of price of 
childcare on its use and the labour force participation of mothers in England. 
Chapter 4 examines one possible solution to the UK childcare problem - the use 
of vouchers that was the chosen policy instrument in Finland - to increase the 
efficiency of childcare markets. 
In Chapter 2,1 examine the extent of excess demand for childcare in England 
in a paper co-authored with Arnaud Chevalier. Numerous reports mentioned 
earlier have indicated that parents of young children would like the availability of 
childcare to increase. However, no formal analysis has examined whether the 
childcare market is in a disequilibrium. The main difficulty in measuring the 
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excess demand for childcare results from the lack of data, which includes both the 
supply and the demand information of the UK childcare markets. Our method 
used in the analysis is unique to the childcare literature and the results indicate 
large excess demand for childcare, which is not filled by the childcare supply in 
the UK. 
Chapter 2 presents a model of partial observability applied to the childcare 
market in England. We simultaneously estimate the demand for childcare and the 
use of childcare and calculate the excess demand for childcare. The size of the 
queue for childcare is substantial: while a bit more than 70% of mothers would 
like to use childcare, only 57% are provided with a place for their child. 
Furthermore, it appears that a majority of mothers queuing for childcare are using 
informal care as a substitute, thus a policy increasing the supply of formal care 
may not have a large impact on the labour force participation of women, but 
mostly shift children from informal care to formal care. 
In Chapter 3,1 estimate the price responsiveness of mothers of pre-school 
children to formal childcare use and their labour force participation. The 
estimation results in Chapter 3 reveal that demand for childcare is relatively 
inelastic. The estimation method simultaneously accounts for non-random 
selection into use of formal childcare and employment using a double-selection 
model. This corrects for the fact that childcare expenditure is only observed for 
those individuals who use childcare and that the wages are only observed for 
employed individuals. Furthermore, the method takes into account the positive 
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correlation between the use of childcare and the probability of labour force 
participation. 
The estimated price elasticity of demand for childcare with respect to 
employment is -0.17 and with respect to the use of formal childcare is -0.09. 
These results allow the estimation of a simulation study to examine the extent to 
which childcare subsidies can affect the work behaviour of these mothers. The 
simulation results show that, if there were a universal zero-cost childcare 
available to the mothers in this sample, the model predicts that 76.1% would be 
employed while only 44.8% would be using formal childcare assuming that the 
supply of childcare is perfectly elastic7. Almost a third of the mothers are hence 
predicted to use informal care when they work even if childcare was provided free 
of charge. This has very important public policy implications. For example, if 
large government subsidies are given to childcare that lower the net costs of 
childcare to families, then more women are likely to enter the labour force. This 
would result in higher government expenditure, which would partly be offset in 
the form of increased tax revenue. 
The policy-relevance of the topic in Chapter 3 is closely related to recent 
government initiatives regarding in-work subsidies. The Working Tax Credit 
(WTC) includes a childcare element, which helps low-income, working 
7 The actual figures for labour force participation and the use of childcare are 50.5% and 27.4% 
respectively and the baseline simulation figures are 50.7% and 28.1% respectively. 
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households with the costs of registered or approved childcare8. However, the 
decision to become employed depends on the characteristics of the individual 
such as their wage rate as well as the price of childcare. Therefore, the childcare 
element of the WTC may or may not have the effect desired by the policy makers. 
This claim is supported by a finding by Kasparova et al. (2003), who find that a 
disproportionate share of subsidised childcare benefits the financially better off 
households. This is mainly due to the fact that households living on lower 
incomes are more likely to rely on informal childcare provision, which is not 
eligible for a subsidy. 
A possible answer for the UK childcare problem is to examine how other 
countries have dealt with their childcare issues. Chapter 4 examines in closer 
detail the childcare market in Finland. 
Finland has invested in a large public provision of childcare since the early 
1970's. In the mid 1990's, Finland spent approximately 1% of the GDP on 
childcare9. This compares to a spending of about 0.01% of GDP for the UK 
(Rake, 2000)10. Virtually no complaints are voiced in Finland regarding the price, 
8 Working Tax Credit (WTC) tops up the pay of low paid workers. It is made up of a basic 
element, plus extra amounts depending on age, hours worked, amount of other income and 
disability status. Anyone with responsibility for children who qualifies for Working Tax Credit 
will also qualify for the Child Tax Credit. Child Tax Credit (and the childcare element of WTC) is 
paid directly by the Inland Revenue to the person who is mainly responsible for looking after the 
children, not through the pay cheque. Until April 2003, this childcare element was a part of the 
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) but has since been subsumed into the Working Tax Credit 
(WTC). 
9 Approximately 1% of the Finnish GDP in the mid 1990's was spent on childcare alone with the 
fees paid by the consumers covering only about 15% of the total cost. 10 In 1999, the OECD countries spent an average of 0.7% of GDP on formal childcare (Jaumotte, 
2003). 
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the availability or the quality of the public childcare. However, the high 
government expenditure on childcare has faced cut-backs in the early to mid 90's 
political environment and measures have been taken to reduce the expenditure 
and increase the efficiency of childcare markets. 
Increasingly the public provision of childcare is being complemented with 
private providers to increase the efficiency of the markets. In the mid 1990's, 
Finland experimented with a move of public intervention from the supply side of 
the childcare market financing to demand side vouchers. Supply subsidies are 
funds distributed directly to the providers of the childcare services. These help 
keep down the costs of childcare centres to the family. Demand subsidies are 
funds distributed to consumers, either directly through the use of vouchers or cash 
grants or indirectly through the tax system. The Finnish experiment is a mixture 
of supply and demand subsidies; the families choose the childcare provider and 
the state then reimburses the facility directly. The research conducted in Chapter 
4 uses a large-scale experiment to estimate the effect of vouchers for childcare on 
the mothers' labour force participation and the use of childcare in Finland. 
Since the voucher for private childcare was implemented in only parts of the 
country, it allows the use of common methodologies used in empirical research 
for examining experimental set-ups. In my analysis, I apply both the difference- 
in-differences (DD) approach and the matching method. The DD method 
compares the difference in average behaviour before and after the reform for the 
group receiving the private childcare voucher with the before and after contrast 
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for the control group who did not participate in the experiment. Since the Finnish 
childcare voucher experiment was not randomised at the municipality level, I also 
estimate the impact of the voucher using the matching method. The non- 
randomisation at the municipality level may be a cause for concern if, on average, 
the characteristics of individuals or the municipalities themselves differ 
significantly between the treatment and the control region. Matching is based on 
selecting observable characteristics of individuals, who exhibit no systematic 
difference in their reaction to the policy reform. Therefore matching individuals 
in the experiment region to the individuals in the control regions based on these 
observable characteristics allows the calculation of the impact of the reform. 
The two different methodologies adopted yield very different results. In 
general, the difference-in-differences results give insignificant impact of the 
voucher experiment on both labour force participation and the use of childcare. 
However, the crucial assumptions underlying the estimation fail in many cases. 
Therefore, the matching estimation may be a better strategy to estimate the impact 
of the experiment on behavioural outcomes of interest. 
Chapter 4 concludes that in a market that is already providing high-quality, 
low-cost public childcare, a voucher for private childcare has a significant, 
positive effect on the use of formal childcare, especially in areas that suffer from 
excess demand for childcare places. The use of formal childcare increased by 
between 3 and 6 percentage points in the whole country while in areas of excess 
demand the increase was approximately 14 percentage points. Labour force 
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participation of mothers of older pre-school age children increased by over 5 
percentage points in areas of excess demand. 
Three voucher types were tested during the experiment and the results are 
provided for a voucher that requires the parents to work or study, a lump-sum 
voucher, and a means-tested voucher. These results are mixed and as the sample 
size gets smaller, better data would help clarify them. 
None of the estimates of the private childcare voucher experiment examined 
in Chapter 4 are found to be significant for the mothers of 0-2 year old children. 
This may be due to the differences in the budget constraint of parents of the 
younger pre-school age children than those of older pre-school age children or 
differences in their preferences. 
In the concluding chapter, I summarise my findings and attempt to shed light 
on the various issues regarding the availability of childcare and the impact of its 
price on the use of childcare and the labour force participation of mothers of 
young children. This collection of papers examines two very different types of 
childcare systems- UK with its mix of private and public provision and Finland 
with a large public childcare sector. While the UK experience may be 
overshadowed by the problems of excess demand and low quality, the Finnish 
experience prior to the private childcare voucher experiment suffers from high 
costs of the public provision to the taxpayers and inefficiencies in the allocation 
of childcare slots. Local municipalities should ideally be able to adjust the supply 
22 
of childcare slots to the needs of working parents while maintaining a high level 
of quality of childcare and its flexibility to the consumers. As discussed in the 
concluding chapter, a quasi-market, or a mixture of public and private provision, 
as experimented with in Finland may provide a partial solution to many of the 
problems faced in current UK childcare markets. 
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CHAPTER ONE: PREVIOUS CHILDCARE LITERATURE 
1.1 Introduction 
Labour economists usually emphasise that young children impose high time 
costs increasing the opportunity cost of working for the main caretaker of the 
children, usually the mother. This in turn raises the reservation wage of the 
mother. The increase in the reservation wages is at least partly due to the 
childcare costs that would be incurred if the women had participated in the labour 
force, hence lowering the participation probability. 
The labour force participation of women varies considerably between 
countries. It can be noticed that often countries with large public provision of 
childcare have a high proportion of women in the labour force (for other 
determinants of female labour force participation see, for example, Jaumotte, 
2003). A good example of this pattern is provided by the Nordic countries. On 
the other hand, countries that rely less on public subsidies for childcare have in 
general lower female labour force participation rates. 
Graph 1.1 shows past labour force participation rates for the UK, US and 
Finland. All countries exhibit remarkable growth in the participation rates until 
the early 1990's. The early 1990's economic slowdown decreased the rate of 
growth in the UK and the US. The combined effect of the economic recession 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union decreased the level of female employment 
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by approximately five percentage points in the early 1990's in Finland 
(Vartiainen, 1998). 
Graph 1.1: Labour force participation rates for selected countries 
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There are a variety of factors that are responsible for the increases in female 
labour force participation over the past 30 years. Rising wage rates, due to 
increased investment in human capital as well as technological advances, have 
facilitated female entry into the labour force. Also, other reasons include the 
widespread use of the contraceptive pill (and hence reduced fertility), the rising 
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divorce rates, and the tremendous growth in the service sector jobs relative to the 
goods sector as well as a lower degree of product market regulation. 
The growth in the childcare industry has corresponded to the rise in the 
female labour force participation rate. However, in countries where the childcare 
system is left to be developed on the market, for example, the UK and the US 
(see, for example, Blau, 2001 or Jaumotte, 2003), there seems to be excess 
demand for childcare services which is widely reported in the media. 
Graph 1.2: Labour force participation in UK according to the level of fertility 
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The large difference in the labour force participation rates of mothers of 
young children and other women in the UK is depicted in Graph 1.2. This 
difference can be due to a choice made by the mothers of young children or to a 
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constraint posed by the presence of young children. Survey evidence quoted in 
the introductory chapter to this thesis indicates that a major explanatory factor 
may be the constraint that the presence of children poses for women's work 
decisions. A substantial proportion of British mothers feel constrained in their 
employment decisions because of the need to care for their pre-school age 
children: Vs of non-working mothers would like a regular paid employment but 
are prevented from working by having to look after their children; 18% of 
mothers of pre-school age children who work part-time say they would like to 
work longer hours but are prevented from doing it due to child rearing 
responsibilities; 11% of mothers of pre-school age children who work part-time 
say they would work more hours if suitable childcare were available. Mothers of 
younger pre-school age children are less likely than mothers of older pre-school 
age children to report that they feel constrained in their labour force participation 
decision or increased working hours (Paull and Taylor, 2002). 
It is unclear whether the mothers' reported preferences regarding their 
working behaviour and complaints about the lack of appropriate childcare 
provision are a sign of a market failure in the childcare sector. A market failure 
occurs when the supply of a commodity or a service is not at a level that would be 
optimal from the society's point of view. The difficulty of saying what is the 
socially optimal amount of childcare provision prevents us from concluding 
whether the childcare market fails in any fundamental aspect. In any case the 
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governments in the US and the UK have decided not to directly intervene in the 
childcare market. 
Understanding the direct and indirect effects of children on labour supply is 
critical to a number of policy debates. Browning (1992) provides a 
comprehensive literature review on the effects of children on household economic 
behaviour. His conclusions include the finding that younger children are 
associated with lower labour supply by the mother. Furthermore, Voicu and 
Buddelmeyer (2003) find that the indirect effect or the time spent out of the 
labour force far outweighs the direct effect (i. e. reduced employment probability 
when children are present) of children on women's labour force participation 
dynamics when looking at the probability of a mother of a young child working 
full-time. 
The time spent out of the labour force may provide one explanation for the 
commonly found family wage gap or the pay differential between women with 
children and childless women. Research on the family wage gap has been 
conducted by, for example, Harkness and Waldfogel (1999) and Viitanen (2004) 
for the UK. Harkness and Waldfogel (1999) find that among a sample of seven 
countries, UK displays the largest wage penalties to children, which is partly due 
to the higher propensity for UK mothers to be employed in low-paid part-time 
jobs. Career interruptions and the greater incidence of part-time employment due 
to childcare responsibilities may be reduced by a policy that makes childcare 
cheaper and more widely available to parents hence leading to a reduction in the 
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wage gap between women with children and childless women (for discussion, see 
also Jaumotte, 2003). The effectiveness of such a policy depends on how 
responsive the labour force participation of mothers is to the price of childcare. 
The socially optimal strategy for the governments may be to boost the 
childcare industry because of the potential impact for reducing inequalities that 
result from the high costs of raising children (see, for example, Lissenburgh, 2000 
for UK evidence) or raising the overall productivity of the economy. Bloom and 
Steen (1990) examine the economic impact of increased social investment in the 
childcare industry and find that expanding the childcare industry will help 
employers cope with a range of personnel problems they face in a labour shortage 
economy. Expanding the childcare industry will also enhance the productivity of 
workers via reduced absenteeism and reduced job related stress in their study. 
This thesis concentrates on the aspect that childcare facilitates the 
employment of mothers of young children. Hence the next section presents an 
economic model of labour force participation and how the childcare dimension 
can be incorporated within this basic framework. I also describe basic models of 
demand, supply and price determination and how government intervention such 
as subsidies or vouchers would affect the equilibrium. 
Section 1.4 examines the demand side of the childcare market while section 
1.5 analyses the supply side of the market. Appendices 1 and 2 describe the 
childcare markets in the UK and in Finland respectively. Section 1.6 summarises 
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the studies that try to estimate the childcare market equilibrium. Section 1.7 
summarises the impact of quality on child development and the determinants of 
childcare quality. Section 1.8 tries to shed light on why there are such large 
differences among western economies in their approach to public policy towards 
childcare. 
1.2 Economic model of childcare and labour force participation 
The economic model underlying the empirical work in this thesis is a basic 
static labour supply model adapted to account for the presence of children. This 
model is set within the wider framework of "new household economics" with its 
gendered divisions of labour (Becker, 1981,1996). Becker theorises that the 
gendered division of labour results in within households specialisation in order to 
maximise the returns to human capital. This joint production function usually 
leads men to work on the labour market and women to specialise in household 
production and childcare. The research in this thesis focuses on married women's 
participation decision based on an individual choice model treating the husband's 
participation as exogenous". As the services for childcare can be bought outside 
the household, the household makes cost-benefit decisions regarding the gendered 
division of labour taking into account the availability and cost of childcare, which 
is compared to mother's potential income from paid work. 
11 The collective model of household labour supply decisions (see, for example, Chiappori et al., 
2002) may be a more appropriate approach to this problem, however, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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The basic model is augmented with the childcare dimension to examine the 
joint decision regarding the mother's labour force participation and their use of 
formal childcare. Theory suggests two alternative approaches to understanding 
the impact of childcare on women's employment, first, it affects the value women 
place on their time at home (Blau and Ferber, 1992) and, second, the cost of 
childcare can be viewed as a tax levied on mother's wages so that higher-priced 
care would have the same effect as lower net wages (Connelly, 1992 and 
Michalopoulos et al, 1992). Both approaches predict that a lower price of 
childcare is associated with increases in the labour force participation 
probabilities of mothers of young children. 
There are two different approached to modelling childcare. The first one 
involves childcare costs in the budget constraint. The underlying assumptions in 
this approach include that maternal care and formal childcare are perfect 
substitutes and that there is a fixed link between the hours of work and the hours 
of childcare utilised. The second approach, which is adopted in this thesis, 
assumes that childcare arrangements have an effect on the mother's utility. 
Formal childcare forms part of the production function for childcare quality, 
which in turn enters the utility function. The subsequent analysis rests on the 
assumption of imperfect substitutability of maternal care and formal childcare in 
the production of childcare quality as well as the omission of a direct link 
between working hours of the mother and the hours of formal childcare used. 
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Entering the childcare arrangements in the utility function affects the budget 
constraint and hence the reservation wage of the mother. 
The following theoretical model is based on the analytical framework outlined 
in Connelly (1992). The model assumes that the mother is married or cohabiting 
with the partner present in the household and that there exists at least one pre- 
school age child. In a typical labour supply model, mothers maximise their utility 
subject to a budget constraint and a time constraint. The utility function can be 
formalised as follows 
U=U(G, Q, L) (1.1) 
where G represents consumption goods, L is the mother's leisure and Q is the 
quality of childcare. The labour force participation of the father is assumed 
predetermined and hence exogenous. The quality of childcare depends positively 
on the amount of time spent in maternal care, Cm, and the amount of time spent in 
formal, non-maternal childcare arrangements, G. The average total quality of 
care over N children in the household can be written as 
Q=QlCm+Q2Cn (1.2) 
where Qj and Q2 represent the productivity measures of, respectively, maternal 
and non-maternal childcare, and N is taken as exogenous. According to this 
approach, the families do not have direct, observable preferences for formal or for 
informal childcare. 
32 
The mother's maximisation problem is subject to three constraints. The 
budget constraint can be formalised as follows 
G+PCn=WH+Y (1.3) 
where P is the hourly cost of formal childcare, tW is the wage rate of the mother, 
H is the number of hours worked by the mother and Y is the household income 
excluding mother's own earnings. 
Time constraints are imposed both on the mother and the children such as 
H+ Cm +L =1 (1.4) 
Cm + Cn =1 (1.5) 
where the mother allocates her time between hours worked in the labour market, 
leisure and childcare, while the child's time is divided between care at home and 
formal childcare arrangements. For a given set of preferences, family and 
taxation policies, for example tax credits for childcare, affect the mother's budget 
constraint while, for example, flexible working arrangements, affect her time 
constraint. Government policy can therefore affect women's participation 
probabilities. 
Maximising the mother's utility function subject to the constraints yields a 
prediction that the mother will participate in the labour market according to 
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Ü` 
=W=UQ(Ql-Qz)+P (1.6) 
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where the marginal rate of substitution between market goods and leisure equals 
the wage, which equals the net benefit of maternal childcare. The model predicts 
that women participating in the labour market equate the market wage to her 
reservation wage. 
A further prediction of the model is that the mother will substitute between 
formal and maternal childcare until her wage rate equals the net benefit of 
maternal childcare. Hence an increase in the wage rate of the mother is expected 
to increase the probability of labour force participation, while an increase in the 
price of childcare is expected to lower the probability of labour force 
participation. This approach relies on the assumption of a functioning market 
system where the parents' willingness to pay determines the amount of childcare 
they purchase. 
The predictions of the theoretical model outlined above provide a basis for an 
empirical choice model. The value of the time spent outside of the labour force, 
the reservation wage, depends on non-working income and domestic 
commitments, for example, the presence of children in the household. Once the 
anticipated income exceeds the reservation wage, W*, the individual will enter the 
labour market. Formally: 
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J LFP=1 if W* <W-P LFP =0 otherwise (1.7) 
Hence the participation probability is lowered due to the increased level of the 
mother's reservation wage. However, the increase in P has an ambiguous effect 
on hours worked and childcare used if the mother stays employed. On one hand, 
work is financially less rewarding and higher P induces a substitution of work 
hours with leisure hours. On the other hand, higher P reduces net income and she 
may want to work more hours to make up the loss. Although the theoretical 
model leaves open whether the income or the substitution effect is dominant, it is 
generally believed that higher childcare costs reduce female labour force 
participation. 
The model can be written as in Equation (1.2), where USE denotes the 
dichotomous choice for the use of formal childcare and LFP denotes the labour 
force participation of the mother. USE and LFP are determined simultaneously. 
The identification of the model is obtained by using separate identifying variables 
in each equation. Formally: 
JUSE=a1+/311W+ß21P+y1X+e1 
LFP=a2+ß 
12 
W+ß 
22 
P+ y2X+ 62 
where W is the wage rate, P is the price of childcare and X denotes individual, 
household and regional characteristics. The price is a function of childcare 
quality, however, this model ignores the childcare quality aspects and assumes 
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they are unobservable, but uniform (see Blau, 2001 for extensive discussion on 
the impacts of childcare quality when the quality is observable). This simple 
model also assumes that the supply of childcare is fixed in the short-run. This 
allows the use of basic supply and demand analysis. 
The labour supply of mothers is dependent upon her gaining greater utility 
from working in the labour market that outside the labour market. Utility derived 
from working is a function of personal, market, and policy factors (see, for 
example, Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986 for a review). Variables such as the 
number and ages of children in the household and the presence of alternative, 
informal caregivers in the household affect the cost of childcare by providing an 
informal, low-cost alternative to formal childcare (see Heckman, 1974 for further 
details) and hence the probability of labour force participation. Furthermore, any 
government policy that affects the cost of childcare is expected to affect the 
labour force participation of mothers of pre-school age children. 
The model suggests the following explanatory variables: wage rate, non-wage 
income, the price of childcare, and the availability of informal care. The model 
also draws attention to the fact that the price of childcare is a choice variable since 
it depends on the quality of purchased childcare chosen by the family. The 
importance of allowing for non-linearities in the price of childcare with respect to 
the quantity of childcare purchased is highlighted in previous research by, for 
example, Ribar (1995) and Duncan et al. (2001a). Ribar (1995) finds that 
childcare expenditures increase with hours of work but at a decreasing rate. 
36 
A higher wage rate (which depends on individual characteristics such as the 
level of education) is generally considered to encourage employment as it raises 
the hourly return to working, while higher partner's income or non-labour income 
reduce the likelihood of working by reducing the family's need for additional 
income. 
The standard labour supply model has to be augmented with other variables 
when incorporating the childcare dimension into the model. These include, for 
example, factors influencing the amount of formal childcare needed, the 
availability of formal and informal childcare, the ability to afford the formal care, 
and the parents' and the children's preferences and tastes. Both the higher cost of 
childcare and the increase in the number of children requiring childcare decreases 
the probability of using formal childcare by increasing the reservation wage of the 
mother. Mothers can capture economies of scale if they stay at home but not if 
they rely on childcare (unless it is cheaper for additional siblings to be in the same 
formal childcare setting). 
The availability of informal (zero-cost) childcare, such as other adults in the 
household or the neighbourhood (which is proxied by the amount of time lived in 
the current accommodation), or older children in the households, is expected to 
have a negative effect on the use of formal childcare. Higher potential earnings of 
the mother can be expected to have a positive effect on the use of formal 
childcare, while the impact of the partner's earnings on the decision to use formal 
childcare may be ambiguous due to the joint nature of the decisions to become 
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employed and to use formal childcare and the relative strengths of the income and 
substitution effects12. Important non-observed components of the decision to 
become employed or to use formal childcare include tastes and preferences, 
which can be proxied by age, ethnicity, and the level of education of the mother. 
Also, partner's years of education, hours of work, or earnings may affect these 
decisions due to, respectively, assortative mating, gendered division of labour 
within the household, or an income effect. 
The estimation of the market equilibrium allows the calculation of elasticities. 
The main focus of research on childcare by economists has been to estimate the 
effects of the cost of childcare on the demand for childcare and the supply of 
labour by mothers of young children. This is an important issue because despite 
the rapid growth in labour force participation of mothers in recent years it is 
possible that some mothers remain out of the labour force partly as a result of 
high childcare costs. Increases in government subsidies to childcare might be 
expected to induce many women to enter labour force, however, this depends on 
the supply side of the childcare market as well as the demand side. If the supply 
of childcare is relatively inelastic, as found by Chevalier and Viitanen (2002), 
then increased subsidies may simply drive up costs rather than expand supply. 
12 Mincer (1974) states that wife's potential income is more important than household or 
husband's income or in other words the substitution/wage effect predominates the 
income/household income effect. 
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1.3 Supply of childcare 
Section 1.3.1 examines the informal childcare sector while section 1.3.2 sheds 
light on the formal sector of the childcare market mainly in terms of the supply of 
childcare labour. 
1.3.1 Informal care providers 
Informal childcare is most often provided by relatives such as partners, 
parents, and parents-in-laws. In 1994 half of British working mothers with 
children less than four years old used informal care for their offspring (Finlayson 
et al., 1996). Holloway and Tamplin (2001) estimate that the valuation of 
informal, daytime care for British children under 8 years old as a percentage of 
GDP ranges from 4 to 6 per cent between 1995 and 1999. However, in countries 
such as Finland with a large public childcare sector, the concept of informal 
childcare use for working mothers is virtually unknown. 
Informal childcare provision has not received a lot of attention in the British 
research community. Instead the majority of previous literature on informal 
childcare providers has been conducted for the US. Brandon (1995) examines 
kin-provided childcare in the US and concludes that kin-provided childcare is an 
in-kind transfer, however, the choice to use kin-provided childcare is also affected 
by economic factors. He argues that policies aimed at reducing the cost of 
childcare may have unintended effects on the private provision of childcare 
within the families. For example, the kin who provided childcare in return for 
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goods and services may suffer losses if childcare subsidies lead mothers to 
substitute market-provided childcare for their care. Thus in-kind transfer 
behaviour within families can weaken or reinforce the effectiveness of childcare 
policies. 
1.3.2 Formal childcare providers 
Since the last 30 years have witnessed such a tremendous growth in demand 
for childcare, it is surprising that the wages of childcare workers have grown 
barely above the rate of inflation (see, Mocan and Viola, 1997 for further details). 
Since a large increase in the demand for childcare has not driven up the wages of 
childcare workers, this suggests that the supply of childcare labour is highly 
elastic. In other words, as demand grows, the quantity of labour supplied expands 
along with it dampening the tendency for the demand increase to drive up wages. 
Estimates for the elasticity of supply of labour to childcare for the US range 
from 1.2 to 1.9 (Blau, 1993) or 1.15 (Blau, 2001) i. e. a 10% increase in the wage 
rate of childcare workers, holding constant the wage rate in alternative 
occupations, would increase the total number of childcare hours worked by 11.5% 
accounting for both new entrants to the sector and increased hours by workers 
already in the childcare sector. These parameter estimates could explain why 
childcare workers' wages tend to remain unchanged in real terms despite rapid 
growth in the demand for childcare. 
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Another possible reason for the childcare workers wages not to have risen 
faster is that the providers have hired less-qualified staff. Walker (1992) finds 
that childminders in the US receive no returns to experience or to education. 
Hence, well-educated individuals have no monetary incentive to enter the 
profession and low-educated providers have no incentive to upgrade their skills. 
The increased educational requirements for the childcare profession, which are 
desirable to increase some aspects of the quality of care (see, for example, Currie 
and Hotz, 2001), may therefore have serious effects on the supply of formal 
childcare. 
Government subsidies for formal childcare and its regulation in the form of, 
for example, child-staff ratios may have an impact on the supply of childcare 
labour. However, Blau (1992) finds that in the US the childcare workers wages 
are generally unaffected by government subsidies and regulations, which suggests 
that the supply of childcare labour is relatively elastic. 
Blau (2001) concludes that, for the US, the quantity and quality of childcare 
are quite responsive to the price of childcare. Also as the childcare price rises, 
childcare providers increase the quality of care they provide with the price 
elasticity of quality supply of 0.66 in the for-profit sector and 0.48 in the non- 
profit sector. 
One potential explanation for the highly elastic supply of childcare labour 
may be the intrinsic value of work. Mocan and Tekin (2000) find evidence of 
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labour donation hypothesis in the childcare sector. In other words, childcare 
workers often express that their work is important from the society's point of 
view and that someone has to do it, even for a lower pay. However, the childcare 
sector suffers from a high rate of employee turnover, which may provide at least a 
partial explanation for the previously found elasticity figures (see Kimmel and 
Connelly, 2003 for US evidence). 
In the UK, similar issues are prevalent. In the survey of childcare students 
and workers, over 90% of the students and workers are committed to working in 
the childcare industry and report a high satisfaction with childcare work 
(Cameron et al., 2001)13. However, the industry suffers from a high turnover: 1/3 
of nursery schools had at least one vacancy and '/a of nurseries had at least one 
member of staff leaving in last 12 months prior to the survey. Fourteen percent of 
the surveyed workers were considering leaving their work shortly because of the 
poor pay, however, most commonly quoted reason for staying on the childcare 
occupation is the satisfaction the work brings and commitment to it. However, 
only 48% of the surveyed childcare staff pictured themselves working in the 
childcare industry in five years time (Cameron et al., 2001). 
The UK government funding for early years services has a needs component 
but none of it has been earmarked for childcare provision. Hence government 
13 The survey examines the characteristics of UK childcare workers and finds that the average age 
of a UK childcare worker is 32 with 1/3 being less than 26,1/2 have their own child and just over a 
half have a teaching, nursing or vocational qualification. Two-thirds of the childcare workers 
work full-time and the mean annual salary before tax was £13,400 for heads of childcare centres 
and £7,700 for others. 
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policy on its own cannot explain the variation in the availability of childcare 
places. However, in the UK, there is a general trend for more deprived local 
authorities to have more day nursery places, for example, in the 1990's the most 
deprived quartile enjoyed nearly three times the number of total nursery places 
compared to the least deprived quartile. However, this is opposite for playgroup 
provision and childminders. Central government provides guidance on which 
groups (for example, according to the level of deprivation) should be given 
priority when allocating local authority day nursery places. 
Interestingly, in the UK, there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between the proportion of women councillors in the local authority and the 
overall local authority provision of childcare between 1984 and 1994 (Randall 
and Fisher, 1999). Mean rate of total childcare provision is the highest in 
Conservative controlled local authorities but median rate is highest in local 
authorities with Liberal Democrat majority control. However, the relevance of 
political party for rates of public day care provision has declined over the last two 
decades. 
All the findings on the labour supply of childcare workers indicate that, both 
in the US and the UK, there exists a potentially large and committed labour force. 
However, for many potential childcare workers the low wage rate acts as a 
disincentive to continue to work in the childcare sector, particularly after 
becoming mothers themselves. 
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1.4 Demand for childcare and the labour supply of mothers 
This section summarises the main findings of empirical studies of consumer 
behaviour in the childcare and the labour market. The theoretical section 1.2 
explained that the labour force participation of mothers is closely related to the 
demand for childcare; therefore these two issues are analysed together in this 
section. The price of childcare and the wages are the key variables through which 
government policy attempts to influence consumer behaviour in the form of, for 
example, childcare subsidies or tax credits. Hence the predictions of these models 
are of direct policy interest. 
The simple economic model in section 1.2 makes predictions of the effects of 
the price of childcare and income on the use of formal childcare and mother's 
labour force participation. To recap, we would expect the price of childcare to 
reduce the likelihood of using formal childcare but to have an ambiguous effect 
on labour force participation. Appendix 3 includes a table summarising some of 
the previous studies that estimate the childcare price elasticities with respect to 
the use of formal childcare and the labour supply of the mothers of pre-school age 
children. 
Appendix 3 shows that out of the 27 previous studies only Del Boca et al. 
(2003) for Italy find no significant effect of the price of childcare on the use of 
childcare; the rest of the studies find the expected negative impact of the price of 
childcare on the probability of its use. The majority of the previous studies also 
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find that the higher price of childcare reduces the labour supply of the mothers of 
young children. Only four separate studies (Blau and Robins, 1991 and Hotz and 
Kilburn, 1991 for the US; Chone et al., 2003 for France; Del Boca et al., 2003 for 
Italy) find no significant effect of the price of childcare on the labour force 
participation probability of the mother. Furthermore, Connelly (1989) finds a 
significant impact for single mothers only. 
Hence the majority of studies find that a higher cost of childcare both reduces 
the likelihood of employment as well as the probability of using formal, paid 
childcare. Some of the insignificant results that are found especially for Europe 
could reflect the cultural differences with respect to the attitudes toward female 
employment and the care of young children in a formal setting. Furthermore, 
European countries, in general, experience much more government intervention 
in the childcare market than the US for example. 
Although most of the studies find consensus on the sign of the effect, the 
magnitude of the impact of the price of childcare varies widely among the 
existing childcare literature. The wide range in the empirical results is not 
surprising given the vast differences that exist with respect to modelling and 
estimation issues. First, many papers focus solely on either the employment 
decision or the use for childcare decision. Second, large differences exist in the 
approach to the sample selection correction and especially the choice of 
identifying variables in the supporting childcare price equations. Furthermore, 
small but a growing number of studies utilise a more structural approach to 
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estimate these issues (see, for example, Chone et al., 2003 for France or 
Wrohlich, 2004 for Germany). 
A range of studies concentrates on the effect of the price of formal childcare 
on the labour supply decisions of mothers of young children. Appendix 3 
indicates that the previous literature on the joint estimation of labour supply and 
use of formal childcare utilises numerous different estimation strategies. 
Most studies estimate a labour supply equation with expected childcare costs 
as an explanatory variable. Heckman's (1974) pioneering article reminds us that 
many working mothers use informal modes of childcare such as care by relatives 
for low or zero cost. Hence the decision to enter the labour market is not 
automatically a decision to use formal childcare but instead it depends on the 
relative weight of the cost and quality of formal childcare versus the cost and 
quality of informal care. Heckman concludes that the quality-adjusted price of 
childcare has a significant positive effect on the marginal rate of substitution 
hence decreasing mothers' labour supply. Studies by, for example, Connelly 
(1990,1992), Hotz and Kilbum (1991), Kimmel (1995,1998), Powell (1997, 
1998) and Averett et al. (1997) have confirmed the significant negative 
relationship between female labour force participation and the price of childcare. 
In general, the empirical method within this group of studies involves an 
estimation of an employment equation, which includes selectivity-corrected, 
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predicted childcare prices and wages 14. The price elasticity of demand for 
childcare with respect to employment ranges from -0.20 to -0.78 in studies by, 
respectively, Connelly (1992) and Averett et al. (1997) or -0.92 by Kimmel 
(1998). In other words, decreasing the market price by 10% would lead to an 
increased likelihood of employment for mothers of pre-school age children 
varying between 2% and 9.2%. Higher childcare costs hence seem to have a 
significant negative employment effect for mothers of pre-school age children. 
Another group of studies estimates the joint decision of mothers of pre-school 
age children to engage in paid employment and to purchase formal childcare. The 
research by Blau and Robins (1988,1991), Michalopoulos et al (1992), Ribar 
(1992,1995), Powell (2002), and Cleveland et al. (1996) highlight the interrelated 
nature of the employment decision and the decision to use formal childcare. The 
childcare price elasticity for married women found by these studies ranges from - 
0.02 by Ribar (1995) to -0.39 by Cleveland et al (1996) and -0.74 by Ribar 
(1992). In other words, decreasing the market price by 10% would lead up to a 
7.4 percent increase in the probability of mothers of pre-school age children 
engaging in paid employment. These papers also find that higher childcare costs 
significantly reduce the likelihood of using formal, paid childcare 15. Based on all 
the previous studies it appears that accounting for the joint labour force 
participation-use of childcare decision the elasticities are reduced. 
14 Several studies use measures of labour supply with indirect proxies (e. g. older children in the household, relatives in household) for the cost of childcare, see, for example, Blau and Robins (1988,1989,1991) who use the average childcare costs in the community. ' The mode of childcare chosen is also found to depend on the age of the child (Leibowitz et al. (1988,1992) and Lehrer (1983,1989)) and the presence and number of siblings (Lehrer (1989)). 
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Duncan et al. (2001), for the UK, find that the price of childcare has a 
negative impact on the decision of a sample of working mothers to use formal 
paid childcare and on the hours of formal care used. The elasticities for the 
former range from -0.26 to -0.45 for pre-school age children using different 
measures of the price of childcare. The elasticity with respect to the hours of 
formal care used is over -0.20 without the controls for hours and quality, 
however, once the unit values are corrected for the choice of hours and quality, 
the elasticity estimates become insignificant. Duncan et al. (2001) stresses the 
importance of controlling for quality effects and non-linearities in the price of 
childcare since the failure to do this may generate significant overestimates of the 
price elasticities. Their evidence suggests that the price of childcare is negatively 
related to quality. Therefore, subsidies aimed at lowering the price of formal 
childcare may increase childcare expenditures by increasing the quantity 
demanded and raising the level of quality purchased. 
On average, the price elasticity of demand for childcare with respect to 
employment is estimated to be higher in absolute terms in the North American 
studies compared to the rest of the world. Furthermore, the US studies overall 
estimate American mothers' employment to be slightly more responsive to the 
price of childcare compared to the Canadian mothers. Similar differences are 
found between the North American studies and those of the rest of the world 
regarding the childcare price responsiveness with respect to the use of formal 
childcare. These results may reflect both institutional and cultural differences in 
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female labour supply behaviour and, in particular, the differences in childcare 
provision. In general, the American childcare system is based more on the ideals 
of a free market economy with few subsidies or public provision, whereas 
especially in Europe government intervenes in the childcare market more 
systematically (for further discussion, see for example Blau, 2003). The lack of 
evidence for the Nordic countries, where low-cost, public childcare is prevalent, 
prevents one from further examining this hypothesis. 
In general, single mothers are found to exhibit less responsiveness than 
married mothers in their labour force participation due to childcare prices (Berger 
and Black, 1992 and Kimmel, 1998). An exception to this common finding is 
that of Connelly and Kimmel (2000) who conclude that employment elasticities 
are larger for single than married women. Unfortunately, the data used in this 
thesis does not allow the analysis to be conducted for single mothers (the UK data 
used in Chapters 2 and 3 is discussed in Appendix 4, while the Finnish data used 
in Chapter 4 is discussed in Appendix 6). However, keeping in mind the findings 
quoted above for the differences between single and married women's results, the 
childcare price elasticity of employment can be expected to surpass that found by 
Jenkins and Symons (2001) for the UK. They find a much lower price of 
childcare-employment elasticity for the British lone mothers (-0.09) than most 
other similar studies that are conducted for both married and single mothers (-0.2 
to -0.92 for married women and -0.22 for single women). 
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Furthermore, Kimmel and Powell (2001) find that the decision to become 
employed in a non-standard job (for example, shift work, night shifts etc. ) is less 
responsive to the price of formal childcare. This implies that childcare subsidies 
are likely to help mothers working in "standard" working arrangements. Being a 
non-standard worker significantly reduces the likelihood of using formal modes 
of childcare, which in general are less likely to offer flexible childcare 
arrangements. 
The papers reviewed in this chapter find that higher childcare costs 
significantly reduce the likelihood of using formal, paid care by posing a 
significant barrier to employment for single and married mothers. Furthermore, 
higher childcare costs may also lead to an increased rate of leaving employment 
(Blau and Robins, 1989). Column 8 of the table in Appendix 3 summarises the 
empirical evidence from the previous literature supporting the theoretical 
expectation of higher childcare costs having a negative impact on the labour 
supply of mothers of young children. 16 The reported estimates for childcare price 
elasticities for employment range from -0.09 to -0.92. The findings of these 
econometric studies are in accordance with the findings of the Daycare Trust but 
also both quantitative and qualitative survey results (Bloom and Steen, 1990; 
Cattan, 1991; Mason and Kuhlthau, 1992; Paull and Taylor, 2002; and the 
16 Some exceptions to the usual finding of childcare costs imposing a negative effect on the labour 
supply of mothers are by Blau and Robins (1991) who find a positive but insignificant result. Additionally, Hotz and Kilburn (1991), and Leibowitz et al (1992) have mixed results. 
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Daycare Trust) indicating that a substantial number of women would like to work 
if there were suitable, reasonably priced childcare available. 
However, qualitative research may lead us to conclude that price and income 
subsidies may not be effective for all parents. This is especially true for those 
living with a partner, being out of the labour force, believing in traditional gender 
role ideology and attending religious services frequently (Mason and Kuhlthau, 
1989) for the US and a disinterest in non-relative care, regardless of its price or 
non-maternal income (Joesch and Hiedemann, 2002) for Germany. This result is 
enforced by quantitative analysis by Powell (2002), who separates between the 
different modes of childcare and finds that relative care is less price sensitive 
compared to centre and childminder care. 
Finally, it must be noted that the majority of the studies examining childcare 
markets are based on US experiences with a few UK studies. Both countries are 
characterised by limited availability of publicly provided childcare. The question 
of the affordability of childcare may lose some of its importance in the context of 
a day care system that is characterised by a high share of public provision and a 
rather unimportant private childcare market. Instead the availability of childcare 
slots may be relevant to policy discussion in countries such as Germany 
(Kreyenfeld and Hank, 2000). It would be desirable to more systematically 
examine the childcare question in the European context to examine to what extent 
the institutional settings affect the magnitude of the childcare price elasticities. 
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However, at this point, no conclusion can be reached regarding this issue due to 
the small number of studies conducted for countries other than the US or Canada. 
The main findings in this section are that a decrease in the price of childcare 
increases the quantity of childcare demanded and the employment probability of 
mothers of pre-school age children. However, Blau (2001) concludes that neither 
the decrease in the price of childcare nor a rise in mother's wage rate increase the 
quality of care demanded, which contradicts the finding by Duncan et al. (2001). 
I will next summarise the findings on the existing research on the quality of 
childcare. 
1.5 The quality of childcare 
Blau (2001) provides an extensive overview of the childcare market in the US 
with a large concentration on the issue of childcare quality. The quality of care 
has also formed part of the analysis in several pieces of economic research'7. 
The quality of childcare could have profound long-term implications for the 
society at large if it has an impact on the child's emotional and cognitive 
development. Quality of childcare can be measured in two main ways: 1) process 
quality i. e. what actually occurs in childcare settings, for example, language 
stimulation, health and safety measures and 2) structural characteristics, for 
example, child-adult ratio, training of caregivers and the group size. Important 
17 See, for example, Berger and Black (1992), Michalopoulos et al. (1992), Hagy (1998) and Blau 
and Hagy (1998). 
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issues to consider include, first, the effect of childcare quality on children and, 
second, the determinants of childcare quality. 
Ideally investment in childcare yields net benefits to society by enhancing the 
human capital of upcoming generations and reducing inequalities due to family 
background. Vandell and Wolfe (2000) and Waldfogel (2002) provide 
comprehensive literature reviews examining the effects of childcare on child 
development. None of the reviewed studies provide any definite answers. The 
main body of research has moved focus from examining whether childcare and 
early maternal employment are detrimental to child development to assessing 
which type of childcare can provide most benefits to children's cognitive and 
socio-emotional development. 
Blau and Mocan (1999) find that, on average, the parents of young children 
are unwilling to spend significantly more on formal childcare in order to obtain 
higher quality care. They find that the supply of quality is inelastic for both 
profit-making and non-profit firms. Blau (2001) reasons that parents may not 
value childcare quality in the terms defined by developmental psychologists or 
that they may simply not have enough information to assess the quality of a 
childcare provider. 
The traditional measures of quality, such as the child-staff ratio or the group 
size have in the recent years come under attack in the academic circles. Blau 
(1998,2000,2001) finds that the easily observed inputs, such as the group size, 
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child-staff ratio and teacher qualifications, are correlated with childcare quality, 
however, there seems to remain a lot of unmeasured centre-specific heterogeneity 
in the quality of formal childcare. Hence Blau's results raise questions about the 
chances of public policy to influence the quality of childcare through regulation 
and childcare subsidies. 
Furthermore, Mocan (2001) compares consumer evaluations of quality to 
actual quality and finds that parents do not utilise all the available information in 
forming their assessment of quality. The parents of young children may suffer 
from information asymmetry, which is exhibited mostly by the parents 
interpreting the signals of quality incorrectly, for example, equating clean 
reception areas with high quality of childcare. However, Mocan (2001) finds 
some evidence of moral hazard whereas the centres with clean reception areas 
tend to produce lower level of quality for unobservable items. These results 
provide a partial explanation for the low average quality in the childcare market. 
Mulligan and Hoffman (1998) argue that in the absence of significant 
increases in government support, the only feasible method for accommodating 
more children in formal childcare rests with higher child-staff ratios. Policy 
makers are given the advice that regulation of child-staff ratios, group sizes and 
qualification levels is too blunt an instrument for improving the overall quality of 
childcare. By focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, childcare providers 
should be free to choose among different combinations of these inputs. 
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The child-staff ratio is not significant for the employment decision of the 
British mothers and larger provider size is associated with higher proportion of 
mothers working full-time rather than part-time or not working at all for all forms 
of childcare except for childminders, which may reflect quality issues (Paull and 
Taylor, 2002). Furthermore, it is possible that in the UK parents do not have a 
choice regarding the quality of childcare due to its low availability. Hence, the 
issue of quality may become more relevant only when the childcare market 
reaches the equilibrium. 
A commonly used method to correct the unit prices for the choice of quality is 
the hedonic pricing model originally developed by Rosen (1974). However, the 
chapters within this thesis ignore the quality aspect of childcare altogether hence 
any price estimates may be biased as a consequence. The reasons for not using 
the hedonic techniques to correct the price of childcare for the quality of care 
chosen include the following: 1) the UK childcare market consists of sub-markets, 
for example, the public and the private childcare provision, which cannot be 
identified in the data, 2) there may be possible problems with the identification of 
the hedonic model, and 3) there may be a reason to believe that the UK childcare 
market is in a disequilibrium, which would possibly result in inconsistent results. 
For further discussion on the estimation or the identification of the hedonic 
models, see Heckman et al. (2003) or Ekeland et al. (2002) respectively. 
Overall, the previous research on the quality of childcare has not reached any 
agreement. Blau and Mocan (2002) for the US find that parents are unwilling to 
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pay more for higher quality childcare, a result which reinforces the finding of 
Blau (2001) that the relationship between family income and quality of care is 
almost non-existent. Since the use of hedonic models requires a more detailed 
knowledge of the underlying market structure (see Ekeland et al., 2002 for 
discussion), this method is not utilised in this thesis. One has to keep in mind 
though that if the quality and the price of childcare are strongly correlated in the 
UK childcare market, the estimates in this thesis may be biased. 
None of the childcare literature has examined the overall costs and benefits to 
the society in terms of whether additional government expenditure on childcare is 
justified given the magnitude and the nature of the social benefits they yield. The 
next section examines the arguments that have been put forward for the 
governments to intervene in the childcare market. 
1.6 Government intervention in the childcare market 
Government intervention in the childcare market varies considerably between 
countries. The US and the UK follow mainly the non-interventionist approach by 
allowing the market to operate freely and privately with only a few subsidies, 
which are mainly targeted at the low-income households. The role of the state is 
limited to ensuring minimum quality standards among the childcare providers. 
An example of the other extreme of the level of government intervention in the 
childcare is provided by the Nordic countries. In the Nordic countries the large 
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public provision of childcare in general guarantees every pre-school age child a 
place in a high-quality, low-cost childcare setting regardless of the family income. 
The laissez-faire approach that is prevalent in the US and the UK relies on the 
notion that having children is a private decision. The possible career break effects 
and the resulting lower income, according to this view, should be factored into the 
decision to have children. On the other hand, both private and social economic 
gains can be expected from governmental intervention in the childcare market. 
Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) state that the differences in the public policy 
configurations regarding childcare are due to the political climate of the country. 
In other words, the Nordic countries, according to their argument, are more 
willing to accept a system of high taxes and redistribution than the US and the 
UK. 
There are two main justifications for the government to intervene in the 
childcare market according to the basic principles of welfare economics. The first 
concerns inefficient resource allocation and argues that the government should 
intervene to correct any imperfections that prevent the childcare market from 
working efficiently and maximizing consumer welfare. Market failures in the 
demand for childcare services include information failures or imperfections in 
capital markets. In the former case, families fail to gauge the financial losses of 
career breaks and/or perceive the benefits of formal childcare. In the latter case, 
the cost of childcare might, in the short run, be greater than the immediate returns 
from employment. Hence, the laissez-faire approach to the childcare markets 
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might be improved by correcting some of the imperfections by intervention as 
long as the benefits to society exceed the private benefits to parents. 
The second justification for government intervention in the childcare market 
concerns inequality. The distributional issues in childcare use, for example, the 
equality of opportunity in society provides a strong argument for government 
intervention in the childcare market. This argument regarding inequality has two 
parts. First, there may exist inequality in the mothers' ability to participate in the 
labour force compared to women with no children or school age children. 
Second, intervention in the childcare market may be required to aid children to 
get an equal starting point in life regardless of the household financial status (see, 
for example, Duncan and Giles, 1996 or Carneiro and Heckman, 2003 for further 
details). In general the Nordic countries have less child poverty, a smaller gender 
wage gap and more similarity in the educational outcomes between different 
socio-economic groups (see, for example, the PISA 2000 study by OECD) than, 
for example, the US or the UK. 
Previous research indicates that there are large differences in the private 
returns on remaining employed between the interventionist and the laissez-faire 
approach. Gornick et al. (1998) find results that demonstrate a strong association 
between policy configurations regarding parental leave and childcare and the 
employment patterns of mothers. Out of the 14 industrialised countries analysed, 
wage penalties for mothers are the greatest in countries with the least-developed 
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public policies for supporting the employment of mothers with young children, 
namely, the US, Australia, and the UK. 
These arguments point to the possibility that the outcomes of the free 
childcare market may have distributional implications that the society would 
prefer to avoid. Duncan and Giles (1996) further note that through examining the 
reasons why the government would want to subsidise childcare helps in 
understanding which type of public policy might be desirable. Universal 
subsidies may result in high private and social returns, however, they are in 
general costly to the government and hence the tax-payers and, additionally, 
result in large dead-weight losses. In the end, the ideal balance in terms of 
economic efficiency is found by weighing both the private returns and the social 
returns and finding the balance between the extremes of the public intervention 
approach and laissez-faire approach to the childcare markets. 
The Nordic countries are characterised by low level of monetary support for 
families compared to the other European countries as found by Kurjenoja (2001), 
who compares the level of monetary support for children in 10 European 
countries. However, this low level of direct monetary support for pre-school age 
children is compensated by publicly provided childcare. Since the universal 
public provision of childcare prevalent in the Nordic countries is designed to 
provide every pre-school age child a low-cost care place regardless of the 
family's ability or willingness to pay for the care, there is potential for large 
deadweight losses for the economy as a whole. 
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Publicly provided private goods such as childcare are closely related to labour 
supply and hence government tax revenue. It is possible that public subsidies for 
childcare "pay for themselves" by inducing higher labour force participation of 
mothers who then pay taxes that are more than sufficient to pay for the cost of the 
subsidies. 
The direction of the labour supply response to childcare subsidies is not clear. 
The subsidies increase the returns to every hour of paid employment thereby 
improving the incentives for individuals to increase paid employment (the 
substitution effect) but they also reduce the number of hours of paid employment 
necessary to achieve a given material standard of living or the number of hours of 
childcare (the income effect). On the producer side, the supply side effects of 
childcare subsidies include the promotion of additional supply of childcare places 
depending on market conditions, for example, the consumers' willingness to pay 
for care and existing competition from other providers and the barriers to entry. 
The impact of childcare subsidies on the demand and the supply side regarding 
the quality of childcare is unclear as outlined in section 1.5. The difficulty in 
measuring the quality of childcare may speak in favour of the interventionist 
approach to childcare provision rather than the free market approach due to 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (for discussion see Akerlof, 
1970). 
Studies examining the impact of monetary support find a positive effect on the 
employment probabilities for both single (Berger and Black, 1992) and married 
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mothers (Powell, 2002). Subsidies targeted at formal care and unconditional 
childcare subsidies were found to have the greatest potential in terms of 
increasing employment. Furthermore, Leibowitz et al. (1992) find that greater 
monetary support for childcare increases early return to work after childbirth in 
the US. For the UK, Forth et al. (1997) find that family friendly working 
arrangements (for example, increased flexibility in childcare arrangements or a 
workplace creche) have a positive influence on the rate of women's return to 
work after childbearing. 
Lehrer (1983,1989), for the US, finds that unless subsidies to formal care are 
means-tested they may result in benefits that mostly accrue to high-income 
families. However, in Sweden the large public childcare provision is found to 
encourage the labour market activity of mothers of young children regardless of 
the spouse's income (Bloom and Steen, 1990 and Gustafsson and Stafford, 1992). 
The difference between the Swedish and the US experience also reflects the 
issues of availability and affordability of childcare but also, to a certain extent, the 
differences in the quality of childcare (real or perceived) available in the 
interventionist versus the laissez-faire childcare markets. 
Childcare subsidies in general can be designed to encourage employment or to 
enhance the quality of childcare. These goals are generally in conflict: policies 
that encourage employment would allow parents flexibility in the choice of the 
quality of childcare and policies that are most likely to encourage the use of high- 
quality childcare would not impose employment requirements. Blau (2001) 
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believes that the main problem with the childcare market in the US is low quality. 
Hence childcare subsidies with an employment prerequisite are likely to worsen 
the childcare problem by increasing the use of low quality care. 
However, the problem in general is to find the middle road between the two 
extremes. The social returns to public childcare provision are hard to quantify 
hence making any accurate cost-benefit analysis impossible. Furthermore, no 
analysis has been done to balance the deadweight losses of public childcare 
provision against the higher female labour force participation and hence higher 
tax revenue in these countries. 
1.7 Conclusions 
The previous research on the economics of childcare leads us to conclude that 
there is no consensus on the effect of the price of childcare on the demand for 
childcare and that the quality of childcare is difficult if not impossible to measure. 
Furthermore, different countries have adopted different approaches and levels of 
government intervention to help their citizens to balance working life with family 
commitments. 
This thesis does not examine the issues of childcare quality due to the lack of 
appropriate data. Instead I will try to shed light on the effects of the price and the 
availability of childcare on the labour force participation and use of childcare by 
mothers of pre-school age children. 
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Another issue of increasing importance, especially in Europe, is to increase 
fertility. This is the traditional argument put forward, for example, in France to 
justify higher expenditure on pre-school age children. The social returns of 
increased fertility are noticeable with the looming pension problem and the 
increasing dependency ratio across the European countries. However, this thesis 
does not examine the impact of childcare policies on fertility. 
Most of the previous research in the field of childcare has been done for the 
US. This thesis concentrates on the UK childcare market that has not received as 
much attention as the US childcare situation. Hence the issues analysed in this 
thesis should be relevant to the current policy debates in the UK. An examination 
of the Finnish childcare market in the final chapter provides alternative 
approaches to dealing with the childcare problem and provides evidence on the 
effect of introducing competition in an interventionist system. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
2.1 Introduction 
"British childcare is worst in Europe" states a headline in The Independent 
newspaper (2.9.2001). The claim is based on a finding that the childcare 
provision in Britain comes close to the bottom among the 15 EU member states 
using measures such as publicly funded nurseries and parental leave (Land, 
2002). This finding is not good news for the current government that has been 
trying to get recognised for its family-friendly policies. The National Childcare 
Strategy, launched in 1999 by the Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment, promises to raise the quality of childcare, making it more 
affordable, as well as increasing its provision. 
The government promises should be welcomed by the general public. A 
recent survey finds that 38% of parents think that there are not enough childcare 
places available and 43% say it is too expensive. According to the Daycare 
Trust, the typical cost of a nursery place is more than the average household 
spends a year on either food or housing. The government estimates that there are 
only 830,000 registered childcare places for the 5.1 million under 8-year-old 
children in England. Based on survey evidence Cameron et al. (2001) 
approximate that 100,000 nursery nurses work in Great Britain. As a 
comparison, in Finland in 1999 there were 48,500 childcare workers for the 
427,688 pre-school age children. The provision of childcare has risen to the 
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agenda of politicians as women have increased their participation to the labour 
force. Thus, the potential shortage of childcare providers in the UK is likely to 
worsen with time as women are expected to fill 2/3 of all new job creations 
between 1998 and 2009 (Wilson and Green, 2001). Evidence of the difficulty to 
combine family and work are found in Paull et al. (2002) who report that 24% of 
non working women would like to participate in the labour force but feel 
hindered because of childcare responsibilities. The shortage of childcare 
facilities is also reflected in the high prices for the service and evidence of 
waiting lists (Callender, 1997). 
In 1999 the UK government launched the Childcare Link help-line and 
website as part of the National Childcare Strategy to enable parents to easily find 
a childcare place in their neighbourhood. Consulting the website for a day 
nursery place in Holloway, part of the London's borough of Islington, the search 
found 42 day nurseries18. However, of the 42 nurseries only 8 reported 
immediate vacancies (on average two vacancies per day nursery, which were 
often only part-time places or reserved for a certain age group). Most day 
nurseries use waiting lists, which vary in length from a few months to several 
years. 
The waiting lists for childcare may indicate that the childcare market is in a 
disequilibrium with an undersupply (excess demand) of formal childcare (see, for 
example, Blau, 1991 for further discussion). Empirical research on childcare and 
18 The search was done on 17.8.2004 on the following website: http: //www. childcarelink. gov. uk. 
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its effect on female labour supply has usually ignored this aspect of the childcare 
market and assume perfect elasticity of the supply side of the market. One recent 
exception is by Chevalier and Viitanen (2002), who explore the causality 
between female participation and supply of childcare in Britain. Using aggregate 
data from the Labour Force Survey, they build an eight year time-series dataset 
and conclude that childcare Granger causes participation without feedback, 
which supports the claim that women could be constrained in their participation 
by the lack of childcare facilities. The absence of a feedback mechanism implies 
that the supply of childcare is inelastic and does not react to an increase in 
demand for childcare services. Equilibrium is therefore reached either by a price 
increase or by the formation of a queue, which is consistent with the stylised 
facts. 
In this paper, we examine whether demand and supply of childcare are in a 
disequilibrium. Whilst there are evidence in the popular press of a shortage of 
childcare, there is no evidence regarding the extent of the disequilibrium. The 
difficulty is that available datasets report the use of childcare but not (in a 
systematic manner) the desire to use it at the current market price. To measure the 
queue for childcare, this paper use an econometric method, first proposed by 
Poirier (1980) and Abowd and Farber (1982), in which a binary outcome (using 
childcare or not) reflects the joint unobserved binary choices of two decision 
makers. In this case, a child is observed in childcare, conditional on the mother 
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demanding it and childcare being available at her reservation price; this is referred 
to as a partial observability model. 
The childcare market is a sequential decision model with partial observability, 
as in Abowd and Farber (1982). First, the mother applies for a childcare place 
and joins a queue of demanders. Then, childcare providers select individuals out 
of the queue and offer places to individuals satisfying a decision rule (ranking on 
a first come-first served basis, a needs basis, or purely randomly). Only children 
who have been accepted are observed using childcare. After estimating the 
probabilities of demanding and receiving childcare, the size of the queue can be 
calculated. While these models have been used to measure queues for union or 
federal jobs (see Heywood and Mohanty, 1995 for example), we reckon that this 
paper provides the first application of partial observability estimation in the 
context of childcare. Determining the size of the queue and the childcare 
arrangement of queuing mothers allows conclusions to be made on the efficiency 
of an increase in childcare supply on the female labour supply. 
Using pre-WFTC data, we find that the queue for childcare is large 
19. 
Demand for childcare is estimated to outstrip supply of childcare by 43%. Thus, 
increasing the supply of childcare would reduce this bottleneck and lead to an 
increase in the labour force participation of mothers. 
19 Unfortunately, the lack of consistent local authority childcare availability data prevents us from 
using the post-reform data (WFTC took effect on October 1999) in the analysis. 
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2.2 Economic model and econometric method 
Models of the use of childcare typically compare the utility derived by the 
mother while using formal childcare and other forms of care. However, 
comparing utilities only determines the demand for childcare (Abowd and Farber, 
1982). In a partial observability model, the supply side of the market is also 
included; the assumption is that the decisions are taken by two agents but only the 
joint outcome is observed. Thus, the final outcome reflects the equilibrium state 
of the market. 
In the case of childcare, a child is observed in formal care if the mother wants 
to use childcare and a place is offered by a provider. A child is not observed in 
childcare if the mother wants to take care of the child herself or if the application 
of the mother to childcare is rejected by the childcare provider. Formally, the 
probability of using childcare is given by the formula below: 
Pr(USE1 =1) = Pr(D, =1 and O; =1) 
Pr(USE, = 0) = Pr(Di =0 or Oi = 0) 
(2. i) 
where USE is the observed outcome of the use of childcare by mother i; D and 0 
are unobserved and reflect respectively the demand for childcare and the offer of 
a childcare place to child i. A childcare offer is always accepted by a mother 
demanding formal care. To simplify the notations, we now drop the i subscript. 
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The two non-observed decisions D and 0 follow latent models such as20: 
D= XD /3D +6'D (2.2) 
O=Xof0+160 
Where xD and xo are vectors of characteristics explaining the demand and the 
acceptance of childcare. These vectors typically will contain household, and local 
characteristics. The random error terms (CD and co) follow a bivariate normal 
distribution (0,0,1,1, p). The independence of the error terms depends on how the 
allocation of childcare is made by the provider. In a model where the allocation is 
done either randomly or on a first come-first served basis, the error term in the 
offer equation will be independent of that in the demand equation. On the other 
hand, if the allocation is made after the provider receives an application or 
interviews the parents, then it is likely that some of the unobservable 
characteristics explaining the choice of demanding childcare will be correlated 
with the unobservable explaining the decision of the provider to offer childcare to 
these parents. In the empirical work, we assume that the two error terms are 
correlated. 
For the model to be identified at least one variable has to be unique to xD or 
xo. We rely on individual characteristics, the average price for formal childcare at 
the local authority level, and proxies for the quality of local authority childcare 
20 The offer equation implicitly suggests that childcare providers use a ranking system based on 
the individual characteristics rather than operate a first come/first serve basis. This assumption is 
not formally imposed in the empirical specification where identification comes from variations in 
the local supply and prices of childcare. 
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provision to identify the demand equation. Childcare being a normal good, we 
assume that higher mean price would have a negative effect on the individual 
demand for childcare. 
The offer equation is identified with local authority level availability of 
childcare paid and free childcare, the proportion of women employed as well as 
council tax quintiles. The availability of childcare at local authority level is 
expressed as a ratio per 100 children for different types of providers. We assume 
that an offer is more likely to be made to individuals living in local authorities 
with a higher supply of care, regardless whether this is paid care or fee-free care. 
This model therefore implicitly implies that the total supply of childcare has no 
effect on the individual demand for the service. This assumption may be rejected 
if individuals faced with a low supply of childcare feel discouraged and do not 
apply. On the other hand, the previous discussion on the waiting lists for formal 
childcare indicate that mothers do not stop asking for childcare only because there 
is low availability of formal care in the local authority. Therefore supply would 
not affect the demand for childcare. 
In a sequential-decision model with partial observability, the second equation 
in (2.2) is conditional on D, =1. Formally, the system of equations (2.2) is 
equivalent to: 
Pr(D =1) = Pr(xD IJD > -ED ) (2.3) 
Pr(O =11 D= 1) = Pr(xo ß0 > -So 1 xD i'D > -ED) (2.4) 
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An offer for childcare is made only to mothers that were in the queue of 
women demanding childcare 21. Thus, the distribution of co only exists for 
Eo > -xDßD and conditional on being in the queue for childcare the error terms 
sD and e, are independent. The likelihood function to be maximised therefore 
has the following form: 
L= fl[(D(ßDxD)(D(ßo'xo)] *fl[1-'(ßDxD)(D(ßOxO)] (2.5) 
D=1 D=0 
The parameters QD and /3o are estimable only if there is at least one non- 
overlapping variable in either xD or xo. This is a sequential decision model with 
partial observability as used by, for example, Abowd and Farber (1982). 
Besides personal characteristics of the parents, the composition of the 
household is clearly an important determinant of the demand for childcare. 
Families relying on parental care can expect economies of scale when taking care 
of more than one young child. Those economies are not likely to be redistributed 
to the parents using childcare, thus we expect that more children will reduce the 
use of formal childcare. The age of the child affects the probability of relying on 
formal childcare in a positive way. First, mothers are guaranteed some maternal 
leave (see Waldfogel, 1998 for details) and the preference for taking care of one's 
own child may be higher, the younger the child is. Additionally, the provision of 
21 For a discussion on the differences between a simultaneous (as in Poirier, 1980) and sequential 
(as in Abowd and Farber, 1982) partial observability models, see Maddala (1983). 
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childcare for very young children is limited and pricier reducing the possibility of 
using childcare for infants less than two years old. 
Mother's health may have ambiguous effects on the use of childcare. On one 
hand, if the health conditions reduce the probability of working then it may 
reduce the need for childcare. On the other hand, serious health problems may 
prevent the mother from providing care herself and thus increase the demand for 
formal childcare. The ethnicity of the mothers may also affect her choice of 
childcare, but the direction of the effect is likely to be specific to unobserved 
characteristics (mother's integration, proportion of non-white in the 
neighbourhood)22. 
We expect childcare to be a normal good and higher local prices should lead 
to a reduction in the use of childcare. Additional determinants in the demand 
equation are proxies for the quality of childcare, including the average pay, job 
tenure and education of childcare workers at the local authority level. The most 
important characteristic of the mother explaining her desire to use child care is 
whether or not she intends to join the labour force. Whilst the intention variable is 
not observable, we include mother participation to the labour force in the model. 
This variable is obviously endogenous but unfortunately there is no additional 
exclusion variable in the dataset that would provide identification. 
22 Unfortunately the sample sizes is limited and does not allow to differentiate the demand of the 
non-white groups. Instead, we estimate a single effect for all non-white. 
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Besides household characteristics and personal characteristics of the parents, 
the offer of a childcare place is determined by local authority level variables on 
the proportion of women employed, proportion of pre-school age children and the 
proportion of racial minorities. The offer of a childcare place can also be 
expected to be higher in local authorities where there are more suppliers of 
childcare. 
2.3 Data 
The data comes from five waves of the Family Resources Survey (FRS) 
covering years 1993/4-1997/823. The FRS is a continuous survey sponsored by 
what was previously known as the Department of Social Security (currently 
known as the Department for Work and Pensions) for policy monitoring and the 
costing and modelling of changes to national insurance contributions and social 
security benefits in Great Britain. The FRS includes a detailed questionnaire 
relating to benefits and childcare take-up and expenditure. Unfortunately, the 
childcare section is routed and only families with at least one working adult have 
to complete it. 
We restrict our sample to mothers aged 18 to 59 with a least one child aged less 
than five (pre-school age), and drop families where no adult works. To limit the 
bias resulting from this selection rule, we drop lone mothers from the sample as 
only a small proportion of working lone mothers were observed. We define the 
23 The definition of some local authorities was changed after 1998 hence breaking the series for 
the local authority level of childcare data used in the analysis. 
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use of childcare as using any type of formal providers of childcare; a detailed 
breakdown of the childcare providers is reported in Table 2.1. Childminders and 
nursery/playgroups are the main providers of formal childcare, but schools are 
also extensively used. Working mothers used more formal childcare, especially 
childminders and nurseries/playgroups, but also more informal care. 
Table 2.1: Main providers of childcare, % 
All Working Non working mothers 
mothers mothers 
Childminder 10.4 17.0 2.4 
Nursery/playgroup 9.8 16.3 1.9 
Creche 0.6 1.1 0.1 
School 6.4 8.4 4.2 
Non-relative provider 22.3 37.1 4.5 
Relative care 50.5 20.1 86.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The FRS is augmented with local authority statistics provided by the 
Department of Health, on the availability of childcare expressed as rates per 100 
children within the local authority (109 local authorities referred to as LA from 
hereon)24. In this administrative data, the detailed provision of childcare by the 
type of provider was badly reported for some local authorities. Hence we drop 
those for which at least one type of provider was missing for each of the five 
years (nine local authorities were dropped). We also impute the provision when 
some years were missing by using the rate reported the following year (or the 
24 The variable combines three types of childcare: day nursery, playgroup, and childminder care. 
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previous year for 1997). The provision of care at the LA level ranges from 850 
places per 10,000 children to more than 6,000 (City of London). City of London 
is a clear outlier since the second best LA only offers 3,800 places per 10,000 
children. 
We also compute the average price for formal care at the local authority level. 
This calculation is based on the price paid by mothers using childcare in the FRS; 
therefore this implicitly assumes that all mothers within the same local authority 
are faced with the same price25. This calculation constrains us to group nurseries, 
playgroups and creche as the FRS does not distinguish between these categories 
of childcare providers. For each LA, we calculate the average price for all forms 
of formal care including nursery, playgroup, and childminder care26. This ignores 
heterogeneity within the local authority, however, this is a caveat that cannot be 
rectified with the FRS data. The model also includes local authority level 
information drawn from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) of the respective years 
on female labour force participation and childcare worker characteristics. 
25 Powell (2002) on the contrary imputes childcare prices for all individuals based on their own 
personal characteristics. 
6 Duncan and Giles (1996) report the hourly price of childcare for different types of providers. 
Even though the distributions are quite different, the hourly price of nursery and playgroup are 
comparable. In 1991,90% of users of nursery and playgroup were paying less than a pound per 
hour, while the average price for childminder care was above £1.00. 
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Table 2.2: Sample derivation (FRS 1993/4-1997/8 
Sample 
size 
% 
working 
% using formal 
care 
All observations 56,341 63.2 23.3 
Households with children 37,586 63.2 22.8 
Married or co-habiting couples 20,622 70.6 25.4 
Women 10,183 54.4 25.6 
Households where partner works 9,228 60.1 26.7 
Not in education/self-employment 9,197 57.7 26.2 
Non-missing LA and other data 7,279 54.5 27.1 
Final sample 7,279 54.5 27.1 
The decomposition of the data to obtain our final sample is presented in Table 
2.2 and the summary statistics on the variables of interest are presented in Table 
2.3, separately for all mothers and then by working status. Table 2.2. also 
includes the mean for the labour force participation rate and the use of formal 
childcare to show that the selection of the sample does not significantly alter these 
variables of interest. The estimating sample includes married or cohabiting 
women with at least one pre-school age child27. 
27 The usual school starting age in England is 5 years and the sample is selected in such a manner 
that only pre-school children are included. 
76 
Table 2.3: Summary statistics (FRS 1993/4-1997/8 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Use of formal childcare 0.458 0.498 
LA price of formal care 2.282 0.361 
LA care worker pay 4.062 0.297 
LA care worker education 16.854 0.227 
LA care worker tenure 4.621 0.736 
LA proportion of four year olds in education 0.126 0.041 
Mother: years of education 17.665 2.348 
Mother: bad health 0.103 0.304 
Mother: non-white 0.076 0.265 
Mother: working 0.548 0.498 
Father: years of education 17.706 2.709 
Father: hours worked 4.457 1.018 
Father: log income per week 6.042 0.561 
One pre-school age child 0.510 0.365 
Two pre-school age children 0.438 0.496 
Three pre-school age children 0.052 0.222 
Number of children 2.061 0.905 
Age youngest child 1.516 1.333 
LA proportion of women employed 0.687 0.071 
LA proportion ofpre-school children of all 0-16 0.307 0.026 
LA proportion non-white 0.058 0.070 
LA formal availability of childcare 2.765 0.894 
LA proportion of free childcare 0.183 0.087 
Number of observations 7,279 
Households, where neither parent works, are dropped from the sample 
because the childcare data in the FRS is asked consistently only from those 
households where at least one parent works (see Paull et al., 2002 for further 
discussion on routing effects in the FRS). Naturally this selection results in a 
sample that may not be nationally representative of all households with pre- 
school age children, however, until better data comes along this cannot be 
avoided. Information is collected on the type of childcare for each child and for 
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each child questions are asked about the total weekly hours of care and total 
weekly expenditure separately for term-time and holidays for each type of 
childcare. For households with more than one pre-school age child, we use the 
information on all the pre-school age children but weight the results by their 
frequency' . 
This selection procedure leaves us with a sample of 7,279 under school age 
children. The average mother in our sample left school at 17 and a half. About 
10% of women self-report themselves as being in bad health and slightly over 7% 
are non-white. Half of the families have only one child less than five and only a 
marginal proportion has three or more children under the age of five. The 
presence of older children will also affect the use of childcare by the mothers by 
changing her utility of staying home. The father may also be able to provide 
some care or financial assistance to pay for childcare. More educated fathers as 
well as those working less hours can be expected to provide more childcare. The 
average price per hour of childcare in the local authority (deflated to 1998 prices) 
is slightly above £2 per hour for the two types of provider. These prices are 
consistent with those reported by the Daycare Trust ( approximately £80 per week 
for full-time care). 
28 As Table 2 shows, the sample is expanded in such way that every pre-school age child's 
information is used in the analysis, subsequently the mothers who are more than once in the 
sample because they have more than once kid are weighted by their frequency, for example, a 
mother with two pre-school aged children is in the data twice with both observations having the 
weight of %2. The estimates are corrected for this non-independence. On the contrary, Powell 
(2002) uses the childcare information only from the youngest child in the family 
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2.4 Results 
Table 2.5 presents results for the queuing model in columns 1 to 6 (Model 2). 
The estimates of the demand equation in column 1 (marginal effect in column 3) 
of Table 2.5 reflect variation in mothers' preferences for formal childcare use. 
Similarly, the offer equation in column 4 (marginal effect in column 6) reflects 
variation in the propensity of childcare providers to pick certain individuals from 
the queue of potential customers. 
However, we first estimate the constrained version of the model where there 
is no queue. This is equivalent to assuming that the supply of childcare is 
perfectly elastic and that a childcare place is always provided to a mother 
demanding childcare. This is a special case of the queue model, which is formally 
equivalent to imposing V i, Pr(O; =1 / D; =1) = Pr(DD =1) = Pr(USEE = 1). This 
model can be estimated as a univariate probit for the use of formal childcare 
(Table 2.4). 
The explanatory variables in both the queue model (Model 2) and the no 
queue model (Model 1) include variables summarised in Table 2.3 as well as 
dummies for year of survey and administrative region of residence29. 
29 Omitted categories are 1994 and London, respectively, for year and region. 
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Table 2.4: Univariate probit estimates of demand for formal childcare (Model 1 
Model 1- No queue 
Coefficient SE Marginal effect 
LA price of formal care 0.480 0.317 0.187 
LA price of formal care squared -0.092 0.061 -0.036 
LA care worker pay -0.060 0.127 -0.023 
LA care worker education -0.179 0.167 -0.070 
LA care worker tenure 0.023 0.059 0.009 
LA proportion of four year olds in education 1.826 *** 0.549 0.720 
Mother: years of education 0.047 *** 0.009 0.018 
Mother: bad health -0.070 0.061 -0.027 
Mother: non-white -0.116 0.074 -0.045 
Mother: working 1.753 *** 0.040 0.602 
Father: years of education 0.015 * 0.009 0.006 
Father: hours worked 0.062 *** 0.020 0.024 
Father: log income -0.283 0.063 -0.111 
Father: log income squared 0.027 0.029 0.010 
Two pre-school age children 0.406 *** 0.049 0.159 
Three or more pre-school age children 0.629 *** 0.103 0.246 
Number of children aged less than 18 -0.143 *** 0.027 -0.056 
Age of youngest child 0.235 *** 0.017 0.092 
Observations 7,279 
Log Likelihood -3480.439 
Note: Column 1 reports probit coefficients while column 3 reports marginal effects. Standard 
errors corrected for clustering at the region and year level. Model 1 is estimated using a 
univariate probit. Dummies for 8 administrative regions and 4 years were also included 
with London and 1994 respectively omitte d. ***, ** and * refer to statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
With the no queue model specification, we can reject that the explanatory 
variables have no power; the log likelihood is -3480.4, which gives a likelihood 
ratio test of 2357, which is significantly higher than the critical value for a Chi- 
square with 30 degrees of freedom (43.77). Most of the expected relations hold. 
More educated households are more likely to use childcare. As an another 
potential caregiver, father's hours of work have a positive impact on the 
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likelihood of demanding formal care as expected. Surprisingly father's income 
does not affect the demand for formal care. Increase in the overall number of 
children below the age of 18 increases the preference for the mother to take care 
of her children herself. However, having two or more children aged less than four 
has a significant positive effect on the demand for childcare, which may reflect 
discounts for siblings in the formal childcare settings. As expected, the older the 
youngest child is, the more probable is the demand for childcare. The local 
authority level of formal childcare price is not a significant determinant of the use 
of childcare. The relatively large geographical grouping used in the analysis and 
the grouping of providers hides a lot of the real childcare price variation and 
hence this proxy for the price households face does not provide enough 
information. Ideally the analysis would be conducted on smaller geographical 
units for the price and quality of formal childcare variables, however, suitable 
data is not currently available. Also, none of the proxies for the quality of 
childcare, the hourly pay of childcare employees as well as their level of 
education and job tenure, are significantly different from zero. If parents have a 
preference for quality but are not able to observe it, they use price as an indicator 
of qualit}l°. . This argument justifies the quadratic function in the price of 
childcare used in this analysis with demand increasing as the prices increases up 
to the level of £1.10, after which the demand becomes negatively affected by 
30 Mocan (2001) reveals moral hazard issues, with providers investing in the quality of easily to 
observe (by the parents) items rather than items directly related to the quality of the care provided. 
Blau (2001) also shows that parents are not good at assessing the quality of the childcare 
providers. 
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price. As expected mother's participation to the labour force is associated with a 
large increase in the probability of using formal childcare. 
The queuing model (Model 2) estimates are presented in columns 1 to 6 of 
Table 2.5. Columns 1 to 3 in Table 2.5 report the estimates for the demand of 
childcare and columns 4 to 6 those for the offer of childcare services. The 
maximum log likelihood value is -3307, which compares favourably with the 
-3480 in the no-queue model. The likelihood ratio test computed from the sample 
log likelihood values is 347, while the critical values for a Chi-square with 30 
degrees of freedom are 40.26,43.77, and 50.89, respectively for 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels of statistical significance, hence the no-queue model (Model 1) is 
rejected. 
The estimates of the demand for childcare in Model 2 are similar to those 
obtained for the use of childcare in Model 1 with some additional significant 
relations. In the bivariate model, the local authority level of the price of childcare 
has a significant, non-linear effect on the demand for childcare with a maximum 
at £2.40 per hour, which compares favourably with the average figures provided 
by the Daycare Trust discussed in the previous section. Childcare providers 
charging a lower price than this probably appear to be of lower quality. Quite 
surprisingly, in this specification mother's years of education has a significant 
negative impact on the demand for formal childcare. All the characteristics of the 
household relating to the children are highly significant. An additional child 
reduces the probability of demanding childcare by three percentage points 
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whereas additional pre-school age children increases it due to economies of scale. 
A one-year increase in the age of the youngest child in the household increases 
the probability of demanding formal care by five percentage points, which is 
expected since the care of younger pre-school age children is more costly due to, 
for example, higher staff-child ratios. Father's earnings have a significant, 
negative impact on the demand for childcare with the maximum at £576.33 per 
week, after which an increase in paternal income increases the demand for 
childcare. This quadratic function supports the ideas that in less well off families, 
the mother has to rejoin the labour market and therefore demands childcare. This 
reflects the need to sustain the family income and thus the demand for childcare is 
reduced as the father's income increases. However, families where the father's 
earn more than £576 a week seems to have a preference for using childcare. This 
finding may reflect assortative mating. In the classic case of assortative mating, 
the men with a higher earnings potential marry women with similar potential for 
whom therefore the opportunity cost of staying home is high. As expected the 
demand for childcare is largely affected by the mother's participation to the 
labour force. 
The childcare offer estimates are presented in the last three columns of Table 
2.5 with the marginal effects in the last column. This equation is identified by the 
exclusion of the local authority price of childcare variables and the local authority 
level mean characteristics of the childcare workers. Furthermore, the offer 
equation includes local authority level variables for the supply of formal childcare 
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and free care as well as the proportions of women employed, non-white and pre- 
school age children, which all proxy for the demand for childcare services at the 
local authority level and thus the amount of competition faced. 
Variables affecting the likelihood of an offer being made are mostly related to 
the characteristics of the children in the household. Older children are more 
likely to be accepted than babies, which could be related to regulations (Children 
Act 1989) increasing the number of staff for children under the age of two. Since 
childcare is a labour intensive activity, providers may have an incentive to focus 
on older children in order to maximise their profits. Interestingly, mother's years 
of education and father's hours of work have a positive impact on the likelihood 
of an offer being made. An offer of a childcare place is less likely to be made to 
non-white mothers although local authorities with a higher proportion of non- 
whites are associated with an increased likelihood of an offer being made. 
It is not clear how providers allocate childcare; a needs basis rule is favoured 
by some, as the participation of the mother to the labour force is a clear indicator 
of the allocation of a place. If personal characteristics have no effect on the 
probability of receiving an offer, this would indicate a first come/first serve 
allocation model, additionally the error term in the offer equation and demand 
equations would be independent. The correlation between the two error terms is 
found to be non-significant; our estimate for rho in Model 2 has a chi-squared 
value with 1 degree of freedom of 2.589, which allows us to conclude that rho is 
not significantly different from zero. 
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The demand and offer equations of Model 2 allow us to calculate the 
proportion of mothers asking for childcare and the size of the queue for childcare 
(Table 2.6)31 
Table 2.6: Predicted probabilities in the use of childcare 
Pr (D=1) 0.707 
Pr (0=1/D=1) 0.567 
Pr(O=0/D=1) *Pr(D=1) 30.6 
Table 2.6 reports the predicted probabilities from the partial observability 
model (Model 2). For our sample, 70.7% of mothers of pre-school age children 
would like to use formal childcare, however, only 56.7% of these demands are 
accepted. This implies that the excess demand for childcare is 30.6% for the total 
population. Furthermore, for the mothers of pre-school age children who want 
formal childcare the queue is 43%. 
The shortage of childcare in the UK is thus rather large. The model does a 
good job at predicting the use of childcare with 80% of the use of childcare 
correctly predicted (see Table 2.7). 
Additionally, the size of the queue is nearly similar to the proportion of 
mothers using informal childcare (see Table 2.1). 
31 The probabilities are estimated for each individual. The mean probability for the population is 
thereafter calculated. 
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In the next section, we explore this issue of whether the informal sector 
accommodates for the unsatisfied demand for formal childcare. If this is the case, 
a policy increasing the supply of formal care may only shift users from informal 
to formal childcare and thus be unlikely to have large effects on the labour supply 
of mothers32. 
2.5 Simulations and policy recommendations 
If informal care only caters for mothers who have been rejected from formal 
childcare then policies aiming at increasing the use of formal childcare (usually in 
order to increase female labour supply) would mostly shift children from one type 
of care to another and hence are likely to have no substantial effect on the female 
labour supply. If, on the other hand, the queue is mostly composed of women 
who are taking care of their children themselves, then a policy of increasing the 
supply of formal care would free these mothers from part of their parental care 
duties and may allow them to participate in the labour force. 
In Table 2.7, we report the actual and predicted use of care33. The model 
predicts rather accurately the type of childcare used. For example, whilst 46% of 
individuals use formal childcare the model correctly predicts 87% of them 
(39.88/45.84). Out of the mothers predicting to be queuing for childcare, 42% 
32 A policy of shifting from informal to formal sector may be desirable, even if no effect on the 
labour supply of mother is expected, if the quality of the care provided is higher in the formal 
sector. The relative quality of the two sectors is difficult to judge. Relatives may be full of good 
intentions but does that make them good carers, on the other hand, formal care may be less good 
than the one provided by the experienced neighbour. 33 Individuals with a predicted probability greater than 0.5 were coded as 1. 
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rely on informal care and 30% use parental care. So it appears that a majority of 
mothers queuing for childcare are using informal care as a substitute, thus a 
policy increasing the supply of formal care may not have a large impact on the 
labour force participation of women, but mostly shift children from informal care 
to formal care. Formal and informal care are close substitutes. 
Table 2.7: Origin of mothers queuing for childcare 
Observed 
Predicted Informal care Formal care Row total 
Not demanding 2,101 156 2,257 [28.86] [2.14] [31.01] 
Queuing 687 278 965 [9.44] [3.82] [13.26] 
Using care 
1,154 2,903 4,057 
[15.85] [39.88] [55.74] 
Column total 
3,942 3,337 7,279 
[54.16] [45.84] [100.00] 
The traditional complaints about childcare in the UK concern the scarcity of 
the supply of childcare and its high cost. We simulate the effects of changing 
these characteristics on the demand and the queue for childcare. Since we have 
used variations in prices and supply to identify respectively the demand equation 
and the offer equation, simulated policies have to affect both prices and supply in 
order to affect both equations. Additionally, family characteristics are important, 
especially mother's labour force participation and paternal income. We simulate 
five policies along these lines, the effects of which on the demand and the queue 
for childcare are reported in Table 2.8. 
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Table 2.8: Effects on demand and queue for childcare (full samp le) 
Baseline Policy] Policy2 Policy3 Policy4 Policy5 
Pr(D=1) 0.707 
Pr(0=1/D=1) 0.567 
0.706 0.981 
0.527 0.614 
0.719 
0.526 
0.708 0.707 
0.525 0.526 
Pr(0=0/D=1) *Pr(D=1) 0.306 0.334 0.379 0.341 0.336 0.335 
Notes: Policy 1: Father's weekly pay increased by 10% 
Policy2: All mothers working 
Policy3: Mean formal childcare price at LA level increased by 10% 
Policy4: LA proportion of children in education increased by 10% 
Policy5: LA proportion of free childcare use increased by 10% 
Overall, the simulated effects seem quite small. Increasing the proportion of 
free childcare or care provided within schools, do not reduce the queue for formal 
childcare. We cannot comment on the relative efficiency of one policy versus 
another one, since the interventions simulated here are not in the same metric and 
the cost of each policy is undetermined. 
2.6 Conclusion 
We have examined the determinants of childcare demand in the UK for 
mothers of pre-school age children. For the first time in this type of analysis, we 
account for partial observability: a woman uses childcare if she demands it and if 
her offer is accepted. We found an excess demand for childcare in the UK. The 
size of the queue for childcare is substantial: while a bit more than 70% of 
mothers would like to use childcare, only 57% are provided with a place for their 
child. 
This research supports the claim that there is some market failures in the 
childcare market with supply appearing rather inelastic. It is unclear why this 
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estimated excess demand does not lead to an increase in the supply of childcare. 
Market failures also suggest that some governmental intervention is needed either 
to provide alternative for of childcare or to help private providers joining the 
market. 
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CHAPTER THREE: COST OF CHILDCARE AND FEMALE EMPLOYMENT 
IN ENGLAND 
3.1 Introduction 
Current government policy in the UK emphasises the importance of work, 
instead of welfare payments, as the main source of income. A key strategy is to 
increase the employment rate among families with children, for example, to 
reduce child poverty (see, Gregg and Harkness, 2003 for evidence of these 
reforms for lone parents' employment rates). The decision of mothers of pre- 
school age children to become employed usually implies the need to arrange 
formal childcare. The labour force participation of mothers of young children, 
however, may exhibit sensitivity to the cost, the quality, or the availability of 
childcare. 
This chapter provides UK evidence on the role that childcare costs play in the 
decision of mothers of pre-school age children to participate in the labour 
market34. The cost of childcare can be an important factor influencing the 
decision to enter the labour force. According to the Daycare Trust, the typical 
cost of a nursery place is more than the average household spends a year on 
either food or housing (Daycare Trust, 2001 )35. It is therefore reasonable for 
34 Contrary to the previous chapter, where the price of childcare was that faced by the inhabitants 
of a given local authority, in this chapter the price is the actual price paid by the household for 
formal childcare. 
35 The figures calculated for the cost of a nursery place for a two-year old child is £134 a week 
(£168 a week in London) in 2004. This compares to an average household income of £562 a week 
and the average weekly expenditure on housing and food combined of £82 per week. 
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mothers with low potential earnings to stay at home and not purchase formal 
childcare. 
In this chapter the decision to become employed is jointly modelled with the 
decision to use formal, paid childcare, both of which are influenced by the 
conventional determinants such as the price of the available childcare and the 
expected wage of the mother. 
The empirical results of this chapter can contribute to the childcare public 
policy debate. For instance, increases in the government expenditure on childcare 
subsidies are often argued on the basis of increasing the labour force participation 
of mothers of young children (Inland Revenue, 2001). These arguments, 
however, are based on certain assumptions about the responsiveness of labour 
force participation with respect to the policy instruments. 
Data are drawn from the 1993/4-1997/8 Family Resources Survey and data on 
the regional availability of childcare from the Department of Health. The 
estimation sample is composed of 7,096 married women with a pre-school age 
child. The use of formal childcare is a binary variable taking the value of 1 when 
the child is reported to be using childminder, nursery, playgroup or creche care 
and the payment for this care is positive. Appropriate sample selection 
corrections are applied to the analysis to obtain consistent estimates for the wages 
and the price of childcare for the whole sample. 
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Baseline simulations, 50.7% for labour force participation and 28.1% for the 
use of childcare, come very close to replicating the observed participation and use 
of formal childcare rates (50.5% and 27.4%, respectively). The simulation results 
show that if there were a universal zero-cost childcare available to the mothers in 
this sample the model predicts that 76.1% would be employed while only 44.8% 
would be using formal childcare. Almost a third of the mothers are hence 
predicted to use informal care when they work even if childcare were provided 
free of charge. 
Previous studies of interest have studied the impact of the price of childcare 
on many issues of public policy interest, for example, on the use of formal, paid 
care, on employment participation, on the type of care36, or on the quality of 
care37. This chapter concentrates on the first two behavioural responses that is the 
use of formal childcare decision and the labour force participation decision. 
The Prime Minister Tony Blair, quoted in the introduction to this thesis, 
identified three areas of concern on childcare policy: quality, accessibility, and 
affordability. This paper concentrates on the affordability of childcare by looking 
at the importance of childcare costs for the joint employment and use of childcare 
decisions. This study focuses on women only since they are the primary childcare 
providers in the majority of families. 
36 See, for example, Hotz and Kilburn (1991), Hofferth and Wissoker (1992), Blau and Hagy 
(1998), Michalopoulos and Robins (1999). 37 See, for example, Berger and Black (1992), Michalopoulos et al. (1992), Hagy (1998) and Blau 
and Hagy (1998). 
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Section 1.4 reviews the previous literature on the impact of the price of 
childcare on the use of formal modes of care and labour force participation of 
mothers. Furthermore, Appendix 3 summarises the previous elasticity estimates 
with details by country and method of estimation. The following section 
presents the economic and econometric model, while section 3.4 describes the 
data used in the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 contains the results of the 
employment and the use of childcare regressions as well as the policy 
simulations and section 3.6 concludes with a brief policy discussion. 
3.2 Theoretical and econometric model 
This chapter implements an empirical choice model to examine the joint 
employment and childcare choice decisions of married mothers of pre-school age 
children. The basic theoretical model underlying this analysis is discussed in 
section 1.2. To summarize the model, the decision to participate in the labour 
force is affected by the conventional determinants such as the wages and the non- 
labour income, but also by the cost of childcare. On the other hand, the decision 
to use formal childcare is influenced by the price of childcare, but also by the 
expected wage of the mother. 
The decision regarding the use of childcare involves the choice between 
formal, paid childcare and informal childcare at zero cost. This chapter focuses 
on these two aggregate modes due to data limitations. Formal modes of childcare 
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include nurseries, childminders, playgroups and creche. Informal modes of care 
include the care by the members of the immediate family and other relatives. 
The econometric method is similar to those adopted in most of the previous 
empirical research referred to in Appendix 3. The method simultaneously 
estimates the probability of labour force participation and the use of formal 
childcare including selectivity corrected price of childcare and wage estimates. 
Unlike in the previous chapter, which used aggregated price of childcare data, this 
chapter uses the actual price paid by the family for their use of formal modes of 
childcare. 
The estimating equations are bivariate probits on the probability of labour 
force participation (LFP) and the probability of purchasing formal childcare 
(USE). This analysis uses the following definition of formal childcare: USE is a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 when the child is reported to be using 
childminder, nursery, playgroup or creche care and the payment for this care is 
positive38. Because the wages are not observed for those who do not engage in 
employment and the price of childcare is not observed for those who do not use 
formal childcare, the estimation requires probit and bivariate probit sample 
selection for the wage and the price of childcare, respectively. The identifying 
restrictions for these models are discussed in more detail in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
38 In this analysis the different modes of childcare are not taken into account since the distinction 
between the different types of care is not accurate enough in the data. 
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The sample selection on the price of childcare relies on a bivariate probit 
because the selection is the result of two decisions: the use of paid care decision 
and the labour force participation decision. Hence the estimation accounts for the 
possibility that women who work may have had access to lower cost childcare. 
The formal childcare price equation therefore involves two selection terms, one 
for the probability of being a wage earner and one for the probability of 
purchasing market childcare. In the previous UK studies, the simultaneity of the 
work and the use of childcare decisions is only accounted for in the study by 
Jenkins and Symons (2001) for a sample of lone mothers. 
Specifically, 
(3.1) L=aL+ßLXL+%LWV+ÖLP+CL 
C=ac+ßcXc+xc1V+8cP+cc (3.2) 
where 
L= coded 1 if the mother engages in paid employment, zero otherwise 
XL =a vector of determinants of the decision to become employed (for example, 
age, family composition, husband's income) 
W= the expected hourly wage of the mother 
P= the expected price of childcare 
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C= coded 1 if mother purchases formal childcare, zero otherwise 
Xc =a vector of determinants of the decision to purchase formal childcare (for 
example, availability of alternative care arrangements such as older children 
or grandparents, education of mother and father, and ethnic origin of mother) 
CL : CC = error terms that are distributed bivariate normal with 'mean 0, variance 
1, and a non-zero covariance p 
The estimated parameter vectors are a, 83, x, and S. The subscripts L and C 
denote the employment and the use of childcare equation, respectively. The 
expected wage W and the expected price of childcare P are entered as two distinct 
terms because the total hours worked per week is not constrained to be equal to 
the number of hours in paid childcare39. In other words, the estimation allows 
mothers to purchase more or less hours of childcare than their working hours and 
even using childcare when they are not working. 
An alternative model to formalise the decision process between the use of 
childcare and female labour force participation includes, for example, a two-stage 
estimator by Mallar (1977), which is extensively discussed in Maddala (1983)40 
The benefit of the Mallar model is that it includes the direct influence or 
propensity of one variable upon the other and vice versa. However, this chapter 
39 Averett et al (1997) uses a single regressor (hourly wage minus hourly price of childcare), 
however, this application may be misleading if the hours of childcare use do not equal hours 
worked. 
40 This alternative method of estimation was brought to my attention by Alan Duncan. 
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uses the type of modelling most common in the previous childcare literature to 
allow more direct comparison across different studies. 
The key parameters of interest in equations (3.1) and (3.2) are the coefficients 
of the predicted wage and price of childcare. Calculation of the price of childcare 
and the own wage elasticities with respect to LFP and USE drives the discussion 
of the policy effectiveness of subsidising childcare costs. For example, the 
childcare price elasticity of labour force participation gives the responsiveness of 
the labour force participation to a change in the price of childcare. 
Before estimating equations (3.1) and (3.2) described above, we must estimate 
the selection equations. As noted earlier, the wages are only observed for 
mothers who work and the price of childcare for mothers who use formal 
childcare. Hence we need to estimate the price of childcare for non-users and the 
wages for non-workers. Working women and women using childcare have 
different unobservable characteristics than non-working women and those not 
using formal childcare, hence a selection problem occurs. The selection- 
correction required for the price of childcare, however, is more complicated since 
it involves two simultaneous decisions (LFP and USE) that are not independent 
from each other. The econometric method uses an extension of the Roy model, 
which allows double-selection (see, for example, Maddala, 1983 for the 
derivation of the selection correction or Tunali, 1986 for related identification 
issues). 
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First, since wages are only observed for those who participate in the labour 
market, we need to estimate a wage equation, which allows me to produce a wage 
measure for all women in the sample. Using the wages from the sub-sample of 
wage earners may result in biased estimates for wages of the non-working 
mothers since the working mothers of pre-school age children may possess some 
unobservable characteristics (such as motivation) that increase their likelihood of 
working. Hence a sample-correction model is used to obtain correct parameters, 
which allows the calculation of the expected wage for the whole sample. We 
construct a wage for all women in the sample using the standard techniques to 
correct for possible selectivity bias (Heckman, 1979). The wage equation is 
estimated for a sub-sample of wage earners and a linear prediction yields the 
selectivity corrected, expected hourly wage, W, for the whole sample. The 
sample selection model corrects for the fact that the reservation wage is less than 
the offered wage for women who work. The wage equation is specified as 
follows and it follows the standard labour economic practice in estimating wage 
equations: 
OW =cbowXow +uow 
where 
(3.3) 
OW = the log hourly wage of the mother for the sub-sample of wage earners 
Xow =a vector of determinants of the hourly wage of the mother (for example, 
age, level of education, region, and previous work experience) 
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uow = standard normal error term with mean 0 and variance oz 
Both the age and the level of education of the mother are expected to increase 
wages. The number of children in the household is used as a proxy for 
intermittent work history and is expected to have a negative impact on wagesal 
The selection model for labour force participation is identified with variables that 
affect the mother's reservation wages and hence the participation decision, for 
example partner's income, but that are not correlated with the wage. 
Second, the expected price of childcare is based on parameter estimates from 
a sub-sample of mothers who purchase formal childcare. Selectivity bias may 
exist if the mothers who use childcare had easier access to childcare at lower 
prices, which might have influenced their decision to work and to use formal 
childcare. Hence we estimate the price of formal childcare equation to produce a 
price estimate for all mothers in the sample. In other words, we need price of 
childcare estimates for those mothers not using formal childcare, and for those 
using zero-cost childcare. The price of childcare equation is estimated as follows 
and it includes two selectivity correction terms, one for the probability of being 
employed and another for the probability of using formal childcare. The 
correction for the probability of being employed is necessary since these mothers' 
entry into the labour force may be influenced by them finding unusually low 
priced childcare and they may not be available to the random potential 
41 Michalopoulos and Robins (2000), Powell (2002), and Connelly and Kimmel (2000) also use 
the number of children in the household in the wage equation to proxy intermittent work history. 
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participan t42. First we estimate a bivariate probit for LFP and USE. The 
appropriate sample selection correction for the childcare cost equation is more 
complicated than that of the wage equation because the selection is the result of 
two decisions, LFP and USE, and the correlation p between these two decisions. 
The two Inverse Mills ratios are then included as regressors in the price of formal 
childcare regression. The selectivity corrected parameter estimates allow the 
prediction of the expected price of childcare for the whole sample. The price of 
childcare equation is estimated as follows: 
OP = ooPX oP + uor 
where 
(3.4) 
OP = the hourly price of childcare for the sub-sample of users of formal, paid 
childcare 
Xop =a vector of determinants of the hourly price of childcare (for example, the 
age of the pre-school child, the presence of additional children, unearned 
income, and regional characteristics) 
uop = standard normal error term with mean 0 and variance cz 
The price of childcare is defined as the hourly price of childcare per hour of 
care used by the pre-school age child. The assumption in estimating the childcare 
42 For example, HSBC banking group have introduced a workplace creche to attract female 
employees. 
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prices is that the price varies according to a set of family characteristics, and 
regional characteristics. The labour force participation decision is identified with 
the same variables as when estimating the wage equation. The use of childcare is 
identified with variables that are correlated with the decision to use formal 
childcare but that do not affect the price paid for it. This may include, for 
example, variables that proxy the extent of the local network which is positively 
correlated with the probability of using informal childcare. 
Let us recap the procedure taken to estimate the supporting equations. First, a 
reduced-form probit (LFP) is estimated to create a selection term (Inverse Mills 
ratio) to correct for sample selection bias in the wage equation. Next, a reduced- 
form bivariate probit (LFP and USE) is estimated in order to produce selection 
correction terms for the price of childcare equation. Finally, the wage and the 
price of childcare equations are estimated by OLS with the appropriate 
corrections for their respective selection biases. After the wage and price of 
childcare equations have been estimated, both the predicted wage and the price of 
childcare estimates are included in the simultaneously determined LFP and USE 
equations. 
The following section describes the data used in the analysis and applies the 
method described herein to analyse the effects of the price of childcare on 
women's labour force participation and the use of formal childcare in England. 
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3.3 Description of the data 
The empirical analysis is conducted using five waves of the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS). These data cover the fiscal years 1993/4-1997/843. The FRS is an 
annual cross-section survey of around 26,000 British households each year, which 
is supported by the Department of Social Security (currently knows as the 
Department for Work and Pensions) for policy monitoring and evaluation as well 
as benefit expenditure forecasting. The benefits of using the FRS include large 
sample sizes and inclusion of detailed questions relating to the labour market 
activity and childcare usage and other characteristics of the family as well as 
benefits and childcare take-up and expenditure. Appendix 6 includes detailed 
information on the FRS. 
The FRS is augmented with local authority (LA) level data on the availability 
of different types of childcare provided by the Department of Health. The 
childcare availability data is reported as the situation in the local authority on 
March 31St of each year; for example, 31.3.1994 data on the availability of 
childcare is merged into the 1993-94 fiscal year FRS. The local authority level 
data is used to form two variables supplyl and supply2. Supplyl gives the 
combined number of day nursery and playgroup places available for children 
43 More recent years of the FRS are available for analysis, however, they have not been included 
in this study due to the constraint that the local authority childcare information is not available for 
years beyond 1998. 
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under 5 expressed as a rate per 100 children under 544. Supply2 reports the 
number of places with childminders expressed as a rate per 100 children under 
545. In the case that the childcare availability figures are missing for all the years, 
the local authority is dropped from the analysis. However, if the information is 
missing for one year, the observation is imputed by taking an average of the 
previous and the following years when possible. 
Table 3.1: Sample derivation (FRS 1993/4-1997/8 
Sample size % working % informal care 
All observations 56,341 63.2 23.3 
Households with children 30,701 63.2 22.8 
Married/co-habiting couples 20,614 70.6 25.4 
Women 10,181 54.4 25.6 
Households where partner 9,227 60.1 26.7 
works 
Not in self-employment or 8,629 57.7 26.2 
education 
Missing LA and other data 7,096 54.5 27.1 
Final sample 7,096 54.5 27.1 
Table 3.1 reports the means of achieving the sample of women used in the 
analysis. Table 3.1 also includes the mean for the labour force participation rate 
and the use of formal childcare to show that the selection of the sample does not 
alter these variables of interest. The estimating sample includes married or 
cohabiting women with at least one pre-school age child46. Households, where 
neither parent works, are dropped from the sample because the childcare data in 
44 The figures come from a table titled "Day care places available for children under 5 at 31 
March, by type of provision" giving rates per 10,000 population aged under 5 for the day nursery 
and playgroup places in the Department of Health publications. 
as The variable combines two variables from the Department of Health publications that are 
separated by the age group for which the childminder was registered: 1) full age range but using 
number of places for under 5's only and 2) specific age registered for under 5's only. 46 The usual school starting age in England is 5 years. 
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the FRS is asked consistently only from those households where at least one 
parent works47. Information is collected on the type of childcare for each child 
and for each child questions are asked about the total weekly hours of care and 
total weekly expenditure separately for term-time and holidays for each type of 
childcare. For households with more than one pre-school age child, we use the 
information on all the pre-school age children but weight the results by their 
frequency48. 
Since the focus of the analysis is the joint employment/use of childcare 
decision of mothers of pre-school age children, the analysis is limited to families 
where this choice is feasible; hence the mothers who are self-employed or in full- 
time education are excluded from the sample. Finally, the local authority level 
data on the availability of childcare places and the proportion of fee-free childcare 
available within the local authority are missing for 414 observations and hence 
these are excluded from the analysis. This yields a frequency-weighted sample of 
7,096 mothers. Of these 7,096 mothers, 3,865 or 54.5% are employed. Of this 
sample, 1,921 or 27.1% report using formal, paid childcare (see Table 3.2). 
These figures are similar to those found in the Repeat Study of Parents' Demand 
for Childcare, which reports that less than half of working mothers had used some 
formal childcare in the past year (Woodland et al., 2002). They report that three- 
47 This is also the reason for single mothers not being included in the analysis. 48 As Table 2 shows, the sample is expanded in such way that every pre-school age child's 
information is used in the analysis, subsequently the mothers who are more than once in the 
sample because they have more than once kid are weighted by their frequency, for example, a 
mother with two pre-school aged children is in the data twice with both observations having the 
weight of %:. On the contrary, Powell (2002) uses the childcare information only from the 
youngest child in the family 
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quarters of all families (including lone mothers and non-working households) 
used informal childcare in the year prior to the survey, most commonly care 
provided by the grandparents 
Table 3.2: Work and use of childcare outcomes (FRS 1993/4-1997/8 
Use of formal care 
0 1 Total 
0 2,823 408 3,231 
(87.4) (12.6) (100.0) 
Work [54.6] [21.2] 
[45.5] 
1 2,352 1,513 3,865 
(60.9) (39.2) (100.0) 
[45.5] [78.8] [54.5] 
5,175 1,921 10,668 
Total (72.9) (27.1) (100.0) 
[ 100.01 H00.01 [ 100.01 
Note: Number of observations in bold, row percentages in parenthesis, column percentages in 
square brackets. 
Summary statistics, separately for the users and non-users of formal 
childcare, for the key variables of interest are provided in Table 3.3. 
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The childcare users and non-users differ especially in the schooling level of 
the mother. The customers of formal childcare are in general better educated 
with 14.4% (versus 8.7% for non-users of childcare) of the sample having left 
education in their 20's. Also, the proportions of those leaving school at the 
minimum school-leaving age are 34.7% for users and 50.3% for non-users. The 
mothers using formal childcare are also slightly older and a larger proportion of 
them are white, in comparison to the non-users of childcare. 
The income differences between the two groups of women are highly 
different. Both own and partner's income are higher for the group of women 
who use formal childcare. Regional variation between the users and non-users of 
formal childcare is virtually non-existent. The childminder provision of care is 
slightly higher within the group of mother's who use formal childcare, however, 
it is not possible to comment on cause and effect49. This would suggest that the 
number of childcare places demanded cannot be explained by the number of 
places supplied at the regional level. However, since the impact may vary by 
individual characteristics, the local authority childcare availability variables are 
not dropped from the analysis. 
Variables used in the analysis include a set of demographic characteristics of 
the mother, a set of household composition variables and a set of structural 
variables designed to capture differences in the labour market and the childcare 
49 However, childminding is commonly considered to be more flexible and affordable than other 
types of formal childcare (see Appendix I for more information on the different types of care). 
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market. The variables capturing the demographic characteristics of the mother 
include her age, her educational level, dummy for non-white50, her and her 
husband's non-labour income and her husband's wage income. The set of 
household composition variables includes the number of children (1,2, or 3 pre- 
school age children), or the presence of children of various ages (5-12 and 13-16) 
as well as the presence of other adults living in the household. The set of 
structural variables include the local authority availability of childcare, the 
proportion of free care used within a local authority, and the length of current 
residence. The length of residence is constructed as a binary variable, which is 1 
if the household has moved within the past two years prior to being surveyed. 
This variable acts as a proxy for the availability of local informal carers. Low or 
zero-cost informal care, e. g. by relatives, neighbours, and older children in the 
household, leads to lower reservation wages and hence to a higher participation 
probability. Ribar (1992) finds that the cross-price effects of market care and 
non-market care are positive indicating that paid and unpaid childcare modes are 
substitutes in the US childcare markets. This finding is contrary to our finding for 
the UK that was presented in Chapter 2. 
The average weekly payment for childcare for married couples was £40.56 
per child in 1994 conditional on reporting a positive payments'. In general those 
so The non-white group includes the following categories: black (Caribbean), black (African), 
black (undefined), Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, and other undefined. 
51 Note that Finlayson et al. (1996) truncate hourly childcare price data at £10 at the top and £0.25 
in the bottom as well as at £120 per weekly data. 
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with more children did not pay more for childcare per week (Finlayson et al., 
1996). 
The expected price of childcare is defined as the full hourly price of care that 
parents should anticipate to pay. Prices paid by users of childcare are used to 
attribute prices to non-users of childcare as explained in the previous section. The 
income variables are excluded from the childcare price regressions since the 
positive correlation between income and price of childcare may be due to the 
choice of higher quality childcare arrangements. The price of childcare is 
expressed in £ per hour. Positive childcare expenditures are in some cases 
reported for those using informal care (28 observations), however, prices are used 
for those using formal childcare only. Since the hours of childcare and the 
payment made for it are recorded as a sum over all types, the hours and 
expenditure data are not used for children who use a mixture of formal and 
informal care. However, the fact that they use formal childcare is used in the 
analysis to avoid further sample selection problems. 
Identifying variables in the previous research that is summarised in Appendix 
3 consist mostly of state level variables that proxy the quality of childcare, for 
example, maximum child-staff ratio, the level of training of centre based 
childcare providers, and mean wage of childcare workers (see, for example, 
Kimmel, 1998). This chapter uses local authority level data on the average 
wages, years of education and work tenure of childcare workers to identify the 
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childcare prices S2. Furthermore, Powell (2002) uses regional per capita income to 
identify childcare prices. As argued in Chaplin et al. (1999), this variable is 
expected to affect the wages of childcare workers but not the demand for 
childcare. We have constructed a similar variable using the household income 
information from the FRS. 
3.4 Results 
Subsection 3.4.1 discusses the results from the supporting equations presented 
in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. The results from the employment-childcare use model 
are presented in subsection 3.4.2 in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. 
3.4.1 Results from the Supporting Equations 
In this section we present the results from the supporting equations that are 
used to predict the wages (Table 3.4) and the price of childcare (Table 3.5) for the 
whole sample. 
52 These variables are constructed from the Labour Force Surveys separately for each year. 
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Table 3.4: Sample-selection corrected wage estimates 
Selection probit work Hourly log wage 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Age 0.240 *** 0.025 0.148 *** 0.016 
Agee/10 -0.031 *** 0.004 -0.017 *** 0.002 
Years of education 0.123 *** 0.035 0.092 *** 0.003 
Non white -0.114 ** 0.050 -0.190 *** 0.031 
Age ofpre-school age child 0.037 *** 0.007 
Two pre-school children -0.445 *** 0.028 -0.149 *** 0.017 
Three pre-school children -0.499 *** 0.045 -0.227 *** 0.031 
Number of children aged 5- -0.292 *** 0.020 -0.173 *** 0.013 
12 
Number of children aged 12--0.261 *** 0.059 -0.181 *** 0.036 
16 
Father's pay, f/week/100 -0.056 *** 0.004 
Father's non-work income, -0.007 *** 0.002 
f/week/10 
Mother's non-work income, 0.009 *** 0.002 
f/week/10 
Lambda 0.509 *** 0.016 
Constant -4.020 *** 0.400 -2.789 *** 0.261 
Observations 7,096, of which 3,581 censored 
Log likelihood -9503.617 
p 0.869 *** 
Note: Specifications include year dummies, regional dummies, and dummies for missing bad 
health, region and qualification variables. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respective ly. 
Table 3.4 presents a selectivity-corrected wage model for the mother, where 
the selection concerns the decision to become employed and hence being in the 
sub-sample of wage-earners. The self-employed and students are not included in 
any of the estimation. The results are generally consistent with theoretical 
expectations. The probability of participating in the labour force increases with 
age but at a decreasing rate53. Schooling has the expected effect on both 
participation and wages. Compared to women who left school at the earliest 
53 As has become standard practice for early stages of estimation, second-order age terms are included while they are excluded in the structural models (see Mroz, 1987). 
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opportunity, those with more schooling are more likely to be employed. The non- 
white ethnic origin is associated with both lower participation and 20% lower 
wages than the comparison woman. The presence of children of any age is 
associated with decreased participation with the effect being the strongest for the 
number of pre-school age children. The variables used to identify the model are 
commonly used in previous studies, for example, Cleveland et al. (1996) and 
Kimmel (1998). These variables (partner's pay, non-labour income) have a direct 
effect on the reservation wages of mothers hence affecting her employment 
decision with no impact on the wage. The partner's work and non-work income 
have the expected negative effect on the employment probability, however, 
mother's own non-work income is positive and significant. This unexpected 
result may be explained by this income being mainly income from, for example, 
investments and savings. The identifying variables are tested using an informal 
method suggested by Cameron and Taber (2000), which examines the 
relationship between the excluded variables and the observables in the wage or 
the price equation. The results suggest that the identifying variables are working 
in the manner that is expected of a valid identifying variable S4. The positive and 
significant selection correction term (lambda) means that the wage earners in the 
dataset have unusually high wages owing to their unobservable characteristics 
(such as motivation) compared to women with similar characteristics who are not 
in the labour force. 
54 These results are available from the author upon request. 
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Table 3.5 presents estimates for the joint model for employment and the use 
of formal childcare (columns 1 and 2) that are used to correct for selectivity in the 
price of childcare equation (column 3). The correlation coefficient p indicates 
that the bivariate probit is the correct method to estimate the joint employment- 
use of childcare decision since it is highly significant and positive as expected. 
The model predicting employment participation has the same covariates than the 
one presented in Table 3.4 with same magnitude effects, hence these results are 
not discussed here. Jointly estimated with the employment participation equation 
is the equation for the probability of using formal childcare. As a reminder, the 
use of formal care is a binary variable taking the value of 1 when the child is 
reported to be using childminder, nursery, playgroup or creche care and the 
payment for this care is positive. Age and the level of education has the expected 
impact on the use of childcare with older and more educated mothers being more 
likely to purchase formal childcare. Non-white women are less likely to use 
formal modes of childcare, however, the possible differences between the ethnic 
groups are not accounted for due to small sample sizes. Age of the pre-school 
child is an important determinant of the decision to use formal childcare with the 
younger pre-school age children being more likely to be cared for informally, for 
example, by the mother. Surprisingly the price of childcare, however, is not 
dependent on the age of the child. 
The variables used to identify the use of childcare equation are also used in 
studies by, for example, Powell (1998) and Jenkins and Symons (2001). The 
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variables indicating alternative caregivers in the household can be expected to 
reduce the likelihood of using formal care, while the regional availability of 
childcare should have a positive effect on the use. 
The price regression reported in the third column of Table 3.5 show mostly 
expected results. The mother's years of schooling is positively related to the price 
of childcare she chooses. In other words, better educated individuals tend to 
choose a more expensive childcare option. The non-white pay over 20% less for 
their childcare which may reflect more reliance on informal childcare to 
supplement the formal care they use. Similarly, the presence of other adults in the 
household is associated with a lower cost paid for formal childcare. The number 
of pre-school age children is clearly associated with increasing economies of 
scale, however, surprisingly the age of the child has a non-significant effect 
although positive as expected. Increasing the number of childminder places in the 
local authority decreases the price paid for formal care as expected by economic 
theory. This significant relationship does not apply to the relationship between 
the price and the number of nursery or playgroup places. This is not completely 
surprising since the childminder is considered the more flexible and desirable 
childcare option by most parents (see Appendix 1 for more details on the UK 
childcare market). The local authority level variables on average wage and 
experience of childcare workers are positive and significant as expected. These 
variables partly capture the unobservable effect that higher quality care costs 
more but also regional differences within England. On the other hand, the 
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education of childcare workers fails to be significant but this may be due to very 
little variation in the level of education of childcare workers. The income quintile 
variables capture the fact that households with more disposable income tend to 
opt for better quality and hence more expensive childcare. The selection 
correction terms for work (imrl) and for the use of care (imr2) fail to be 
significant at the usual statistical level of significance. However, they are of the 
expected sign. 
3.4.2 Employment-childcare use model results 
Table 3.6 provides the empirical results of the main equations of interest, the 
bivariate probit results for the joint employment and use of childcare that are first 
introduced in equations 1 and 2 respectively. Table 3.6 reports the probit 
coefficients and hence for the elasticity estimates the reader should consult Table 
3.7. 
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The first column of Table 3.6 reports the estimates of the employment 
equation of the bivariate probit. The predicted wage has the expected positive 
effect and the price of childcare has the expected negative effect on the 
probability of employment. The number of children and the father's working 
income both have an expected negative effect on the mother's employment 
behaviour since they affect the reservation wage of the mothers of young 
children. 
The third column of Table 3.6 reports the estimated probit coefficients of the 
use of formal childcare equation of the bivariate probit. The predicted wage and 
price both have the expected sign with respect to the use of childcare. The 
number and the age of the pre-school age children in the household increase the 
likelihood of using formal childcare. However, surprisingly the provision of local 
authority childcare has no significant impact on the use of childcare55. On the 
other hand, variables that proxy the availability of informal childcare all have a 
negative, and in most cases significant, effect on the probability of using formal 
childcare. 
The most important empirical result is that the predicted price of childcare 
exerts a significant negative impact on the decision to become employed as well 
as the decision to use formal childcare. Hence a reduction in the market cost of 
childcare should have a positive effect on both employment and the use of formal 
55 These statistics do not include private provision of childcare. 
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childcare. The extent of this effect is examined in the employment and use of 
childcare simulations presented in section 3.5. 
Table 3.7 presents the elasticity estimates for married women with pre-school 
age children. The sign of the wage elasticity according to economic theory is 
ambiguous but in the empirical literature the sign is typically positive. One 
should bear in mind that the reported elasticities are just a measure of the mean 
effect and that different individuals may well have different wage elasticities. 
Table 3.7: Price and wage elasticities for employment and formal care use 
Employment Use of formal childcare 
Price of childcare -0.173 *** -0.091 *** 
(0.028) (0.034) 
Wage 0.354 *** 0.405 *** 
(0.087) (0.075) 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis 
The wage elasticity with respect to employment is estimated to be 0.35, 
therefore a 10% increase in wages would lead to a 3.5% increase in the 
employment participation of mothers of pre-school age children. The estimated 
elasticity with respect to the use of formal childcare is 0.41. In other words, a 
10% increase in wages would increase the use of formal childcare by 4.1%. As 
Appendix 1 indicates the previous estimates for the wage elasticity of 
employment range from 0.04 in Michalopoulos et al. (1992) to 3.25 in Kimmel 
(1998) for the US. For the UK, Jenkins and Symons (2001) estimate the wage 
elasticity of employment to be 0.25 for single mothers. Unfortunately, they do 
not provide estimates for married mothers. 
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The price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in the quantity 
of childcare demanded resulting from a given percentage change in the price of 
formal childcare. The price elasticity of demand for formal care with respect to 
employment is -0.17 indicating that across-the-board 10% decrease in the price of 
formal care would lead to a 1.7% increase in the employment participation rate of 
mothers of pre-school age children. Comparing the estimated elasticity of -0.17 
to those found in previous literature, as summarised in Appendix 3, we can see 
that it lies in the lower end of the estimates found for the US. The estimates for 
the US range from -0.20 to -0.92 in studies by Connelly (1992) and Kimmel 
(1998), respectively. However, the UK estimate provided by Jenkins and Symons 
(2001) is -0.09. Berger and Black (1992) and Kimmel (1998) estimate the 
elasticity to be smaller in absolute value for single mothers as opposed to married 
mothers hence my estimate of -0.17 seems reasonable for the UK. 
The price elasticity with respect to use of formal childcare is estimated to be - 
0.09. In other words, a 10% reduction in the price of childcare would lead to 
approximately 1% increase in the use of formal childcare. Hence a subsidy that 
results in a large cut in the price of childcare would have only a modest impact in 
inducing families to switch to formal childcare. Appendix 3 summarises a 
number of studies and indicates that the estimated price elasticity of childcare use 
is smaller than the previous estimates for the US, which range from -0.22 to - 
1.86 in studies by Ribar (1995) and Ribar (1992) respectively. However, the 
results of the current study may be biased due to the endogeneity of the variable 
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indicating the choice to work part-time. Both the prevalence of part-time work 
and the use of informal childcare in the UK are caveats that this chapter has not 
attempted to tackle but that should be on the future research agenda on this topic. 
The estimated elasticities highlight the effectiveness of policy variables that 
affect the price, for example, the recently introduced childcare element of the 
Working Tax Credit (WTC). In general, since a ten percent decrease in childcare 
costs would lead to a modest 1.7% increase in the mothers' employment 
probabilities, childcare clearly is an inelastic good S6. Hence the costs of the 
programme may not be recovered from increasing tax revenue, especially since 
the take-up of subsidies and tax credits is usually well below 100% (see Witte and 
Queralt, 2002 for US evidence). However, since childcare is a good with 
potential benefits to the society, not just to the individuals, a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis examining these issues would be desirable. 
Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that the childcare market may not be 
perfect. In other words, the supply may not automatically adjust to the demand, 
for example, due to a shortage of childcare personne157. Studies of this kind 
assume that the supply of childcare is perfectly elastic and that childcare is a 
normal good. These assumptions are questioned by, for example, Chevalier and 
56 Factors that affect the magnitude of the elasticity include the number and closeness of 
substitutes for the commodity. When there are no good substitutes, the good is more inelastic. 
Hence it is likely that the elasticity is lower in absolute value for mothers with no access to 
informal childcare arrangements. 
57 As long as the demand for childcare is inelastic, the producer can increase total revenue (TR) 
simply by increasing the price of childcare. If the producer increases the price, less of this 
commodity will be consumed hence resulting in smaller output and a smaller total cost of 
production (TC). Hence the consumers will be worse off while, with TR rising and TC falling, the 
profits (TR-TC) for producers increase. 
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Viitanen (2002) who conclude that the supply of childcare is inelastic. They find 
that in the UK women's labour force participation is constrained by the lack of 
childcare facilities. Hence the elasticity figure obtained here may not reflect the 
true elasticity that would prevail in the absence of excess demand for childcare. 
3.5 Employment simulations 
As a final exercise, this chapter reports the results of policy simulations in 
Table 3.8. The estimates of the basic economic model estimated in the previous 
section can be used to analyse key policy issues. In this section we simulate the 
employment and the use of formal childcare effects of revisions to childcare 
subsidisation policies that lower the price of childcare to the consumers of formal 
modes of childcare. The simulation results provide another way to gauge the 
magnitude of the estimated price effects. The simulated responses are obtained 
by computing mean probabilities for each of the alternatives in the choice set over 
the individuals and for different alterations in the budget constraint. 
Table 3.8: Employment and use of childcare simulations 
Employment Use of formal childcare 
Baseline 50.7% 28.1% 
50% subsidy 64.5% 36.2% 
100% subsidy 76.1% 44.8% 
Note: 7,096 observations 
The first row of Table 3.8 lists the baseline employment and childcare 
utilisation rates from the sample. The baseline represents the predicted 
probabilities of formal childcare utilisation and labour force participation as they 
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are at the optimal point before any change in the budget set. Baseline simulations 
come very close to replicating the observed participation and use of formal 
childcare rates (50.5% and 27.4%, respectively). 
The first policy change consists of a flat 50% subsidy on childcare 
expenditures. This policy would increase labour force participation by 13.8 
percentage points to 64.5%. On the other hand, the use of formal childcare would 
increase by only 8.1 percentage points to 36.2%. 
Previous research for the UK has found that a 25% decrease in childcare costs 
would encourage 1/3 of parents to use more care while with a 25% increase in 
costs 1/5 of respondents would reduce or stop using the childcare (La Valle et al., 
2000)58. Their higher estimates may result from using a different metric (hours of 
childcare) rather than a binary variable for the use of formal childcare. 
The second policy change provides a full childcare subsidy for all pre-school 
age children. Although as an out-of-sample prediction these estimates may be 
unreliable, this exercise is worth undertaking to compare the outcomes with the 
actual figures for Finland, where the childcare sector is highly subsidised. A 
100% subsidy increases the average employment probability by 25 percentage 
points. In other words, provision of free care causes a 50.1% increase in the 
employment probability of married mothers of pre-school age children to 
S$ This fording comes from a Baseline Survey of Parents' Demand for Childcare for children aged 
14 and under in England and Wales. 
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76.1%59. The full subsidy for childcare would increase the use of formal 
childcare by 59.4% to 44.8%. Therefore 31.3% of mothers who work under the 
full childcare subsidy scheme would not use formal childcare. This suggests that 
many families prefer family care or relative care even when formal care is fully 
subsidised (see, for example, Duncan and Giles, 1996). This may be an 
indication of mothers perceiving the quality of formal childcare to be lower than 
informal care. A childcare subsidy would not affect their decision unless it 
induced them to switch from the informal to the formal childcare sector. Hence, 
childcare subsidies may not be a very effective policy for encouraging mothers to 
work if they fail to induce many mothers to take advantage of them and use 
formal care. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper has presented empirical evidence on the impact of wage rates and 
childcare prices on the joint employment-use of childcare choice decision of 
married mothers. The estimation results showed that, as expected, childcare price 
has a significant, negative effect on the probability of working and use of formal 
modes of childcare. This study examines the extent to which female labour force 
participation is affected by the costs of replacing maternal care with market care 
in England. This is done through the estimation of bivariate probits for work and 
use of formal childcare controlling for the expected wage and the price of 
59 This compares favourably to actual labour force participation rates of over 70% for mothers of 
pre-school age children in Finland where all parents are entitled to a childcare subsidy ranging 
between 88% and 100% of the childcare costs depending on the income. 
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childcare. This method reflects the interrelated nature of the childcare choice and 
the labour force participation decision. 
The empirical analysis is conducted using five years of the Family Resources 
Survey with additional local authority level information on the supply of 
childcare and local labour market characteristics. 
The results confirm the findings of previous research. The opportunity cost of 
mother's time at home increases with the increase in her earnings as expected. 
Simultaneously accounting for non-random selection into use of formal childcare 
and employment, the estimated childcare price elasticity with respect to 
employment is -0.17 and with respect to the use of formal childcare is -0.09. The 
estimation results reveal that demand for childcare is relatively inelastic 
Baseline simulations, 50.7% for labour force participation and 28.1% for the 
use of childcare, come very close to replicating the observed participation and use 
of formal childcare rates (50.5% and 27.4%, respectively). The simulation results 
show that if there were a universal zero-cost childcare available to the mothers in 
this sample the model predicts that 76.1% would be employed while only 44.8% 
would be using formal childcare. Almost a third of the mothers are hence 
predicted to use informal care when they work when childcare is provided free of 
charge. 
The results indicate sensitivity of female labour supply to the price of 
childcare. The policy-relevance of this topic is closely related to current 
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government policy, for example, the Working Tax Credit (WTC). This policy 
relies heavily on a very elastic demand for childcare. The childcare element of 
the WTC distributes low-income working individuals money to be used for the 
payment of childcare. However, the decision to become employed depends on 
the characteristics of the individual as well as their wage and the price of the 
available childcare. Unfortunately this data does not cover the time period when 
the childcare component of the WTC, or its predecessor Working Families Tax 
Credit, has taken effect, however, the elasticity figures in this paper may give 
some indication of the likely impact of such policies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF A PRIVATE 
CHILDCARE VOUCHER 
4.1 Introduction 
In the past three decades, female labour force participation has increased in 
most Western countries, particularly for mothers of pre-school age children. In 
most countries this shift has put a strain on the provision of formal childcare 
leading to problems commonly associated with a market failure. As a 
consequence government policies have been formulated to assist both the supply 
and the demand side of the childcare market. 
The formulation of most effective government policies requires the 
knowledge of the responsiveness of the consumers to the price of childcare. 
Hence, numerous studies have examined the impact of the price of childcare on 
the labour force participation and the use of childcare. 
Ideally the impact of the price of childcare on the labour force participation 
and the use of childcare is examined in an experimental set-up. An exogenous 
shock in the price of childcare that affects the household budget constraint allows 
us to identify the impact of the price of childcare on labour force participation and 
the use of formal childcare. 
This paper relies on an experimental set-up to estimate the impact of a private 
childcare voucher on labour force participation and the use of childcare. As 
argued by Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000), an extensive public provision of 
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childcare may discourage private providers from entering the market for 
childcare. However, there is evidence that the voucher for private childcare for 
Finland facilitated the market entry of new participants hence increasing the 
availability of childcare in the experimental regions. 
The increased availability of childcare places provides an exogenous shift in 
the price of childcare faced by the parents who resided in the experimental 
regions where the voucher was available. This in turn allows the identification of 
the impact of the price of childcare on the labour force participation and the use 
of childcare. 
The next section examines the literature on childcare financing and vouchers 
specifically. Section 4.3 explains the voucher experiment in more detail while 
section 4.4 explains the econometric method used in the analysis. Section 4.5 
through to section 4.7 includes a description of the data and the estimation results 
while section 4.8 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the 
main findings. 
4.2 Previous literature 
Previous studies have found that high-quality publicly subsidised childcare 
encourages the labour market activity of mothers of pre-school age children (see, 
for example, Gustafsson and Stafford, 1992 or Kaj anoj a, 1999). However, a full 
childcare subsidy, which is common in continental Europe, interferes with market 
mechanisms. For example, Ilmakunnas (1997) and Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000) 
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argue that heavily subsidised public provision of childcare prevents competition 
from private providers due to high barriers to entry60. Therefore, depending on 
individual preferences for private versus public childcare, some people may be 
discouraged from entering the labour market. Along the same lines, Bradford and 
Shaviro (2000) discuss the importance of competitive private supply. They argue 
that public provision creates monopoly power and misdirected bureaucratic 
incentives. On the other hand, the private sector with their profit motive 
combined with the need to satisfy customers induces both cost-saving production 
and socially valuable innovation. Hence it is cheaper to produce despite 
subsidies. 
A universal childcare subsidy is subject to a large deadweight loss since it 
subsidises families that would be willing to pay the market price for childcare in 
the absence of the subsidy (Duncan and Giles, 1996)61. The deadweight loss is 
considerable in Finland, first, because every child is provided a child subsidy 
regardless of household income and, second, because the parental contribution 
towards the total cost of the universal childcare provision is small even for the 
highest income groups (see Appendix 2 for more details on the Finnish family 
policy). 
Vouchers are a classic way to finance a quasi-market, where private sector 
mechanisms are transferred to the public sector, and have been widely used in the 
60 Parents' willingness to pay for private childcare may be low since under the system of public 
provision of childcare they are used to paying low fees. 
61 More extensive discussion on childcare subsidies and their simulated impacts for the UK can be 
found in Duncan et al. (1995). 
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provision of education or healthcare62. Vouchers increase the efficiency of the 
market by introducing consumer choice and therefore increased competition 
between providers63. A voucher system enables parents to choose freely between 
the public or "subsidised private" sectors of the childcare market. Users 
("buyers") create demand for one establishment rather than another. 
Establishments ("sellers") react by expansion, contraction, or adjustment of costs 
and quality. The increased consumer choice and competition has the following 
positive aspects: price decreases while the provision increases, which leads to 
increased consumer satisfaction (Bradford and Shaviro, 2000). Since childcare 
vouchers for low-income families were introduced in the US, there has been an 
unprecedented increase in the number, quality and variety of providers available 
responding to parents needs and preferences, for example, regarding the hours of 
care needed (Besharov and Samari, 2002). 
The Finnish Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT, 1995) 
discusses the possible merits and disadvantages of a childcare voucher system. 
Ideally this type of quasi-market combines the best components of a competitive 
market and the public system. Specifically, a quasi-market may be more 
responsive to changes in demand. Additionally, VATT (1995) notes the 
importance of taking into account the effect of the voucher combined with the 
62 Steuerle et al. (2000) provide a comprehensive review of vouchers used for financing of public 
services. 
63 However, Besharov and Samari (2000) note the importance of calibrating the childcare voucher 
payments to the local market conditions to prevent subsidies meant for low-income families to 
benefit more affluent families or increasing profits for providers. Similar issues are also discussed 
in Duncan and Giles (1996). 
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effects of the tax system, housing subsidy and childcare fees. In particular, a 
means-tested voucher combined with other income-conditioned aspects of the 
tax-transfer system may lead to a combined effective marginal tax rate 
approaching or even exceeding 100% hence leading to incentive problems. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the decisions of parents between public childcare provision, 
private (non-subsidised) childcare provision and voucher-subsidised private 
provision assuming that families have well-behaved preferences. On the x-axis is 
the amount or quality of childcare purchased (CC) and on the y-axis all other 
goods (Y). The budget constraint for publicly provided childcare is rectangular 
because in the Finnish context it is provided largely free of charge, or for a low 
fee, which allows the household to spend its income on alternative consumption 
(Y). The children attending public childcare receive CC1 amount of care. 
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Figure 4.1: Budget constraint effect of a private childcare voucher 
Y 
I(voucher) 
I(public) 
(private) 
cc 
Private childcare provision may be a more desirable option for some 
households according to parental preferences (for example, better opening hours, 
a more convenient location, or some aspect of the perceived quality of childcare). 
However, the budget constraint CC2 for privately provided childcare is very 
steepTM. In other words, the household must give up many units of Y to purchase 
an additional unit of CC. Figure 4.1 depicts a situation in which the utility of 
choosing the public childcare provider is higher than the utility derived from 
privately provided childcare because the extra cost outweighs the extra benefit 
derived from attending a private childcare provider. 
64 The two goods, public childcare and private childcare, are substitutes as most childcare is 
provided full-time and hence the budget constraints CCl and CC2 are drawn as separate lines not 
allowing a combination of both types of care. 
137 
A private childcare voucher shifts the budget constraint for private care from 
CC2 to CC3. Because the voucher subsidises the cost of private childcare to the 
parents, the new budget constraint is much flatter depending on the amount of the 
voucher. Hence depending on the flatness of the budget constraint, the household 
could reach a higher level of utility I(voucher) and a higher level of CC as 
depicted in Figure 4.1. 
According to this simple analysis, a private childcare voucher can be expected 
to increase the use of private childcare on average, either as a substitution away 
from public childcare to private childcare or as new entrants to the childcare 
market. In the former case it can be expected that the hours of work of the main 
caretaker in the household (usually the mother) will stay the same or increase if 
the previously used public provision did not adequately accommodate her 
working behaviour. In the latter case there should be an increase in the 
participation probability of mothers of pre-school age children. 
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Figure 4.2: Market for childcare with a voucher 
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The voucher can be expected to increase the overall supply of childcare since 
more private providers will enter the market (move from So to Si) in Figure 4.2. 
The decrease in the price of childcare (Po to PI) resulting from increased 
competition is expected to increase the demand for childcare. The magnitude of 
the effect depends on the income and price elasticities of demand for and supply 
of different types of care (move from Do to Di or D2)65. Hence the overall effect 
of the voucher on the price of childcare is ambiguous. Furthermore, if private 
65 As a general rule, short-run elasticities are lower in absolute value than long-run elasticities. 
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S, 
providers have local monopoly power, they may try to capture part of the 
voucher. 
4.3 The Finnish voucher experiment 
Childcare costs in Finland represent 1.4% of GDP. The childcare is provided 
by municipalities, which finance it through municipality taxes and contributions 
from the central government. Users pay a means-tested fee, which is fixed by the 
municipality, of up to E168 per child (in 1998). However, the payment by the 
consumers of childcare only covers approximately 15% of the total cost of 
childcare. The high level of public expenditure has led to pressures to enhance its 
effectiveness (Hemmings et al., 2003). 
The large public provision of childcare has led to an inefficient outcome 
where many municipalities suffer from excess demand while at the same time 
others experience excess supply66. Clearly the universal provision of public 
childcare is inefficient and costly. Overall, more than 20% of municipalities 
could not meet their childcare requirements (Palokangas, 1995). To cope with the 
discrepancy between the supply and the demand for childcare, Palokangas (1995) 
66 Palokangas (1995) find that overall the supply and demand for childcare do not meet; in 1994, 
there was an oversupply of about 7100 places but also excess demand of 2800 places varying by 
region mostly for 3-6 year olds and part-time places. The Ministry of Social Services and Health (1998: 20) find that most excess demand was found in the municipalities of Espoo, Vantaa, 
Helsinki (which are in the treatment group of the experiment), Savonlinna, Lahti and Lappeenranta (which are in the control group of the experiment). 
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suggests the introduction of vouchers for childcare services as well as introducing 
a needs-basis for childcare67. 
By introducing competition to the market for childcare, the vouchers should 
lead to efficiency gains. In general, enhanced competition boosts private 
initiatives, which leads to an expansion of the market for childcare services. 
Moreover, private childcare provides parents with more choice and suitable care, 
for example, longer opening hours allowing atypical employment. Hence, at the 
margin, the voucher is expected to increase both the labour force participation and 
the use of childcare of mothers of pre-school age children. 
The early 1990's recession forced municipalities to cut costs in all public 
services including public childcare provision. As a consequence, the childcare 
services concentrated on providing the services that were required by law and 
reduced the financing for discretionary after-school care and playgroups. In this 
spirit, the voucher experiment started with a main objective of reducing the costs 
of provision of childcare as well as increasing childcare availability. The goal of 
the experiment was not to privatise childcare services but instead to get the 
benefits of competition in the market for childcare, in particular to reduce the 
dead-weight loss and concurrently to give parents more choice regarding the type 
of childcare services they have available. The voucher experiment lasted from 
67 The right to a childcare place in Finland does not require the parents to be employed or in full- 
time education. 
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1.3.1995 to 31.7.1997, and it was administered by the Ministry of Social Services 
and Health. 
The municipality representatives who were interviewed before the start of the 
experiment guessed that the private childcare voucher would increase the cost of 
childcare but have zero (71% of respondents) or negative effect (20%) on the 
demand for childcare (Heikkilä and Törmä, 1996). 
The voucher is a child-specific subsidy for privately provided childcare for 
any pre-school age child. It is available from the date the parental leave 
(vanhempainrahakausi) ends as the child turns three years old (see Appendix 2 for 
more details on the Finnish family policy including parental leave) until the child 
reaches school age at seven. 
Each municipality pays a subsidy to the private childcare provider chosen by 
the family. The amount of the subsidy varies by municipality. The private 
childcare providers are entrepreneurs 68, however, they face the same laws 
regarding child-staff ratios and educational requirements of the staff as publicly 
provided childcare and are regularly inspected by the municipality 69. 
Privately produced childcare is in general cheaper to produce than public 
care 70 . On the organisational level the private childcare, is less bureaucratic with 
the entrepreneur as the sole decision-maker regarding the business. Additionally, 
68 The private childcare is exempt from VAT. 
69 Average child/staff ratio is 4.2 in daycare centres and 2.8 in childn-dnder care. 70 However, there has not been any municipality level analysis on whether private childcare is 
cheaper for the parents. 
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private childcare can be thought to have a comparative advantage in producing 
more specialised care as well as providing more flexible opening hours and more 
interaction with the parents and the childcare personnel7l. 
By the beginning of 1995,33 municipalities, out of 450, reported wanting to 
take part in the experiment and all were accepted. Out of the 33 participating 
municipalities, 13 were cities and half of the remaining participants were small 
municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants. Most of the participating 
municipalities were in the government office regions of Uusimaa (12), Pohjois- 
Kaýala (6), and Harne (4) with the rest distributed across the country (Appendix 5 
shows the geographical location of the participating municipalities and names the 
municipalities taking part in the experiment). Six municipalities are excluded 
from the analysis due to inconsistencies in their participation, for example, a few 
municipalities started the voucher experiment before others in 1994. 
Eligibility to receive vouchers typically depends on personal and household 
characteristics. The amount and the type of the voucher were chosen freely by 
the municipality to best suit their needs. 21 municipalities chose a means-tested 
voucher (IE140-366/month/child for 0-2 year olds; E128-343/month/child for 3-6 
year olds) while 12 municipalities gave out a lump-sum voucher 
(C304/month/child on average for 0-2 year olds; C263/month/child on average for 
3-6 year olds). On top of the voucher, the childcare centres can charge additional 
71 The personnel may also be less unionised but there are no statistics available to confirm this 
hypothesis. 
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fees. Since this fee is chosen freely between the provider and the customer, the 
childcare providers can cater for different parental preferences regarding the 
hours of the type of childcare 72 . About half of the families in private care pay 
between C168 and E252 a month on top of the voucher. A fifth of the families 
using vouchers pay more for private care on top of the voucher than they would 
pay for public care. 
Heikkild and Takala (1999) and Takala (2000) surveyed a sample of families 
with pre-school age children after the experiment. They conclude that the 
families choosing the private childcare voucher have a higher level of education 
and a higher occupational status (approximately 80% were in professional or 
managerial occupations). 
The finding that families with a higher socio-economic status are more likely 
to use private childcare is also reflected in the price paid for this mode of care. A 
quarter of the families using private childcare pay over 10% of their disposable 
income for the fees (however, most of these are low income families) while this 
percentage is only 14% for families using publicly provided childcare (Takala, 
2000). The highest payment for public childcare is approximately 6168 per 
month and about 40% of families using the care are in this group, while 13% of 
families are exempt from fees. In general, private care is more expensive, for 
example, while 13% of families using public care pay over C252 per month on top 
72 Helsingin Sanornat "Joka viidcs plivikoti on yksityinen" and "Yksityinen paivakotiketju aikoo 
kasvaa ripeasti" 2.12.2002. 
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of the voucher for the care of all their children, this proportion for private care 
users is 27%. 
For the municipalities, using vouchers has been cheaper than producing the 
care themselves (Heikkild and T6nnd, 1996). On average, the voucher cost, 650 
less per child per month than the publicly provided care. The savings varied by 
municipality depending on the amount of the voucher. While the private care 
accounted for approximately 6% of all childcare provision, the average costs for 
the municipalities were only 1.5% of total childcare spending. The cost of private 
care provision is between 60% and 90% of the comparative public care. The 
survey did not examine the main reasons for the cost differential. However, the 
main reasons are believed to include lower bureaucracy and the ability to turn 
away potential customers, for example, children under the age of three who are 
more costly to care for in formal childcare settings. 
Of the families choosing the voucher, 17% moved into private care from 
public care, and 45% were already customers in the private care 73 .A quarter of 
the families were given the voucher as an only option due to excess demand for 
publicly provided childcare. In a survey by the Ministry of Social Services and 
Health, 41.2% of families use specialised childcare (most commonly care with 
foreign-language, music or art oriented activitieS)74 . Families choosing the 
73 The deadweight is large, however, there is large public support for subsidised childcare for all 
income groups (see Bergstrom and Blomquist, 1996 for more details). 74 The percentage is over 80% in Helsinki and higher than average in other municipalities in the 
capital region. 
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voucher and using privately provided childcare, on average, subjectively valued 
75 the quality to be better than those using public care . 
The Ministry of Social Services and Health (1997) examine the experiment 
and note that it brought about a good base for changing attitudes towards the 
production of childcare, moving away from the traditional model of municipality 
produced childcare, which is financed by tax revenue. As a consequence, even 
small municipalities witnessed a rise in the private production of childcare. A 
survey finds that 22% of the private childcare entrepreneurs who were in 
operation in 1998 started their business when the voucher experiment started. Of 
the entrepreneurs that started their business during the experiment, 59% reported 
that the reason for starting was the private childcare voucher (Johtoryhmdn 
muistio, 1997). 
The municipalities have expressed their wish to maintain the acquired level of 
private childcare provision and many have increased the amount of the private 
care subsidy afler the experiment (Johtoryhmdn muistio, 1997). The experiment 
was deemed a success and a private childcare subsidy was introduced nationally 
in 1997. By 2002, a fifth of all childcare centres (approximately 3,000 in total) in 
Finland were private enterprises accounting for about 6% of all childcare places. 
The Ministry of Social Services and Health (1998) interviewed municipality 
representatives after the experiment finished in 1997 and found that private 
75 The subjective quality is reported to be better in the private sector in terms of co-operation 
between the family and the childcare centre. Public care was considered especially good in terms 
of food, rest and safety. 
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childcare is available in 85% of the bigger municipalities (over 10,000 
inhabitants) and 53% of the smaller municipalities (less than 10,000 
inhabitantS)76. Additionally, in a third of the municipalities, the private childcare 
provision has increased during the experiment and the provision did not decrease 
in any of the surveyed municipalities. 
A new law regarding private childcare subsidies was ratified immediately 
after the experiment ended on 1.8.1997. This subsidy is paid to the private 
childcare provider appointed by the parents including nurseries, childminders, and 
nannies. Unlike the experimental voucher, the nationally adopted private care 
subsidy enabled the child to be taken care of at home by a nanny as well as in a 
private nursery17 . The subsidy is a tax-free transfer when used to 
hire a childcare 
provider. Each child is eligible for the private care subsidy from the end of the 
parental leave period until the school starting age of seven. The subsidy is, 6118 
per month per child with a means-tested add-on of up to C135 per month per 
child. Many municipalities introduced a higher level of subsidy than the 
minimum legal requirement. 
This research is of immediate interest for the Finnish policy makers but more 
generally, our findings provide essential input in the policy making process in 
many countries that are currently struggling with excess demand for childcare 
(see Chapter 2 for UK evidence). 
76 Unfortunately it is not possible to identify municipalities with zero provision of private 
childcare in the data. 
77 The private care subsidy is handed out by the Finnish Social Insurance Institution (KELA), 
while during the experiment the subsidy was administered by the municipality concerned. 
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Overall, the universal public provision led to excess supply of childcare at the 
national level. Thus, our estimates provide a lower bound estimate for most 
countries where excess demand is experienced nationally. However, many 
municipalities in the experiment (including three in the capital region) 
experienced excess demand. Hence using this information we can also evaluate 
the impact of the voucher under the conditions of demand outstripping the supply 
of childcare services. 
4.4 Econometric method 
Meyer (1995) examines the use of natural and quasi-experiments in 
economics. He explains that good natural experiments are studies in which there 
is a transparent exogenous source of variation in the explanatory variables that 
determine the treatment assignment. A natural experiment induced by, for 
example, a policy change may allow the researcher to obtain exogenous variation 
in the main explanatory variables. This occurrence is especially useful in 
situations in which the estimates are ordinarily biased due to omitted variables or 
selection effects. 
The childcare voucher experiment is a policy change that results in exogenous 
variation in women's labour force participation and their use of formal childcare. 
The difference-in-differences estimator (referred to DD from hereafter) gives the 
effect of the policy change by comparing the changes in the outcomes of the 
treatment group with the outcomes of the control group (see, for example, 
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Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). The validity of this estimator rests on the 
assumption that the treatment and the control group would behave identically in 
the absence of the policy change i. e. that they share a common macro effect as 
well as a time-invariant group effect. 
The DD method is a before-and-after design with an untreated comparison 
group. The regression adjusted DD estimates can be formalised as follows: 
yý =a, +a 2Z, +a 3T +a 4G 
+ý3(T xG)+ -I 
(4.1) 
. where T=l after the start of the voucher experiment and 
0 otherwise, G=l for 
the treatment group and 0 otherwise, and TxG is their interaction while Z includes 
individual and household characteristics. The TxG is a dummy for being in the 
experimental group after it receives the treatment and P is the true causal effect of 
the treatment on the outcome for this group. 
The difference-in-differences approach gives the average treatment effect on 
the treated. Two important assumptions underlying the difference-in-differences 
approach include: (1) common time effects across groups and (2) no systematic 
composition changes with each group 78 .A key idea is that a3 summarises the 
way that both groups, G=l and G=O, are influenced by time effects, for example, 
macroeconomic conditions or regional growth in employment trend. There may 
'8 These problems are especially prevalent when using cross-sectional data. It is then possible that 
the before-after comparability is not valid due to variation between the groups in their fixed effect 
component. Further research will examine the extent of this problem in this study. 
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be a time-invariant difference in overall means between the two groups but this 
aspect is captured by a4 (see, for example, Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002 for 
more detailed discussion). The main coefficient of interest in the difference-in- 
differences model P can be estimated directly by applying OLS to equation (1). A 
key identifying assumption is that fl=O in the absence of the treatment. 
Meyer (1995) points out that DD estimation can be sensitive to non-linear 
transformation of the dependent and independent variables, hence all the analysis 
using the DD framework is undertaken using OLS even for limited dependent 
variables. 
A weakness of experiments is that their results may not be easy to generalise 
beyond the group of individuals or the setting used in the study. Internal validity 
threats to DD studies include serial correlation, which may lead to standard errors 
that are biased downwards (see, for example, Bertrand et al., 2004). The 
solutions to compute consistent standard errors include, for example, 
collapsing the data into pre- and post-refonn periods, 2) allowing for an arbitrary 
autocorrelation process when computing the standard errors, or 3) block 
bootstrapping. However, Hanushek et al. (1996) provides evidence that omitted 
variables bias tends to increase along with the level of aggregation. 
In studies based on comparisons of reforming and non-reforming states, the 
most important threat probably comes from the possibility that changes in 
legislation are endogenous. The DD approach relies on a strong assumption that 
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the unobservables in the error term are uncorrelated with the policy change of 
interest. At the aggregate level the problem involves the self-selection of 
municipalities into the voucher experiment. Takala (2000) notes that the 
experiment areas are not significantly different from each other when it comes to 
observable characteristics, for example, municipality finances. However, quite 
often it seems that neighbouring municipalities have similar policies where one 
has learned about the potential benefits from their neighbour. 
To examine whether the non-random assignment into the treatment group 
9 
biases the DD estimates, we provide estimates using propensity score matching' . 
Matching experiment area individuals to their closest counterparts in the control 
area solves the problem that the treatment and controls areas may be quite 
different, on average, in their demographic composition. However, it does not 
account for differences in unobservable characteristics between treated and 
untreated areas. The advantage of using propensity score matching in this 
analysis is that it matches like individuals on their observable characteristics, 
whereas the DD approach compares the average characteristics of the treatment 
and the control regions. 
A further advantage of propensity score matching over DD estimation is that 
the matching approach relaxes the linearity assumption inherent in the DD 
79 This research estimates the effect of treatment not allowing for multiple, simultaneous 
treatments. Future research plans include estimating the separate effects of different treatments 
jointly (for further details on multiple treatment effects, see Lechner and Pfeiffer, 2001). 
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approach while maintaining the assumption of selection on observable 
characteristics. 
Only matching highlights the support problem in a way that is often 
overlooked in a regression analysis. The common support condition requires that 
conditional on the set of observable characteristics Z, the probability of observing 
both the participants and the non-participants is positive. In my case, if the 
municipalities are different in the first place, then a regression analysis will not 
identify the impact of the voucher. Instead what is identified in this case are the 
pre-existing differences in the municipalities' provision of childcare or 
employment prospects, for example. 
The lack of common support may lead to biased estimates of the effect of the 
treatment on the treated (see Heckman et al., 1997 for details). Hence, it is 
crucial that the common support is as large as possible otherwise the matching is 
done on the tails of the two distributions i. e. matching individuals that are quite 
different in their observable characteristics. 
A primary assumption underlying matching is the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA), which states that the treatment status is random conditional on 
a set of observable characteristics X. The CIA will be satisfied if X includes all of 
the variables that affect both participation and outcomes (see, for example, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Rather than matching on X it is equivalent to 
match on P(Aq, thus avoiding the problem of dimensionality. 
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All matching estimators can be written as follows: 
E(Yo I P(Xi)) w(P(XI), P(Xj))Yoj (4.2) 
j-1 
where subscript i denotes treated individuals and j indexes the untreated 
comparison group observations. The matching estimator constructs an estimate 
of the unobserved counterfactual for each treated observation by taking a 
weighted average of the outcomes of the untreated observations. The difference 
between the various matching estimators lies in the type of weighting placed on 
thejth observation in constructing a counterfactual for the ith treated observation. 
This paper uses two alternative matching estimators: the nearest neighbour 
estimator and the Epanechnikov kernel matching estimator. The weighting for 
the nearest neighbour matching estimator takes the following form: 
1 if j=argmin(IP(Xi)-P(Xk) 11 
wfp(xi), 
P(xj)) 
= kr=(D-0) (4.3) 
10 
otherwise 
The nearest neighbour matching estimator assigns the weight of I to the 
comparison observation with the closest propensity score to each treated 
observation and 0 to all other observations. The nearest neighbour estimator does 
not impose a support condition but instead constructs a counterfactual for every 
treated observation no matter how large the distance is to the propensity score of 
the nearest comparison group observation. Hence, to overcome this potential 
problem, the nearest neighbour estimator is combined with a caliper. A caliper 
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defines an interval around each treated unit within which the propensity score of a 
control individual should lie for it to be included in the estimation. The nearest 
neighbour matching in this paper is done with replacement 80 . 
Rather than relying on a single control, it is possible to construct a synthetic 
individual based on a group of control individuals. The weight attached to each 
control is given by a kernel. The kernel matching potentially assigns a non-zero 
weight to several observations in the comparison group in constructing the 
counterfactual for each treated observation. The standard form for the weighting 
function is given by: 
K 
P(Xi)-P(Xk) 
4(xl), P (xj)) = 
a. 
^-I* 
(4.4) 
ýK 
P(x 
')- 
P(xk) 
ke(D=O) an 
I 
where KO is a kernel function and a, is a bandwidth. As mentioned earlier, we 
use the Epanechnikov kernel which takes the following form: 
K(V)= 
114 ('-V')f IV l< 
0 
otherwise 
(4.5) 
Asymptotically, all the matching estimators produce the same estimate 
because they all end up comparing only exact matches. However, in finite 
so Matching without replacement keeps variance low at the cost of potential bias while matching 
with replacement keeps bias low at the cost of larger variance. 
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samples, different matching estimators produce different results because of the 
variation in the weighting (see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002 for details)81. 
A further threat to the validity of the estimates results from the fact that this 
paper analyses partial equilibrium effects. In other words, the impact of the 
treatment is estimated when only a proportion of the population is treated. The 
following estimation assumes no general equilibrium effects i. e. persons outside 
the experimental treatment area are not affected by the treatment. This includes 
the assumption of, for example, the costs of private childcare in untreated 
municipalities being independent of whether a neighbouring municipality is 
treated. In the statistics literature this assumption is called the stable unit 
treatment value assumption (SUTVA). The results may be different when the full 
population is treated, however, this issue is not dealt with in this paper. 
4.5 Data description 
The estimation uses data from the Income Distribution SurveY82 (referred to 
as IDS from hereon) from 1994 until 1997. The IDS is a rotating panel survey 
interviewing 10,000 households per year. Each household is interviewed for two 
consecutive years. The interview data is linked with data from administrative 
registers, for example, on income and subsidies. All the data are provided on an 
81 The choice of the matching estimator depends on the data. For many and evenly distributed 
comparison observations, the multiple nearest neighbour provides the best estimates while for 
many and asymmetrically distributed comparison observations kernel matching may be the best 
choice. Local linear matching should be used when there are many observations with the 
propensity score near zero or one. 
Tulonjakotilasto in Finnish. 
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annual basis, for example, employment participation is reported as months per 
year. 
The information on the municipality of residence is not released in the IDS 
due to confidentiality reasons. Instead Statistics Finland has, on request, created 
dummies to identify the experimental regions including any variation in the type 
of voucher. 
The childcare voucher experiment was administered between 1.3.1995 and 
31.7.1997. Hence the pre-treatment period is 1994, which is denoted T=O 
henceforth. The experiment period includes year 1995 to 1997, denoted T=I. 
The experiment began on 1.3.1995 hence the first two months of the year are not 
affected by the experiment. Similarly, in 1997 the last five months of the year are 
not affected by the experiment. However, this should not affect the estimation 
results and any bias resulting from the time frame should reduce the coefficient 
estimates. 
The childcare information has been included since 1994 and includes 
questions on the type of care, amount used during the year and payment made on 
childcare during the year. The childcare questions are part of the interview. A 
comparison to several national datasets in Vaajakallio (1999) concludes that any 
inaccuracies are due to different survey periods but the data is representative of 
the whole population. 
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The childcare questions in the IDS are asked per child for each household 
with children under the age of nine. All different types of care and the 
corresponding months of use and payment are recorded. Unfortunately the data 
does not include information on the amount of the private childcare voucher 
received. Furthermore, it is not possible to accurately predict the amount due to 
variation in the amount of the voucher between the participating municipalities. 
Table 4.1: SaMDle derivation (IDS 1994-97 
Number of observations 
Original 1994-97 data 29,083 
Drop voucherproblem regions 27,676 
Drop households without 0-6year olds 20,427 
Drop men and children 5,904 
Drop single parents 4,511 
Drop iffather not employed 4,355 
Expand data by child aged 0-6 6,651 
The estimating sample includes all the mothers with pre-school age children 
(aged 0-6) who are married or cohabiting and whose partner works 83 (see Table 
4.1 for details). Some regions were dropped from the sample because they do not 
represent either the control or the treatment region, for example, in some cases the 
private childcare voucher was used prior to the start of the experiment. Single 
mothers are not used in the analysis because of the small sample sizes, especially 
for the treatment region. The unit of observation is a pre-school age child, hence 
each mother observation is weighted by the number of pre-school age children. 
The estimation is corrected to account for the multiple occurrences in the data. 
83 Non-employed fathers are dropped from the analysis because of the requirement to work in one 
type of voucher. 
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The final estimation sample is 6,65 1, of which 2,618 are mothers of 0-2 year old 
children and 4,033 are mothers of 3-6 year old children. 
Table 4.2: Pre-eXDeriment summarv statistics (1994 
Control G=O Treated G=l Difference 
Work 0.692 (0.462) 0.665 (0.473) 
Use offormal care 0.379 (0.485) 0.506 (0.501) 
Age 32.605 (4.874) 32.977 
(4.563) 
Dad's age 35.622 (5.476) 34.900 
(5.118) 
No. of children <7 1.838 (0.870) 1.772 (0.673) 
Age ofyoungest child 2.200 (1.867) 2.223 (1.789) 
Size of household 4.613 (1.375) 4.297 (1.017) 
Mother's schooling 
Compulsory school 0.106 (0.308) 0.102 (0.303) 
Baccalaureate 0.450 (0.465) 0.366 (0.482) 
Baccalaureate plus vocational 0.316 (0.465) 0.309 (0.463) 
Bachelors 0.048 (0.213) 0.046 (0.210) 
Masters and above 0.081 (0.270) 0.177 (0.375) 
Father's schooling 
Compulsory school 0.181 (0.385) 0.118 (0.323) 
Baccalaureate 0.485 (0.500) 0.348 (0.476) 
Baccalaureate plus vocational 0.165 (0.371) 0.156 (0.378) 
Bachelors 0.065 (0.247) 0.100 (0.310) 
Masters and above 0.104 (0.303) 0.279 (0.415) 
Capital region 0.003 (0.051) 0.505 (0.500) 
Cities 0.373 (0.484) 0.300 (0.459) 
Densely populated municipalities 0.224 (0.417) 0.107 (0.310) 
Rural municipalities 0.400 (0.490) 0.087 (0.282) 
Unemployment rate 0.210 (0.044) 0.163 (0.044)_ 
Number of observations 1,134 391 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
*** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level of significance. 
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics separately for the control region G=O 
and the treatment region G=I for 1994. Column 3 of Table 4.2 reports the results 
of a test for differences in the means between the control and the treatment 
region. There are no significant differences in the working status of the control 
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and treatment region, however, the use of formal childcare is about 13 percentage 
points lower in the control region before the start of the experiment. Another 
significant difference between the control and the treatment region is the level of 
84 
unemployment, which is almost 5 percentage points higher in the control region . 
Significant differences exist also for the number of pre-school age children as 
well as the size of the household. 
There are significant differences in the level of education between the control 
and the treated region for both mothers and fathers of the pre-school age children. 
Mothers are more likely to have finished their schooling at the baccalaureate level 
in the control region whereas, in the treated population, significantly more women 
have acquired at least a Masters degree. A similar trend is observed for fathers' 
level of education. Therefore on average the treated region is more educated. 
These differences are partly due to the fact that the capital region accounts for 
about 51% of the treated areas and that there is over 30 percentage point 
difference in the proportion of rural municipalities between the two groups. 
Table 4.3 provides a simple difference-in-differences calculation for selected 
variables of interest. Throughout the analysis, the main variables of interest are 
labour force participation (referred to as UP from hereafter) and the use of 
formal childcare (referred to as USE from hereafter). Employment participation 
in the IDS is provided only as months worked per year and hence UP is defined 
84 Unemployment figures are included in the analysis since VATT estimates that 1% decrease in 
average unemployment rate increases the demand for childcare by 2,500 places. 
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as having worked at least one month a year either full-time, part-time or as an 
85 
entrepreneur . Sensitivity analysis 
is conducted using six months and twelve 
months as the cut-off points, however, this has no significant impact on the 
results 86 . Similarly, the binary variable 
for USE is I for those who have used any 
private or public childcare services. 
The DD in the means of labour force participation is 4.1% in favour of the 
treatment region. As the theory predicted, the increased availability of childcare 
has therefore allowed more mothers to participate in the labour force. Also, the 
price of private childcare has decreased as expected by theory. Surprisingly, the 
price paid for public care has slightly increased according to these calculations. 
This may be due to higher use of public care by high-income families. Against all 
expectations the use of formal care has decreased. 
Table 4.3: Si 
Treatment, G=l 
Before After Before After 
Labourforce participation 
Use offormal childcare 
Paymentfor private care, 61month 
Paymentforpublic care, Elmonth 
69.22% 69.65% 66.50% 71.02% 
37.92% 44.94% 50.64% 53.72% 
171.92 195.79 236.83 218.55 
121.75 126.14 141.17 159.07 
4.09% 
-3.94% 
-42.15 
13.51 
Source: Income Distribution Survey 
Note: "Before" refers to 1994 while "after" refers to the experimentation period 1995-97. 
85 The share of part-time employees is only slightly higher than 10% among female employees 
and hence no difference between full-time and part-time employment is taken into account in the 
estimation. 
86 The results are available from the author upon request. 
le difference-in-differences (IDS 19 
Control, G=O 
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It must be noted though that these simple DD calculations do not take into 
account any individual, regional or household characteristics. These controls are 
included in the analysis in the following sections. 
Graph 4.1: Type of care used by child's age 
100'. 
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Source: Income Distribution Survey 
The family benefits and materrial and paternal leave are more generous for 
parents with children below three years old than for parents with older pre-school 
age children. In Graph 4.1, parental leave is included in the "home care" 
category. The kink in the budget constraint motivates the examination separately 
by the two age groups. Graph 4.1 shows that children below the age of three are 
most likely to be taken care of at home, usually by the mother. This may be due 
to parental preferences or even the financial support for horne care as well as its 
161 
gC o hild 
0 I'mate care 0 Public care olloille Carc 
ease, and the job security provided by law (see Appendix 2 for details on the 
Finnish family policy including maternity leave legislation). 
As mentioned in Section 4.4, the non-randomisation of the experiment at the 
municipality level may lead to threats to the validity of the DD estimates. For 
example, the municipalities participating in the experiment may have experienced 
resource constraints in the provision of childcarc services hence directly affecting 
the labour force participation and the use of fonnal childcare of its inhabitants. 
Table 4A SaMDle size for different Woes of voucher 1995-97 
Control Means test Lumpsum Total 
Excess demand 0/0 0/0 120/159 120/159 
Prerequisite 0/0 258/356 89/114 347/470 
Rest of the country 1426/2330 85/133 28/28 1539/2491 
Total 1426/2330 343/489 237/301 2006/3120 
Note: First figure in each cell is for the 0-2 age group, the second figure for the 3-6 age group 
Municipality level statistics for net childcare costs per capita, relative level of 
debt and long-run unemployment rate indicate that, on average, there are no 
significant differences in these variables between the treatment and control 
regions 87 . However, an examination of these statistics by the type of voucher 
reveals some differences between the municipalities. The sample sizes for 0-2 
and 3-6 year olds by the type of voucher are reported separately in Table 4.4. 
87 These statistics are for the period immediately after the childcare voucher experiment and hence 
may not be a good indication of the situation before the start of the experiment. Statistics for the 
pre-experiment period are not available for this research. 
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Out of the 33 participants, 21 municipalities provided a means-tested voucher 
while the rest used a lump-sum voucher 88. Besides the variation in the amount of 
the voucher, there are further differences in the type of voucher between 
municipalities. Thirteen municipalities adopted a voucher with a prerequisite for 
the parents to work or study to be eligible for the voucher. Such requirements to 
work or study do not exist as a prerequisite for the use of public childcare. 
Furthermore, it is possible to identify three municipalities within the 
experiment region that suffer from excess demand for childcare (see Table 4.4 for 
sample sizes)89. Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify similar regions within 
the control regions due to data confidentiality reasons. However, this potential 
problem reduces the estimated coefficient hence providing us a lower bound 
estimate. 
Municipalities with a means-tested (lump-sum) voucher had on average lower 
(higher) net childcare costs and long-run unemployment rate but also higher 
(lower) level of debt compared to the country average. Municipalities that had a 
prerequisite to work or study for the receipt of the voucher had on average 
slightly lower net childcare costs, significantly higher level of debt and lower 
level of long-run unemployment than the national average. 
8' Municipalities adopting the means-tested voucher mostly use the payment schedules of public 
childcare. 
89 These municipalities are identified as suffering from excess demand for childcare by the 
Ministry for Social Affairs and Health in Finland in their publication "Lasten pdivahoitoselvitys - 
syyskuu 1997". 
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To account for the possible selection of municipalities, we also estimate the 
voucher effect with propensity score matching. The propensity score matching 
estimation uses information from the period of experimentation (1995-1997) thus 
dropping the 1,525 additional observations from 1994 used in the DD analysis. 
The matching methods include the nearest neighbour and the Epanechnikov 
kernel estimation with caliper/bandwidth values of 0.1,0.01, and 0.005. The 
common support mostly holds without being too thin with any of the chosen 
caliperlbandwidth. 
The propensity score is estimated with a probit where the covariates are 
mother's and father's age and their level of education, interaction of mother's and 
father's age, the household size, age of the youngest child, number and age of 
pre-school children, age of the pre-school age child interacted with father's and 
mother's age, interaction between the number of pre-school age children and the 
age of the youngest child, father's earnings, father's earnings interacted with the 
size of household, father's trade union status and year dummies. 
4.6 Empirical results 
The empirical analysis is conducted using the Finnish Income Distribution 
survey. The methods of analysis include difference-in-differences and propensity 
score matching. The results for the whole country are reported in section 4.6.1 
while section 4.6.2 presents the analysis for parts of the country that experienced 
excess demand for childcare. Sections 4.6.3 through 4.6.5 examine different 
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types of vouchers adopted throughout the country, for example, a lump-sum or a 
means-tested voucher. 
4.6.1 Whole experiment 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the impact of the private childcare voucher 
experiment, respectively, on the work and the use of formal childcare behaviour 
of mothers of young children using DD analysis. The propensity score matching 
estimates are presented in Table 4.7. 
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In Table 4.5, the childcare voucher experiment is estimated for a sample of 
mothers with 0-2 years old children (columns 1 and 2) and 3-6 year old children 
(columns 3 and 4). Models (2) and (4) include controls for individual 
characteristics. Column (1) of the table shows the raw differential between the 
control and the treatment region to be 4.9 percentage points but this coefficient 
estimate is not significantly different from zero. Controlling for individual and 
regional characteristics in Column (2) of Table 4.6 reduces the effect of the 
voucher to 2.1 percentage points, still not significant. 
The results are larger but still insignificant for mothers of children aged 
between 3 and 6 years. Otherwise both models perform well at explaining the 
UP decision of mothers of young children. Older and more educated mothers 
are more likely to work. The size of the household and, in particular, the number 
of pre-school age children capture the economies of scale experienced with many 
children or a possible lower preference for work for mothers of young children. 
These somewhat disappointing results tell us that the availability of a private 
childcare voucher did not have any impact on the UP rates of mothers of pre- 
school age children. However, this is not completely unexpected since the 
municipalities themselves provide high-quality low-cost childcare. Hence unless 
the municipality is constrained in its provision of childcare the private care 
voucher is expected to have only a small effect on the UP rates. 
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Table 4.6 reports the estimates of the impact of the private childcare voucher 
experiment on USE. The results indicate no significant effect for USE for either 
age group. The other covariates indicate that the probability of using formal 
childcare rises with the level of education. This is expected since for the highly 
educated group, the actual wage net of childcare costs is more likely to be higher 
than the reservation wage. The probability of using non-maternal care rises also 
with the age of the youngest child indicating either a higher preference for taking 
care of the younger children or a different budget constraint for the mothers of 
younger children due to, for example, a higher cost of childcare or higher level of 
financial support from the government. The population density dummies are only 
significant for the older age group children, likewise for the mother's age and the 
total number of pre-school age children. 
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The non-significant results of the experiment on USE may seem counter- 
intuitive especially since Heikkild and T6nn! i (1996) report that 55% of the 
families who chose the private childcare voucher were new customers to the 
private sector care. 
170 
Q ýo 
6.4 
, 
1. D 
Cd. -4 
N 
CL 
le 9 
r3 \O 
e' 
Z 
t. 0 
0 
-9 
b. 4 
1.0 
4) 
1.4 
0 
.0 
*** 
** 
** 
** 
* 
* 
rMM9 rm" rm" 00 
01-1 
c) 
00 4.1 (D te) M 00 CA 'n cq 00 C: ý Cý t1i q c! (C> C7, -. 4 6--d '-'ý (6 C% ,6a CN =; -. ý 6-4 '-, ý ". " --j 
en 
t-- M 
--, tn 
ýo qRT ý, m 
ýo t- 
-, r, 
ýo 
Cý 
r-, 00 
en 00 00 M -4 00 
_4 
N" qT ýo 
Nt en C) ,0 cl c) o C! r-: c) C, Cý t1i (5 0 Cý 0q0c! (=, c; 0 C% , ci Q CN -1 6060 c) 00 , -, ' 6-. J '-. 6--J "ý ý-., I-j -.. o I. -I r. 5 1-1 Cq W) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
r--9 f-" 
00 cl 00 ON 00 00 c> til C> C) c) N C14 0 (14 t- 00 cq 00 ýc C> - C) N C> N cq o CD Cý c" C! Cý r.: 00 (R (R tti Cý q (R Cý IR C! . C; o cs o C) cs (D cN c> c) 0o C) o. CN 1 1-1 6-.. J 1 1-1 L. -J I 6. -J II I-W I I--' en t*- 
N xt rn -ý C", 1 ýo nt --4 rn 00 ýrt --4 00 -4 oo CD el -4 N -4 rg ýo C C, CD 1: ý o kr; o0 CD 000 Co> CD cý c; - C) 0 cý C) C) cý cý Ci Z; <: ý . 00 6 1-1 6-. J ý-, 6 ý-w 6--1 6 ', W 6-J -, 6, '-, C, 1 kn 
to-) 
1-4 Z 
13 c 
;Z ;2 ;2 
Z Z 
Z -z -Z 
-, Z -Z -Z 
>tj lz 
Z -Z 
2 2 2 
Z Z Z r4) -Z 
9: 1 
ý. 0 
2 
0 
.0 
MUU 
(4 9 Li 
4... .e iz 
,22* ri ti 0 
e 
00 
'ZJ zj Z t. m0 
ll, 
(D M s. 
.-000. v) vl +ý 
, 6ý 
ý-o -U .2 
0 cu 0 
Z b. M 
CU EI eZ 
0 
'ZJ 0 ICJ e4 
t02 U2 12-, Z 
171 
Table 4.7 reports propensity score matching estimates of the impact of the 
private childcare voucher for the whole country swnple. Nearest neighbour 
matches are reported with a caliper of 0.1,0.01 and 0.005. Similarly, kemel 
estimates use a bandwidth of 0.1,0.01 and 0.005. As indicators of match quality, 
the table reports the proportion of matched treated observations (with nearest 
neighbour) and, as an indicator of the thickness of the common support, the 
number of control observations accounting for 50% of the matches. When a few 
controls are used several times, the precision of the estimates suffers (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2001). Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap with 500 or 100 
replications depending on the kernel. 
None of the estimates for the younger age group are significant. On the other 
hand, for the older age group the use of formal childcare has increased as a result 
of the experiment. The nearest neighbour kernel gives a three percentage point 
increase for the use of formal childcare, while using the Epanechnikov kernel the 
impact increases to 6 percentage points. The Epanechnikov kernel is our 
preferred specification since it uses more control observations and throughout 
results in lower standard errors. A large proportion of the treated are matched, 
however, even the largest caliperlbandwidth does not result in a 100% matching 
accuracy. 
It must be noted that the propensity score matching results are very different 
from the previously estimated DD results. This may indicate the importance of 
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relaxing the assumption of linear functional form inherent to OLS estimation. 
Furthermore, DD assumes that there is a fixed difference in the level of outcome 
between the treated and the control group observations prior to the experiment as 
well as a fixed difference after the start of the experiment equalling the previous 
fixed difference plus the impact of the treatment on the treated. Graph 4.2 shows 
that this assumption may not hold for the use of formal since the rate of growth 
differs between the treatment and the control group. 
Graph 4.2: Proportion of users of informal and formal childcare 
0.6 
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Source: Income Distribution Survey 
Note: I for experiment region; 0 for control region 
4.6.2 Areas of excess demand 
Formal I 
Home I 
Formal 0 
Home 0 
Municipalities that experience excess demand for childcare are expected to 
exhibit a positive impact of the voucher on the labour force participation rates 
since expanding the market for childcare, the private childcare voucher would 
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release previously non-employed mothers to work. In the data it is possible to 
identify three municipalities within the experiment region that experienced excess 
demand for childcare prior to the voucher experiment. The following analysis 
includes these three municipalities as the treated while the non-experimental 
municipalities provide a control group as previously (see Table 4.4 for sample 
sizes). 
Columns I and 2 of Table 4.8 provide estimates of the impact of the private 
childcare voucher for UP in areas of excess demand versus the control region. 
Controlling for individual, household and regional characteristics, the impact of 
the voucher on employment is not significant for either age group. On the other 
hand, column 4 shows that the mothers of 3-6 year old children were 31.2 
percentage points less likely to use fonnal childcare as a result of the private 
childcare voucher availability. It is reasonable to expect that the private care 
voucher would relieve the shortage of supply and therefore increase the use of 
formal childcare. This unexpected negative result is highly significant, however, 
it may be seriously biased due to initial differences between the two regions and 
possibly the failing assumption of linearity. 
174 
*********** 
*********** 
*********** 
t) 
&. ýa -% lo-N -IN 00-1 lo-% 0-1 I. -N O-N 0. -1 00-N I--, -IN 2 11 cq W) eq W'i W) C) 00 -4 0 en t- CN cs 41n. . V-4 r- o 00 It 00 tn 0 vt 00 t- " C) en tn r1l C) 1.0 - fn en IRT Itt t3 ri -ý 0 C) C) 00 (=ý (:: ý (: ý .q C-4 Cý en (:: ý en q E -"ý 0 CD " (6 C; c; 66 (=5 (=5 6dC; 6 c) 060C; C> (:: 5 C> 60 
rA 
0 
W M 
0 
Cý 
2 
Cd 
0 
U 
1ý 
r. 
Cl* 
t12 
ý 0. 
E- 
Z 
r3 \O 
gý 
, -IN O-MN ols 0-ý lo-ý lo-ý A--, O. -N olm-ý 0-1 q: r tri (N C) Itt en W) C14 N0 ýo 1.4 00 cs C) tn -, 
r- 
C14 cli 00 C14 en t- -4 0 00 M V*) %0 1-4 -4 -4 (z) 0 C) 0 00 C14 
MQ en 
IRt 
tn 
en 
'Ict 
o '; (:; 0 C! . C! Cý q0C! . Cý oq eq (0 8866oC; (=5 00060 (=3 0 C5 0 C; 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
****** 
******** 
******** 
, -IN -IN I. -N 01--. 0-% "-% O-N A-*ý 1-1ý lo-ý CD 1-4 It 
V- CNI VII 
N en N 1-4 r- 19t 
-, 
I'D IC en cl, 0 00 Cý r- C14 ýo en tn C4 tn C) 'Rt -4 en en %0 qt t- o -4 C) ef) It kn (ON en 4 C! c! qqqC, 
4 0 a0Qp C) C> (=> c; 2-0 6 
**** 
******** 
******** 
(, q le V, 3 00 0 Kn (D 2 r- M le rn 00 e4 en Nt Q00C 
<: ý cý ci Z; cl, 
cý 
Qý Qý E-4 to 'Itlý 
(Z) 
4 
lltý 
R: Gn 14i 
;, -, 
to 
lq4l 
Q 
-%t fS 
-z: t ti 
Cý 
Q 
Its 
t: 3 
175 
*** 
*** 
*** 
QJ 
&. \0 
C`i - .- 
CY) 
0 
" 
I 
00 
iz oo N oo rn oo CD e Im ' 0 en 0e (Z) r- 't 
c; c; cý c; c; c; c; 4 N-W 8 --0 6 _w 8 Zw 0c 
* 
N 
0-1% --% O-N 
(: ý C14 CN N cý en Cý c) IRt VI t- 10 t- 0 r- en en r t) C14 -4 (14 .. 4 -4 Cl . 4t -4 C tc 
C; C; C; C; C5 C; 6 
cq C 
'1114 
a . -ý I . -ý 1-0 . Z., a- 
- --------------------------------- 
** 
*** 
1-S1 1-IN ON 00 r4 IN0 vi f4 V) r- -4 ýi 
1--4 (D '-, 
vi cý r- 
ri -! m, C) 
c; 0 c; c; -Z d 1. -d , -ýI 1%W 1 %_w 
* 
* 
0-% 1-% --% 0-1 cs -4 tf) eq C, 4 0 
N 00 eq "T N %'o N r- 
C14 C14 -4 N wmi C'4 tn V) M 
ci 6 (: 6 (6 C5 6 C; - 
cl. 
aI1 -01 1 . -ý 0 '" 
le 
u le :i l 
Z 9 
0 
c) c44 
Z 
113 
c) 
10 
1 
ce 
0 , *m ce 
ei 
ý -ri 
c93 
4; 4-. 
_J. j 
c93 U 
'; 2u OE 9 eig 
un rA 3 `0 , 
176 
Table 4.9 reports the results of propensity score matching using both the 
nearest neighbour matching estimator and the Epanechnikov kernel matching 
estimator. The results in Table 4.9 give the impact of the private childcare 
voucher on UP of the treated group in the areas that experienced excess demand 
for childcare. The results are reported separately for the mothers of children aged 
between 0-2 and 3-6. The distributions of propensity scores are reported in 
Figure 4.3. 
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In Figure 4.3, the top histogram corresponds to the treated (G=1) group, while 
the bottom histogram corresponds to the control (G=O) group. In these 
histograms, each bin has a width of 0.05. Figure 4.3 shows that there is thick 
support throughout the distribution hence providing strong identification 
throughout the distribution. 
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The results for the 0-2 year olds are insignificant both with respect to USE 
and UP (see the first and third columns of Table 4.9). The second and fourth 
columns of Table 4.9 report the impact of the private childcare voucher on UP 
and USE for the mothers of 3-6 year old children. The DD results reported in 
Table 4.8 showed a significant negative impact of over 30 percentage points on 
USE. The estimates using the propensity score matching are positive both for 
LFP and USE. First, the nearest neighbour kernel indicates about a 6.5 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of working, however, this result is only 
marginally significant. On the other hand, the Epanechnikov kernel estimate is 
slightly lower at 5.2 percentage points but this estimate is highly significant. As 
predicted by the theory, kernel matching reduces the variance of estimates. 
The results of the voucher experiment in areas of excess demand for the use of 
fornial childcare for the 3-6 year olds show over 13 percentage point effect 
regardless of the kernel or the caliper/bandwidth. In general, a tighter 
caliperlbandwidth reduces the estimates slightly or leaves them unchanged. With 
the larger bandwidth, there is no problem of common support and all treated 
observations are matched. 
All the results for the older age group in areas of excess demand are highly 
significant for USE. The results are slightly weaker for LFP, especially with a 
bandwidth/caliper of 0.005. However, the matching accuracy is reduced 
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considerably with the smallest bandwidth/caliper with only 92.93% of the treated 
being matched to a control group observation. 
The distinction between the results of the different age groups is as expected 
due to differences in the municipalities requirements for the provision of 
childcare places. Since 1990 the municipalities have faced a legal requirement to 
provide a childcare place for every 0-2 year old who needs a place. Hence the 
municipalities have had time to expand the provision for the younger age group. 
Municipalities had no requirement to give a universal access to the 3-6 year olds 
until 1996. Therefore this age group might have formed the bulk of the queue for 
childcare in the areas of excess demand for childcare. 
Another potential explanation lies in the differences between public and 
private care. In general, private childcare is more specialised. It might therefore 
appeal to some mothers with a high valuation of specialised care who previously 
took care of the children themselves. Private care also offers more flexibility in 
opening hours, which facilitates combining childcare and a career. Furthermore, 
mothers of older children are in general more likely to participate in the labour 
force. 
4.6.3 Voucher with a prerequisite 
The type of voucher varies within the experiment region. This and the 
following two sections examine the impact of the different types of vouchers on 
182 
UP and USE90. The estimation methods include DD and propensity score 
matchin 91 as before. 
Thirteen municipalities adopted a private childcare voucher where as a 
prerequisite for eligibility, the mother had to be in employment or in education. 
These 13 municipalities form the treatment group while the control group 
includes the municipalities not adopting a childcare voucher (see sample sizes in 
Table 4.4). 
The type of voucher that has this prerequisite of working or studying has a 
positive impact on LFP and a negative impact on USE, both of which are 
insignificant, as shown in Table 4.10 using the DD estimation. 
90 We do not account for the potential endogeneity of the voucher type at the municipality level in 
this analysis. 
91 The sample is restricted to include the voucher type as the treatment region while the control 
group is unchanged compared to the previous difference-in-differences analysis. 
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Table 4.11 reports the impact of a voucher with a prerequisite to work or 
study using propensity score matching. Column I for the 0-2 year olds shows a 
negative effect of the voucher on UP, however, all of these estimates are 
insignificant. However, for mothers of older children a significant negative result 
on participation is obtained. A voucher with a working requirement reduces UP 
by about 7.7 percentage points, which is highly significant using the nearest 
neighbour kemel. 
186 
i. -ý CY) 
rL ý3 t) 
U 
cl 
0 
r 
c: 
c. 4 e 
leý 
Z 
9 
(.. 0. 4 
:i 
0 
-9 
k4 
t12 
ý-4 C: ý 
. 4 
0 
C. ) 
ri 
iz 
E2 
* 
*** 
*** 
00 00 r- W) r- en en 0 tQ Cý 0 C14 
00 en tn W) tn en 00 rý 00 eq 1.0 C> C14 (=) 06 C-4 C) C-4 C: > C! 00 C; C7N 0 CN C> c> CT T 6-J 
r--4 
r-, 4 
Cl% 00 
(ON 
C) 
cq 
en 1-1ý C'4 (=ý 0 1- 
00 -N0 00 
C> C71% C) 6 (6 
C> t- 
6-4 - C) -" 
6 
I-, ' 6-J 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
V--9 r--9 
1 
r-. 9 1.9 11 
llllý 
lol% r- 0 %0 C) --4 ý, V- ". 4 -4 .,, R: 
t en -, W-) 
V- M t- en VI tt-I t- en 00 tý. V-4 C-4 en Cl N '=ý Cý 0N (=! R o6 C4 C! q ý6 C, 4 0 C) C) C) C) C) C) p (R p-qp c-, qp CN 00 t- "-ý' 6-J o 'ý-" 6-. j 1 1-1 L. --j ^ N It 
r- r--, 'o -o ýp en ; ýz ý10 IRT (ON %0 CN -4 
6ý 
00 mN ýo 
0 qt C> 'I ýc plý 0N en en 00 C> 1ý0 00r,: C, C) Cý tr; N c) c> oao0 00 00 r- C) CN C', C5 6 C5 
-. ( Z 
lelb 
e e cs 
Z-21. e Z3 2 
t A 
2 
u 
42 
u 
r3 
zý 
3 
e e e l Z e 
C. 0. 
2 
0 
. LEO 0ý 
0 rj 
e' r. 'ii 
0, ce .5 
:: '. o, e= cu e l', ', 2 * og ýmo 9 
> 
jo V) ' V) . 4ý --, 
00 
0 
IC ou "0 0 It) u=U C) 'n t: CU . Ei rj JD 020U0 
LZ 0 13 -0 P., *ä 0u. 4. 
- 42 '5 ý- 0 
10 b. 
rn * En P. Z 
187 
The coefficient estimate is negative as expected since requirements to work or 
study to obtain childcare place do not exist for publicly provided childcare. 
Furthermore, due to the municipality's legal requirement to provide a childcare 
place for children aged 0-2, parents have no incentive to use private care if it 
imposes any requirements. Similarly, this pre-requirement increases the cost of 
obtaining the voucher, for example, the search costs for employment are higher 
for parents of young children. Hence, one may expect a negative impact of the 
voucher on mother's participation. 
The voucher with a prerequisite to work or study results in positive significant 
effects on USE for the older age group children ranging between 6.2 and 8.4 
percentage points depending on the bandwidth used. The corresponding nearest 
neighbour estimates are not significant. The positive coefficient is as expected, 
however, proves slightly peculiar combined with the negative impact on UP. 
This combination is feasible if most of the increase in USE is experienced in 
public childcare sector. The raw data confinns this with an increase of 10.6 
percentage points in public care while private care decreased by 1.4 percentage 
points between 1994 and 1997. 
4.6.4 Lump-sum voucher 
A lump-sum voucher was adopted in six municipalities. The lump-sum 
voucher is on average of higher value than the means-tested voucher (see Table 
4.14 for further details) for both age groups, however, since the distribution of the 
188 
means-tcsted voucher is unknown we cannot draw any conclusions on the 
expected impact of the lump-sum versus means-tested voucher on the dependent 
variables of interest. 
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With DD estimation, a lump-sum voucher has a marginally significant 
negative impact on USE for the mothers of 0-2 year old children (see Table 4.12). 
Most of the coefficient estimates on both USE and LFP are negative but fail to be 
significant. 
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Table 4.13 reports the results of a lump-sum voucher using propensity score 
matching. Only marginally significant negative results are reported for UP of 
mothers of 3-6 year old children (column two of Table 4.13) using the 
Epanechnikov kernel. However, even the widest bandwidth results in relatively 
worse rate of matching with 97% of the treated being matched. 
One may expect a positive result for both LFP and USE since any type of 
voucher should increase the availability of childcare in the municipality. 
However, a negative coefficient is feasible considering that half of the 
observations in the lump sum regions also suffer from excess demand for public 
childcare services (see Table 4.4). Hence since the private care is likely to be 
more expensive with the lump sum voucher than public childcare, mothers may 
be discouraged from working without access to affordable care. 
4.6.5 Means tested voucher 
The means tested voucher was adopted in 21 municipalities. Over 70% of the 
observations in municipalities with a means tested voucher also have a 
prerequisite to work or study. This may reduce the estimated impact, however, 
not to the extent of the lump sum voucher since the maximum means tested 
voucher is higher in value. Unfortunately the data does not allow the examination 
of individual municipalities, or the value of the different types of voucher 
adopted. 
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Table 4.14: Average value of lumiD-sum vs. means-tested voucher 
Age 0-2 Age 3-6 
Lumpsum 304 263 
Means-tested minimum 140 128 
Means-tested maximum 366 343 
Source: Own calculation using figures from Heikkild and T6rmd (1996) 
Table 16 reports the DD estimates for LFP and USE in areas of excess 
demand separately for mothers of 0-2 and 3-6 year old children. The estimates 
for UP are approximately 5 percentage points for both age groups, however, the 
estimates fail to be significant. The impact for USE is less consistent being 
positive for the younger age group and negative for the older age group, but both 
are insignificant. 
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Table 4.16 reports the results of propensity score matching for a means tested 
voucher. The only significant results are those for the use of formal childcare for 
the older age group children. Furthennore, the results are positive for USE as 
expected. The results range from 7.9 percentage points with the nearest 
neighbour matching to 7.2-9.6 percentage points with the Epanechnikov kernel. 
In all cases the matching is above 98% and the support is thick with 
approximately 155 control observations accounting for half of the matches. 
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4.7 Estimated elasticities 
I have estimated the elasticities of the private childcare subsidy with respect to 
the use of formal childcarc and the labour force participation of mothers in areas 
of excess demand and in the whole country. The results arc reported in Table 
4.17. 
Table 4.17: Elasticities for labour force t)articir)ation and use of formal care 
LFP USE 
, 
0-2 3-6 : 0-2 3-6 
117iole country -0.003 -0.008 '-0.010 0.022 
Areas ofercess demand -0.005 0.014 .: 0.034 0.052 
The estimated elasticities reported in Table 4.17 indicate a very small impact 
of the amount of the private care voucher on labour force participation (LFP) and 
the use of childcarc (USE) both in the whole country and in areas of excess 
demand for childcarc. As expected though, the impact is larger in the areas of 
excess demand as expected. The results in section 4.6.1 indicated that the private 
childcare voucher increased the use of childcare by 13 percentage points for the 
children aged between three and six. However, these elasticity estimates indicate 
that a 1% increase in the average amount of the private childcare voucher 
increases the use of formal childcare by only half a percentage point. This 
elasticity estimate is significantly smaller than the majority of estimates found in 
the previous literature using reduced form models. However, studies using more 
thorough structural models find elasticity estimates of similar magnitude (see, for 
example, Anderson and Levine, 1999). 
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This small impact of the amount of the voucher on USE may indicate that the 
most important cfTect of the private childcare voucher was to lower the barriers to 
cntry into the childcarc market for the potential suppliers of private childcare. 
He= once the private provision of childcarc was available, the customers 
flooded in regardless of the price they had to pay. 
These elasticity estimates are quite imprecise because the estimation uses the 
average level of the voucher across different municipalities and different voucher 
levels. Better data that enables us to identify the municipality would result in 
more accurate results. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This study has examined the impact of a childcare voucher on the labour force 
participation of mothers of pre-school age children and their use of formal 
childcare using an experimental sct-up. Between 1995 and 1997 the Finnish 
government and the municipalities provided a voucher to be used for privately 
provided childcare services affecting approximately a quarter of the population. 
The estimates of the private childcare voucher experiment are produced using 
both diffcrcnce-in-diffcrcnccs as well as propensity score matching estimation. In 
a number of cases the diffcrcnce-in-diffcrences and propensity score matching 
estimates are very different. This suggests that the OLS assumption of linear 
functional form inherent in the differcnce-in-differcnces analysis fails. 
Additionally the use of cross-sectional data in this analysis cannot ensure that the 
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crucial assumption of diffcrcncc-in-diffcrcnces regarding the non-variability of 
time cffccts across the treated and the control groups holds. Hence further 
research should also examine whether diffcrcncc-in-diffcrcnccs estimates improve 
with the use of panel data. Propensity score matching performs well with 
common support throughout the distribution hence providing strong 
idcntirication. 
None of the estimates arc found to be significant for the mothers of 0-2 year 
old children, which is expected due to considerable financial support for parents 
under the age of three. 
The results for the mothers of 3-6 year olds indicate that even with widely 
available high-quality, low-cost public childcare, a voucher for private childcare 
has a significant positive impact for the use of formal childcare, especially in 
areas that suffer from excess demand for childcare services. The use of formal 
childcare increased by between 3 and 6 percentage points in the whole country 
while in areas of excess demand the increase was approximately 14 percentage 
points. Labour force participation of mothers of older pre-school age children 
increased by over 5 percentage points in areas of excess demand. 
The elasticity estimates of the private childcare subsidy indicate that an 
increase in the average amount of the private childcare voucher had a very small 
impact on the use of formal childcare. The small impact of the amount of the 
vouchcr on the use of childcarc may indicate that the most important cffect of the 
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private childcarc voucher was to lower the barriers to entry into the childcare 
market for the potential suppliers of private childcare. Therefore it can be argued 
that the most important cffcct of the voucher was to boost private enterprise in the 
childcarc market and hence increase the overall supply. Once the private 
provision or childcare was available, the customers started using the private 
childcarc provision regardless of the price they had to pay for it. 
Policy makers struggling Mth excess demand for childcare can use the 
estimates of private childcarc voucher experiment in Finland to guide their 
choices regarding their childcare policies. Finland has a large, low-cost public 
childcare sector unlike many other Western economies. Hence it is reasonable to 
expect that a similar arrangement in a country with less childcare, provision will 
have an even larger impact on the variables of interest. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attcmptcd to shed more light on the problems currently faced in 
the UK childcarc markct including the low availability of fonnal childcare and its 
high price. My research points to a possible market failure in the childcare sector 
and attcmpts to give policy guidance on how best to improve the current situation. 
Chapter I examines the prc%ious, literature on childcare and concludes that the 
existing research has not reached a consensus regarding the impact of the price of 
childcarc on the use of childcare and on labour force participation. Also, the 
quality of childcare is found to be difficult, if not impossible, to measure. 
Furthermore, the majority of research conducted in this field is for the US with 
very few papers examining the markets for childcare in the European context. 
ne previous research is inconclusive on the cfficiency of the childcare markets 
as well as the current policies regarding childcare financing and subsidisation. 
However, it is genemily agreed that childcare provides benefits to society that far 
outweigh the costs to the indhidual consumers. 
Chapter 2 concentrates on examining the impact of the availability of formal 
childcarc within a Local Authority on the efficiency of the childcarc markets. The 
cfficiency of the childcare market is estimated by calculating the size of the queue 
for fon-nal childcare. For the first time in this type of analysis, we account for 
partial obscrvabilit)r a woman uses childcare if she demands it and if her offer is 
accepted. This chapter provides first analytic evidence that there exists a sizeable 
excess dcmand for formal childcarc in the UK, which confimis the previous 
descriptive evidence. The size of the queue for childcare is substantial: while a bit 
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more than 70% of mothers would like to use childcare, only 57% are provided with 
a place for their child. Furthermore, the queue is underestimated since we have 
imposcd the cxogcncity of the mother's labour force decision. 
Furthermore, it appears that a majority of mothers queuing for childcare are 
using informal care as a substitute, thus a policy increasing the supply of formal 
care may not have a large impact on the labour force participation of women, but 
mostly shift children from informal care to formal care. Formal and informal care 
are close substitutes. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on estimating the price elasticities of childcare in the 
UK with respect to its use and labour force participation. The knowledge of the 
childcarc price elasticities is crucial in the formulation of effective childcare 
policies. T'he estimation results showed that, as expected, childcare price has a 
significant, negative effect on the probability of working and use of formal modes 
of childcare. Ile estimation relies on simultaneously modelling the use of 
childcarc and the labour force participation of the mother. This method reflects the 
interrelated nature of the childcare choice and the labour force participation 
decision. Simultaneously accounting for non-random selection into use of formal 
childcare and cmplo)mlcnt, the estimated childcare price elasticity with respect to 
employment is -0.17 and with respect to the use of formal childcare is -0.09. 
11cricc the demand for childcarc is relatively inelastic. 
Furthcrmorc, this knowledge allows the simulation of different childcare 
policies. Bascline simulations, 50.7% for labour force participation and 28.1% for 
the use or childcarc. come very close to replicating the observed participation and 
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use or rormal childcarc rates (50.5% and 27.4%, respectively). The simulation 
results show that if there were a univcmal zcro-cost childcare available to the 
mothers in this sarnplc the model predicts that 76.1% would be employed while 
only 44.811-ý would be using formal childcarc. Almost a third of the mothers are 
hence predicted to use informal care when they work- even if childcare were 
provided free of charge. 
The results indicate sensitivity of female labour supply to the price of childcare. 
The policy-rclcvancc of this topic is closely related to current government policy, 
for example, the Working Tax Credit (WTQ. This policy relies heavily on a very 
elastic demand for childcarc. 'Me childcarc component of the NVTC distributes 
low-income working individuals money to be used for the payment of childcare. 
Ho%%, cvcr, the decision to become employed depends on the characteristics of the 
individual as well as their wage and the price of the available childcare. 
Unfortunately this data does not cover the time period when the WTC has taken 
Cffect, however, the elasticity figures in this paper may give some indication of the 
likely impact of such policies. 
Chapter 4 moves away from analysing the UK childcare markets and instead 
examines the childcarc policies adopted in Finland. The Finnish childcare policy 
has traditionally relied on heavy public provision of formal childcare services. 
However, the escalating costs of universal public childcare provision led the policy 
makers' to introduce faccts; of competitive markets in the publicly provided model 
of childcarc provision. This chapter examines the ways this competitive 
component, a private childcarc voucher, affected the use of childcare and the labour 
force participation of mothers of young children. This study has examined the 
206 
impact of a private childcarc voucher on the labour force participation of mothers 
of prc-school age children and their use of formal childcarc using an experimental 
set-up. 
The results for the mothers of 3-6 year olds indicate that even with widely 
available high-quality, low-cost public childcare, a voucher for private childcare 
has a significant positive impact for the use of formal childcare, especially in areas 
that suffer from excess demand for childcarc services. The use of formal childcare 
increased by between 3 and 6 percentage points in the whole country while in areas 
of excess demand the increase was approximately 14 percentage points. Labour 
force participation of mothers of older pre-school age children increased by over 5 
percentage points in areas of excess demand. 
I'lic elasticity estimates of the private childcare subsidy indicate that an increase 
in the average amount of the private childcarc voucher had a small but significant 
impact on the use of formal childcarc. This impact is expected since the price of 
childcare overall is relatively low. The small impact of the amount of the voucher 
on the use of childcare may indicate that the most important effect of the private 
childcarc voucher was to lower the barriers to entry into the childcare market for 
the potential suppliers of private childcare. Therefore it can be argued that the most 
important effect of the voucher was to boost private enterprise in the childcare 
market and hence increase the overall supply. Once the private provision of 
childcarc was available, the customers started using the private childcare provision 
regardless of the price they had to pay for it. 
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Policy makers struggling %%ith excess demand for childcare can use the 
estimates of private childcarc voucher experiment in Finland to guidc their choiccs 
regarding their childcarc policies. Finland has a large, low-cost public childcare 
sector unlike many other Wcstcm economics. Hcncc it is reasonablc to expect that 
a similar arrangement in the UK uill have an even larger impact on the variables of 
intcrcsL 
The currcnt childcarc pro%ision in the UK is very fragmented with a large 
variation in the availability of childcarc provision between one local authority and 
another. The diversity in the childcare services in the UK may partly be a 
consequence of the divides in government responsibility for childcare services9'. It 
might be possible to achieve efficiency gains by concentrating all the pre-school 
services to one responsible government office. One office that is responsible for all 
the childcarc provision can better formulate policies that attempt to increase the 
proýision of childcarc and its quality. Tle currcn% fragmented policy formulation 
may lead to more inequality in the long run by concentrating on small segments of 
the society. Small steps have been taken towards bringing the different children's 
seniccs together (Every child matters, 2003) as well as raising the image and status 
of childcarc work and recruiting more personnel into the childcare field. 
Recent policy discussion in the UK involves increased reliance on employer- 
supportcd childcarc, for cx=plc, the use of childcare vouchers provided by 
cmploycrs that arc frcc of tax and national insurance (Inland Rcvcnue, 2003). 
Ilowcvcr, this Policy may not have a large cffect on the UK childcare markets if 
"' For example. the Department of I lealth bas supported day nurseries that had the primary role of 
providing care for socisHy. emotionally. or materially deprived children aged 0-5. On the other hand. the Department for Education and Skills has concentrated on providing nursery schools and 
nursery classes or reception classes in primary schools. 
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potential childearc pro%idcrs rind it difficult to enter the market place. The high 
cntry costs, %%hich arc partly due to heavy regulation regarding the childcare 
prcmises, arc oflcn quotcd as the rcason for the lack of suppliers in the childcare 
markct. 
Furthermore, the survey of childcarc providers in the UK discussed in Chapter 
I indicates that many childcarc pro%iders arc constrained in the provision of their 
services due to staffing constraints and constraints on the available facilities. It 
may be desirable that the govcrnment participates in the building of childcare 
facilities either directly or by gi%ing the providers tax breaks or subsidies. The 
survey of childcarc workers and students indicates that the majority of current and 
future childcarc employees are eager to work in the field. However, the low wages 
in the profession deter them from remaining in the profession for long. 
In the summer of 12002 Gordon Bro%vn announced the doubling of government 
childcare expenditure by 2005-6. However, by international standards this higher 
level of spending would still fall short of the OECD average of 0.7% of GDP spent 
on childcarc. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the childcare policies depends on 
whCther the subsidies or tax breaks arc provided for the supply or the demand side 
of the market. Evidence in Chapter 3 indicates that demand side subsidies in the 
UK would have a very small effect on both the use of childcare and the labour 
force participation of mothers of pre-school age children. 
The main policy recommendation based on this thesis includes the introduction 
of a private childcarc vouchcr, which is independent of parental income. The 
Finnish experience presented in Chapter 4 indicates that this arrangement affected 
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both the supply and the demand sidc of the market. As a result of the voucher 
private cntrcprencurs received the necessary incentive to enter a market place with 
many competitors (large public sector provision) and high barriers to entry (tight 
regulation) by differcrttiating their product from that of their competitors (more 
specialiscd childcam). Chapter 4 indicates that this differentiated product was 
appealing cnough for the consumers and some previously non-employed mothers 
entered the labour forcc as a consequence. 
Prc-school childcare provision is a topic that deserves further research for 
several reasons. First, high quality childcarc may provide the earliest possible 
starting date for reducing inequalities in children's later outcomes that may be due 
to. for examplcý low parental income. Very few studies have looked into the 
impact of the modc of childcarc on the children's later outcomes on one hand 
because of the lack of appropriate dam and on the other hand because it is difficult 
to disentangle the impact of childcarc per se on a child outcome at a later date. 
Second, access to affordable childcare may reduce the wage gap between 
mothers and childless women by allowing the former to continue employment after 
childbearing. It is desirable that women. who arc often highly educated, have the 
option to continue employment after childbearing to reduce the impact of the time 
outside of the labour market on, for example, wage growth or job tenure. For the 
same reason, it may also reduce the gender wage gap. In general countries with a 
large affordable childcarc sector also exhibit the lowest gender wage gaps. 
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APPENDIX ONE: UK CHILDCARE SYSTEM 
The Children Act of 1989 was implemented on 14 October 1991 and it changed 
the legal framework for the provision and registration of day care facilities in the 
UK. All childcare services (childminders, playgroups, and day nurseries) are, as a 
result, required to be registered with the local authority (Social Services 
Department) under the Children Act 1989 (Part X), most of which are subject to an 
annual inspection. However, services with a grant for nursery education are also 
inspected every four years under the Nursery Education and Grant Maintained 
Schools Act of 1996. The Children Act governs premises and staffing levels 93 
Local maintained nursery schools, primary schools with nursery classes and 
independent schools are subject to inspection by Office for Standard in Education 
(OFSTED) under the Schools Inspection Act 1996. From 2001 onwards, there 
should be a single inspection for all of above by OFSTED. Unregistered services 
include, for example, nannies or au pairs94. OFSTED inspects maintained schools 
providing nursery education under the School Inspection Act of 1996. 
Factors that influence mothers' decision to become employed: 1/3 financial 
necessity (59% for lone mothers versus 29% for partnered women), 18% financial 
independence, 25% said intrinsic interest in work, 42% of mothers with no 
qualifications said socialisation (La Valle ct al., 2000). The reasons for mothers 
staying home include: lack of family friendly and flexible work arrangements, 
perception of low employability, financial considerations, for example, loss of 
"' Children Act covers children aged eight and under in cases where more than two hours of 
childcare per day are regularly provided. The staff-child ratios are: 1: 3 for 0-2 yrs, 1: 4 for 2-3 yrs, 1: 8 for 3-8 yrs. 
94 A survey by Finlayson et al. (1996) found that 2% of working mothers with dependent children 
use nannies. 
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benefits, 25% said lack of affordable and adequate childcare. The likelihood of 
paid employment riscs steadily with the age of the youngest child from 45% for 
year olds to 78% for 16-18 year old children's mothers (Paull and Taylor, 2002). 
There is no sudden increase in cmployTnent when the youngest child starts school. 
However, they do not take into account that the ones who may be really 
constrained in their cmplo)mcnt due to childcare put their child to an early 
education class at primary school before the official school starting age. Paull and 
Taylor (2002) further find that the total costs of childcare rather than age related 
costs are most important affecting the propensity to work of the mother. 66% of 
surveyed mothers said they would work- if there was quality affordable childcare. 
90% of mothers expect government and employers to do more to help working 
families. 36% of respondents said they had difficulty paying for childcare. 18% of 
parents would like to work term and school time only so they could look after their 
children themselves (La Valle et al., 2000). 
Callender (2000) finds that demand for formal childcare in the UK is influenced 
by local availability of childmindcr places and out-of-school club places. 
Finlayson ct al. (1996) examine UK surveys with nationally representative 
estimates of patterns of childcarc use and family spending on childcare. 95 They 
report a rise in the pcrccntage of mothers using childcare in the 1990's. The 
increase in the use of formal care is due to the increased use of childcare by 
inarried mothers while lone parents' use has remained stable. They find that 55% 
of working mothers in 1994 used informal forms of childcare. Family spending on 
childcare has riscn bctwccn 1991 and 1994 controlling for wage inflation; V4 of 
9' These arc large (over 3000 families with working mothers) postal surveys from 1991,1992, and 1994 that were carried out as part of the Policy Studies Institute/Department of Social Security 
Programme into Low Income Fan-Oics (PRILIF). 
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mothers who work pay for childcare and that cost has increased by 26%. Average 
hourly cost of childcarc has increascd from ELIO in 1991 to fl. 54 in 1994, which 
is a significant increase controlling for wage inflation. 49% of parents had paid for 
the childcare used in last wcck (40% for fees and wages only). Median childcare 
costs were E19 per week for those who paid. Possible reasons that mothers pay 
more for childcare per weck and per hour worked include: 1) increase in the 
consumption of childcare, which raises the price of limited supply, 2) increase in 
the prefercnccs for higher quality care, 3) increase in use of fonnal care, 4) increase 
in the number of hours worked by mothers, and 5) increase in the unit costs of 
childcare unrelated to demand side factors. The impact of mother's earnings on 
childcarc choices is found to be greater than that of other family income in the UK 
hcncc policies affecting mother's income are likely to be more effective (Paull and 
Taylor, 2002). 
In 1991,37% of families used parental care, while 13% supplemented parental 
care with other forms of free care provided by other family and friends. Y2 used 
some form of formal care, of which V4was free. 40% of families paid for childcare 
(Duncan and Giles, 1996) 96. In the late 1990's, 86% used some form of childcare 
in the last year while 57% used some form in the last week. 47% of 0-2 yr olds 
97 
received some form of care last week (La Valle et al., 2000) . Usage the week 
prior to the survey was highest for lone parents with full-time employment at 77%, 
and for couples where both parents are employed at 70%. Use of childcare is 
highest among families with non-manual jobs and for those in higher income 
"6 Duncan and Giles (1996) use childcarc information in the 1991-92 GHS with a sample of 128,8 
households urith at least one prc-school age child. 
17 La Valle et al. (2000) examine the parents' demand for childcare by using the results from a 13aseline Survey of Parents' Demand for Childcare for children aged 14 and under in England and Wales. 
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groups. 34 )T olds wcrc most likcly to have received formal care. Childcare used 
was most likely to be informal and most often by grandparents. In 1994 67% of 
married mothers used any childcarc, while 23% use professional childcare, with 
11% using childmindcr services, 5% nursery or cr&he, and 6% nursery schools or 
playgroups (Finlayson ct al., 1996). 
Day Care Trust (1997) estimates that registered childcare services for pre- 
school and school age children cater for an estimated I in 9 children less than 8. 
Volumc in some services is declining (LA day nurseries, playgroups, childmindcrs) 
while others are growing rapidly (private and voluntary sector day nurseries, after 
school clubs, holiday schemes). Randall and Fisher (1999) find that the provision 
of local authority provided care is highest in London and lowest in non- 
metropolitan counties, however, including private provision, the counties offered 
the highest number of places while metropolitan boroughs offered the fewest 
number of places. 
Munton et al. (2001) examine how quality assurance and quality improvement 
schemes are being used in childcare in day nursenes, out-of-school clubs and 
Childminding nctwork-s. Most accreditation on childcare quality concerns the 
promotion of health and safety as well as equal opportunities. Only 12% of 
nurseries have tak-cn part in any accreditation scheme. The childcare providers that 
were more likely to have gone for accreditation were more likely to be larger 
facilities (more than 30 places) and to have been open for less than five years. 
Registered childmindcrs arc self-employed child carer workers who look after 
the children in their own home. They must be registered with the local authority 
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(LA) and inspcctcd oncc a )=. Childmindcrs can care for up to six children aged 
under eight of whom no more than three must be aged under five, at any one time. 
They are limited to one or two babies at one time. On average, childminders look 
after three children %ith the average age of 2.4 years (Callender, 2000). The 
childminders set the charges themselves and there is no national rate, however, 
most charge between f 60 and f 120 per child per week for full-time care. The 
average price at the national level reported by the Day Care Trust is E88.87., 
For many parcnts, childmindcrs arc seen as a more flexible and affordable 
option than a nurscry, for cxample, by providing care all year around for the full 
adult working day. Childminding is a major source of employment in the field of 
childcare. According to a study by Thomas Coram Research Unit, childminders 
are the main pro%iders of formal childcare accounting for nearly a quarter of 
children receiving non-parental formal care. However, the number of childminders 
has fallen in the recent years. Knight ct al. (2001) quote possible reasons for the 
decreasing number of childminders as: lack of support for childminding at the local 
authonty level, low pay and poor status of work, increased regulatory demands and 
increased provision of places by other modes of childcare. According to the 
National Childminding Association, 70% of childminders have no relevant 
qualifications; for looking aftcr children and 23% have no qualifications at all. The 
average gross weekly income for childminders in late 1990's was f 103. 
Preschool playgroups usually provide play and education sessions lasting about 
to thrcc hours pcr day. Thcy arc also registered and inspected by LA. Some 
provide free carly cducation and arc inspected by OFSTED. Playgroups usually 
care for children aged 2 V, to 5 )Ts. At least half the staff must be trained to work 
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uith children. Rccommcndation is that there is one member of staff for every eight 
children aged three to fivc and one adult for every four children aged two to three. 
Most arc run on a sclf-hclp basis by groups of parents with 1-2 paid staff, while 
some arc run by the local authority. Playgroups tend to develop in areas with little 
childcare provision. Around 90% of playgroup places involve some cost or 
charges. Preschool playgroup costs between L2 to 0 per session. 56% of 
playgroups and pre-school schemes are run by voluntary organizations. Playgroups 
cater 24 yr olds and while school-age children are mostly looked after in out-of - 
school provision. 
Nurseries look aflcr and educate children aged 0-5. They are registered and 
inspected by the LA. There are different types of nurseries: private, local authority, 
community (non-prorit), and work-place. 77% of day nurseries are run by private 
sector. Majority of public nurseries are provided by Local Education Authority 
(62%), private or independent schools (22Vo), and community or voluntary 
organisations (10%) (Blak-c et al., 2000,2001). At least half the staff must be 
trained. Staffing levels arc: one member of staff for every child between three to 
five years old, one for every four childrcn aged two to three and one for every three 
children aged under two. Day nurseries primarily look after babies and children up 
to four years old (Callender, 2000). Most nurseries provide between 26 and 40 
places. The expected price per child per week is between E80 and E180 and the 
average price for full-time care for a hw-ycar old is El 10.49 (Daycare Trust). 
Registered day nurseries in the private and voluntary sector a. k. a. independent 
or registered day nurseries, offer day care for children aged 0-4 and are largely 
dependent on parental fees and more recently, the nursery education grants, which 
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have experienced a rapid growth. Independent/registered day nurseries are a 
primary source of employment for childcare workers or nursery nurses. On 
average, the heads of nurseries had thirteen years of experience and other staff 6 
years. 22% of heads and 33% of other staff had no childcare qualifications. Gross 
hourly pay for childcare workers varies from less than 0 for playgroup workers to 
E17 for nursery teachers (Daycare Trust, 1997). 
Blake et al. (2000,2001) examine mostly nursery education and say that one is 
more likely to attend nursery education coming from higher social classes. In 
1997,19% of 3 year olds and I I% of 4 year olds attended childcare in the week 
before the interview (in 1999, these figures were 21% and 15%, respectively). 
Participation in different types of nursery education varies by the age of the child, 
for example, playgroups and preschools are most common for younger children, 
reception classes for older children and nursery classes for the mid age groups. 
The younger children are more likely to attend part-time. 52% of parents thought 
there were not enough places providing nursery education in the area (48% said not 
enough places in general, 36% said trouble finding place, 25% not enough choice 
in provision, 19% not enough state provision). Importantly, 52% of parents 
surveyed thought there were not enough information available to help them choose 
a place. 52% thought the education in local area was excellent or good (white 
parents were more likely to rate the care as good). Only 2% described it as not 
very or at all good. 28% of nursery school users paid education fees, and 53% paid 
for meals and refreshments. Parents were least likely to pay anything in reception 
classes in which 41% paid nothing, in nursery classes 29% paid nothing while in 
day nurseries only 8% paid nothing. Among those who had some or all education 
229 
fees paid for, the fees were paid for by LEA (69%) or DSS (10%). 25% of parents 
said that the costs restricted the amount of nursery education their child received 
(more common for low income families). The average distance to nursery school 
was 2.4 miles. 21% of parents reported that choice of nursery education was 
restricted by means of transport. The priorities when parents choose the provider 
include: 49% if local, 30% if easy to get to, 41% if good reputation, 30% if sibling 
has same provider. 
A further option is early education and nursery classes at schools. They are 
part of primary or independent schools and the places are usually for three and four 
year olds. Some are private and some are provided by the state. The staffing levels 
for early education classes are 2 members of staff to 20 children with at least one 
adult being a qualified teacher and the other a qualified nursery assistant for 
nursery schools. The nursery class staffing levels are 2 adults to 26 children. 
Nursery schools and classes are open from 9 am to 3.30pm and are likely to close 
for school holidays, hence working parents need to find supplementary care. 
Nursery schools and reception classes for 4 year olds at primary schools are most 
likely to be free of charge and are also the most common type of care used. 
230 
APPENDIX TWO: FINNISH FAMILY POLICY AND CHILDCARE SYSTEM 
The 450 municipalities are responsible for providing social and health care 
services including childcare in a country with a population of 5.1 million 
inhabitants or 1.4 million families, of which 635,000 have children present (about 
18% of these are single parent families). The childcare services are funded with 
local taxes levied by the municipalities and with the subsidies allocated to them by 
the state. The customers using social and health care services also pay additional, 
although small, fees. 
In 1948, child allowance system was introduced, however, childcare was 
mostly provided at home by mothers or nannies, or at private childcare centres. In 
the 1960's, as female employment started booming shortages in the childcare 
services appeared. Hence, in 1973, the government introduced the Children's Day 
Care Act, which placed responsibility for the pre-school childcare on the 
municipalities. 
In 1990, parents were entitled to unconditional childcare for children under the 
age of three either at a childcare centre or by receiving child home care allowance. 
In 1996, the entitlement to municipal childcare was expanded to include the parents 
of all pre-school age children (less than seven). After the childcare voucher 
experiment, which ran from 31.5.1995 until 31.7.1997, the voucher was introduced 
nationally and parents had the option of receiving financial support for arranging 
private childcare for their children. 
Public childcare services are funded by local taxes levied by the municipalities 
with the subsidies allocated by the state. The customers using social and health 
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care services also pay additional, although small, means-tested fees. VATT (1995) 
reports that in 1993 all governmental aid to families with children (including tax 
deductions) amounted to 5.6% of the GDP, of which 24% is spent on childcare and 
12% on the home care allowance. Parents pay about 12% of the cost of public 
childcare; the fees are means-tested and range from 65 to 241 euros per child per 
year in 5 increments determined by the municipality. The municipality also decides 
the level of income below which childcare is provided free of charge. Family 
benefits in 1997 came to about 4.2 billion euros i. e. about 4% of GDP. Table Al 
shows the distribution of family benefits in 1997. 
Table Al: Distribution of family benefits in Finland (1997) 
Child allowance 33.1 
Daycare 32.8 
Parental allowances 10.8 
Child home care allowance 8.1 
Private childcare allowance 0.2 
Housing allowance 5.0 
Maintenance allowance 1.9 
Home help 0.8 
Institutional carefor children andyoungpeople 3.1 
Other 4.2 
Maternity leave in Finland is 105 working days and an employee has the 
right to return to the same or equivalent position at the end of the maternity leave. 
At the end of the maternity leave either parent can take up paid parental leave for a 
maximum of 158 working days for first child and 60 days for each additional child. 
Paternity leave can be used during the maternity leave or parental leave for a 
maximum of 18 working days taken in a maximum of four periods. The paternity 
leave can be extended by 1-12 working days if the father uses the minimum of 12 
days at the end of the parental leave. Home care allowance can be taken up at the 
end of the parental leave period and lasts until the child turns three years without 
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affecting the employment status at return to work. All these benefits depend on 
previous wages or are set for the previously unwaged. 
In September 1997, the Ministry for Social and Health Services (1998) 
interviewed 1/3 of all municipality representatives. They summarise that 46% of 
all pre-school age children are in municipality provided childcare and of those 
about 80% are in full-time care and 64% are in nurseries while 36% are cared for 
by a childminder. However, there are large differences by the age of the child. In 
1995, a quarter of 1-2 year olds were in childcare provided by the municipality and 
over 70% were taken care of at home using the home-care allowance (Takala, 
2000). Heikkild and Takala (1999) show statistics that only 2% of babies (less than 
one year olds) are in formal childcare arrangements. 
In 1997, the private childcare allowance was adopted nationally. It amounts to 
117.73 euros per month per child as a lump sum plus a means-tested component 
worth up to 134.55 euros per month. The allowance is paid to the private producer 
of the care. The producer of the private care cannot be a relative (in which case the 
family should use the home care allowance) and the receipt of the private care 
allowance requires a contract to exist between the family and the producer of care. 
The private care allowance is taxed through the producer of the care. 
At the same time the home care allowance was worth 252.28 euros per month 
plus 84.09 euros per month for each child under three and 50.46 euros per month 
for any 3-6 year old sibling. On top of this lump sum fee, a means-tested 
component of maximum value of 168.19 euros per month is paid depending on the 
family's income. Hence the home care allowance is worth up to C250 more per 
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month than the childcare voucher. The municipality of residence in some cases 
pays an additional subsidy on top of these payments. The home care allowance can 
be used to hire a nanny to take care of the children at home. Furthermore, the 
home care allowance is taxable income. 
Municipality provided public care cost a maximum of 200 euros per month for 
the first child and a maximum of 180 euros for the second child. Each additional 
child pays a fee that is proportional to the total cost of childcare provision. The 
public care is means-tested in the whole country. 
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APPENDIX FOUR: FAMILY RESOURCES SURVEY 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is conducted using five 
waves of the Family Resources Survey (FRS). This data covers the fiscal years 
1993/4-1997/8. The FRS is an annual cross-sectional survey of around 26,000 
British households each year, which is launched by the Department of Social 
Security for policy monitoring and evaluation as well as benefit expenditure 
forecasting. The benefits of using the FRS include large swnple sizes and inclusion 
of detailed questions relating to the labour market activity and childcare use and 
other characteristics of the family as well as benefits and childcare take-up and 
expenditure. 
The childcare section of the FRS provides infonnation for each dependant child 
on who looks after the child with multiple responses permitted with following 
options: close relative (partner and other children etc. ), other relative, 
friend/neighbour, childminder, nursery/playgroup, creche, other (nannies, au pairs, 
after-school and school-holiday clubs). For each child and per type- of care there 
are questions on the hours of childcare used separately for the holiday and tenn 
time, the payment for childcare if any, and the amount spent each week during term 
and holiday period. The information on parental employment is collected at the 
time of the survey. 
In my analysis the FRS is augmented with a local authority (LA) level data on 
the availability of different types of childcare as recorded by the annual Department 
of Health publications "Children's Day Care Facilities". Figures are collected on 
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day nurseries, childminders, playgroups, out of school clubs and family centres as 
well as playgroup sessions on a voluntary basis (first year for playgroups). The 
statistics in these publications are compiled from surveys completed by each LA in 
England on 31 March of each year. All LA's are required to keep records of day 
care services that have to be registered and inspected under the Children Act 
(1989). The majority of LA's submitted the data for all years. 
Information is collected for each of the 109 LA's on the following that are 
relevant for this analysis (the data is also collected for school age children but this 
information is not used in my analysis): number of day nurseries and places for 
children aged under five, number of playgroups and places for children aged three 
to five, number of childminders and places for children aged under five. All of 
these statistics are calculated as places provided per 10,000 of the relevant age 
population for each childcare setting. The Department of Health statistics are 
merged into the FRS at the local authority level98 . FRS 
does not provide a big 
enough sample size for smaller regions that could be appropriate for the analysis. 
The Department of Health statistics on day care facilities do not cover 
unregulated and informal forms of childcare such as nannies, or care by relatives or 
by unregistered childminders. However, Moss et al. (1998) regard these statistics 
as the most comprehensive source of national data on the supply of childcare 
regardless. Furthermore, Childcare Information Services collects data on childcare 
services and its cost in particular (only approximately 40 LA's provide this 
98 There is a problem with the reorganization of LA's into unitary authorities (see Paull and Taylor 
2002 p. IS). 
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infonnation). Of the continuous household surveys only General Household 
Survey (GHS) in 1991 and FRS have included questions on childcare. These 
surveys include no information on parental preferences for the mode of childcare or 
on the unmet need for childcare. 
A possible drawback of FRS is that not all households with children are routed 
to answer the questions about childcare. Only women who work or have a working 
partner are asked the questions of whether they use childcare, which makes the 
analysis potentially non-representative of the non-working families. 
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APPENDIX FIVE: VOUCHER EXPERIMENT (TREATED) 
Municipalities participating in the voucher experiment include: Askola, Espoo, 
Hattula, Hausjdrvi, Helsinki, HyvinkU, Ilomantsi, Joensuu (omitted), Jurva, Juva, 
Jyvdskyla, Kajaani (omitted), Karkkila, Kauhajoki, Kerava (omitted), 
Kirkkonummi (omitted), Kontiolahti, Kuusamo, Leppqvirta, Liperi, Loppi, 
M! ints5ld, Mikkeli (omitted), Nurmijarvi, Polvijarvi, Pyhdselkd, Rauma, 
Rovaniemi, Sipoo, Tampere, Tuusula, Vantaa. (omitted), Virolahti. 
Some of the municipalities are omitted from the analysis since their voucher 
experiment differed from the majority. For example, Mikkeli, Kirkkonummi, and 
Joensuu had a voucher for childcare in place already in 1994, however, their 
voucher experiment was not perfect since not all childcare places were open for 
competition. 
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Geographically the municipalities are distributed as indicated by the darkened 
areas in the following map. 
APPENDIX SIX: INCOME DISTRIBUTION SURVEY 
The data used in Chapter 4 comes from the Income Distribution Survey" 
(referred to as IDS) from 1994 until 1997. The IDS is a rotating panel survey 
interviewing 10,000 households per year. Each household is interviewed for two 
consecutive years. The interview data is linked with data from administrative 
registers, for example, on income and subsidies. All the data is provided on an 
annual basis, for example, employment participation is reported as months per year. 
The information on the municipality of residence is not released in the IDS due 
to confidentiality reasons. Instead Statistics Finland has, on request, created 
dummies to identify the experimental regions including any variation in the type of 
voucher. 
99 Tulonjakotilasto in Finnish. 
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